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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of plaintiff s adjustments to
company book value, contrary to the shareholder agreement that book value would be
established by the company's year-end audited financial statement.
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Lee v. Barnes, 1999 UT App 126, ^ 7,
977 P.2d 550.
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised by objection of defense counsel at trial
(Trial Transcript, hereafter "Tr.," 256-57, 264), as well as by pretrial motion in limine
(Tr. 1-8), and pretrial motion to compel discovery (R. 141, 165-68).
2. Whether the trial court erred in altering the special verdict question on company
book value of stock, after reading the jury's verdict, to support the court's own view of the
evidence.
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr.,
701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1985).
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved through contemporaneous
objections by defense counsel (Tr. 990, 994), as well as through post-trial objections to
the proposed judgment (R. 278, 340).
3. Whether the trial court erred in awarding plaintiff all requested attorney fees,
without apportionment for nonrecoverable fees and without supporting findings of fact.

Standard of Review: Correction of error. Miller v. Martineau & Co., 1999 UT
App 216, m 28, 46,983 P.2d 1107.
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised by post-trial motion. (R. 284, 331.)
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 38(a), 47(r) and (q), 49(a), and 59(a), and U.C.A. §§
78-21-1 to -3, reproduced verbatim in the Addendum, are relevant to analysis of the
issues presented. (Add. 96.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a dispute between the plaintiff, Roger Eggett ("Eggett"), and
his former employer, Wasatch Energy Corporation ("Wasatch" or the "Company"), over
the book value of stock for which Eggett claimed payment upon termination of his
employment. (R. 1.) The issue was tried to a jury. Wasatch argued that Eggett agreed to
be bound by the book value set forth in the company's audited financial statement.
However, the trial court permitted Eggett to present evidence of alleged "adjustments" to
vary the audited financial statement, all going to the total book value of company stock to
which Eggett's ownership percentage would be applied to calculate the amount owed to
Eggett.
The jury returned a special verdict, finding a book \dX\xtfor the entire company of
$135,672. (R. 267, Question 5, Add. 8.) After reading the verdict answer, however, the
trial judge, the Honorable David S. Young, sua sponte altered the verdict question to refer
only to the book value of Eggett1 s stock. (Tr. 988-95, Add. 11.) The court thereafter
2

entered judgment awarding Eggett the full $135,672, instead of only his 36.5% ownership
interest in the total Company equity. (R. 367, Add. 2.) The court also awarded Eggett
attorney fees, without reduction for nonrecoverable fees. (Supplemental Judgment,
unnumbered, R. Vol. II, Add. 4.) Wasatch appeals from both judgments. (R. 392,
Amended Notice of Appeal, unnumbered, R. Vol. II.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Formation and Operation of Wasatch Energy.
In 1993, Eggett formed Wasatch. Wasatch is a marketer and distributor of natural

gas, purchasing, pooling, and reselling gas from small producers who cannot efficiently
market the gas individually. Eggett began by working part-time out of his home. By
1995, he was working full-time and had hired two employees, Todd Cusick and Curtis
Chisholm. (Complaint, R. 1-2; Tr. 107-11, 130.)
On April 13, 1995, Eggett, Cusick, and Chisholm entered into a Shareholders'
Agreement ("Agreement"). (Trial Exhibit, "Exh.," 1, Add. 20.) Eggett also signed the
Agreement as president of the corporation. This Agreement set forth the shares of
Company stock allotted to each of the three employees, with Eggett as the majority
shareholder. Paragraph 2 of the Agreement provided that, upon the termination of
employment of any shareholder, the remaining shareholders or corporation would have
the option to purchase the stock of the terminating shareholder. Paragraph 3 of the
Agreement set the purchase price for the stock of the terminating shareholder as the
"Book Value" of the stock. If the termination was "for cause," however, the purchase
3

price would be the price paid for the stock by the terminating shareholder, or "par value."
Paragraph 18(d) of the Agreement defined "Book Value" as the net shareholders1 equity
of the corporation as certified in the Company's year-end "audited financial statements."
Such certified "Book Value," by the express terms of the Agreement, was to be "binding
and conclusive upon the parties." (Add. 28; Tr. 112-17.)
In late April 1995, to obtain additional capital to expand the business, Wasatch
arranged for Magna Energy International ("MEI") to invest in the Company. Thereafter,
the Wasatch Board of Directors consisted of Eggett, Cusick, Chisholm and two
representatives from MEI, Keith Painter and Dennis Fox. To protect its investment, MEI
insisted that decisions related to payroll, debt, and equity be approved by four-fifths of the
Wasatch board, giving MEI supervisory control over financial matters. However, as
Company president, Eggett retained personal control over operating expenditures,
including actual payment of salaries, profit sharing, and reimbursement of personal
expenses. From 1995 to 1997, Wasatch's sales volume increased significantly, and the
number of employees increased to thirteen. (Tr. 121-25, 379-81, 529-30, 592, 756-57.)
This business growth and MEFs control led to various management disputes
between Eggett and Wasatch. These disputes pertained primarily to management
structure and financial decisions, including Eggett's level of compensation. (Tr. 125-32;
170-97, 208-50, 316-40, 388-430, 470-80, 529-33, 756-70.)

4

B.

Termination of Employment
Unable to resolve these disputes, Eggett submitted a letter of resignation, dated

April 15, 1997. (Exh. 3, Add. 31.) By this letter, Eggett resigned immediately from his
positions as Wasatch president, board member, and chairman of the board of directors. In
addition, he terminated his employment with Wasatch effective July 14, 1997. Citing the
Shareholders' Agreement, Eggett offered to sell his Wasatch stock "for the audited Book
Value as of June 30, 1997," the date of the Company's fiscal-year-end audit. In a letter
dated April 25, 1997, Wasatch formally accepted Eggett's resignation. (Exh. 4, Add. 32;
Tr. 132-38,141-42,895-96.)
In a letter dated May 1, 1997, Wasatch informed Eggett that it was changing his
status from employee to consultant and conducting an audit of certain Company accounts.
(Exh. 6.) The subsequent audit report, dated May 9, 1997 and prepared by MEI's outside
accountant, revealed that Eggett had taken from the Company unauthorized compensation
and reimbursements for personal expenses in the approximate amount of $185,000. (Exh.
38, Add. 37.) Based on this excessive compensation and other grounds, Wasatch
terminated Eggett's employment "for cause" by letter dated May 16, 1997. (Exh. 7, Add.
33.) Because Eggett was terminated for cause, Wasatch subsequently tendered to Eggett
a check for the par value of his Company stock, in the amount of $1,217. (Exh. 8, Add.
36.) However, Eggett rejected the offer, and his shares of stock were subsequently
canceled on the Company books. (Tr. 146-51, 347-52, 388, 435-54, 470-505, 509-10,
597-618, 642, 712-14, 723-28, 744-48, 773-86, 845.)
5

C.

Legal Action and Trial.
Eggett subsequently commenced this action, claiming the right to additional

compensation for 1997, as well as a right to the book value of his Company stock.
(Complaint,ffl[14, 19, R. 3-4.) Eggett alleged that the book value of his stock,
comprising 36.5 percent of the Company's outstanding shares, was $80,000. (Complaint,
Tf 20, R. 4.) Wasatch counterclaimed for refund of Eggett's unauthorized compensation
and benefits in the approximate amount of $175,000. (R. 17-25.) The parties presented their competing claims in a jury trial, with Judge Young presiding. (R. 255-66.)
On the issue of compensation, Eggett asserted a right to 10 percent of Company
profits for 1997, claiming unpaid profit sharing in the total amount of $66,688. (Exh. 26,
p. 5, Add. 50; Tr. 252-55, 894.) Wasatch argued that Company net income for that year
was only $57,224, and that Eggett was accordingly entitled to a maximum profit sharing
payment of only $5700. (Exh. 42, p. 4, Add. 64; Tr. 573, 980.) The jury awarded Eggett
additional compensation of only $11,888. (Special Verdict, Questions 1 and 2, R. 266,
Add. 7.) Wasatch does not challenge that portion of the verdict and, indeed, believes that
this jury resolution bears on the issues before this Court on appeal.
On the separate issue of payment for Eggett's stock, the jury found that Eggett was
entitled to the book value of the stock, implicitly finding that Eggett was not terminated
for cause. The jury also found that the book value of Eggett's stock should be determined
as of June 30, 1997, the date of the Company's year-end audited financial statement.

6

than his own self-serving testimony, in support of his adjustments to the Company's
audited financial statement. In fact, Eggett conceded that the Company's audited
statement for June 30, 1997 was prepared in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles, and that retroactive adjustments to estimates for reserves and
contingencies would be contrary to those principles. (Tr. 890, 290-92.) Further, both the
Company's chief financial officer and its independent auditor, representing Ernst &
Young, testified that Eggett's retroactive adjustments to the audited statement were
unjustified and violated generally accepted accounting principles. (Tr. 570-79, 653-70.)
Eggett admitted that his book value calculation was substantially different from the
audited statement and, therefore, was outside the terms of the Shareholders' Agreement,
but nonetheless he asked the jury to award him "what is fair and just." (Tr. 313-15.)
D.

Jury Verdict As Rendered and Revised.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial judge read the jury instructions and

special verdict form to the jury. Minor corrections were made to the special verdict form
to make it internally consistent; however, no objection or correction was made to
Question 5. (Tr. 925-29.) That question, following the formula used by both parties
during the trial, asked the jury to determine the total stockholder equity of the Company:
"On the date for evaluation of the shares that you selected above [June 30, 1997], what
was the 'book value' of Wasatch Energy as defined by the Shareholders Agreement?" (R.
267, Add. 8.) The clear intent of the parties, consistent with the trial formula, was to
multiply this total book value figure by Eggett's ownership interest of 36.5 percent to
9

obtain the book value of Eggett1 s stock, thus sparing the jury the math and avoiding any
risk of computational error.
The jury came back with the answer to Question 5, finding a total Company book
value of $135,671.96. (Id.) The jury was not asked to make, and did not make, any
determination as to what amount Eggett should be awarded as the book value for his
stock. Thereafter, on his own initiative and without any objection from Eggettfs counsel,
Judge Young suggested to the jury that its response to Question 5 was a "mistake," and
that the question should be altered to fit their answer. Over the objections of defense
counsel, the judge opined that the question was "confusing" and "ambiguous" because "I
don't know how they would have come up with the book value of that company at 135."
(Tr. 990, 993, 995, Add. 14, 17, 19.) The judge then polled the jury, asking through a
thoroughly confusing compound question whether Eggett was entitled to 36.5 percent of
$135,000 or to the full $135,000. Prompted by the trial court's expressed view of the
question, each juror answered "yes" to the judge's alternative question, leaving the judge
room to apply his own inference that they intended to award the full $135,000. (Tr. 99193.)
The court subsequently rejected Wasatch's objections to the proposed order, which
sought that the order conform to the actual verdict (R. 278, 340), and entered Judgment
for Eggett in the amount of the full $135,671.61. (R. 367-68, Add. 2.) The court
subsequently entered a Supplemental Judgment awarding Eggett costs and attorney fees
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as the prevailing party, (R. Unnumbered item filed April 7,2000, Add. 4.) Wasatch
appeals from both judgments. (R. 392, and unnumbered item filed April 13,2000.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The parties contractually agreed that the book value of Eggett's stock would be
"conclusively established" by the Company's audited financial statement. Courts are
bound to enforce contracts according to the parties5 intent. Extrinsic evidence is
inadmissible to alter or circumvent the terms of a clear contract. That substantive rule
applies as well to a stock buy out agreement, such as the Shareholders' Agreement here.
Moreover, Eggett makes no claim that the audited financial statement was not prepared in
accordance with accepted accounting practices. Accordingly, Eggett is bound by the
audited statement setting Company book value at $75,452, and the trial court erred by
admitting evidence of Eggett's adjustments to that figure. Eggett's 36.5 percent share of
that book value is $27,540.
Alternatively, the book value of Eggett's stock should be limited to $49,520,
which is 36.5 percent of $135,672, the Company book value found by the jury in response
to Special Verdict Question No. 5. Once the issue of Company book value went to the
jury, Wasatch was legally entitled to have that issue determined exclusively by the jury,
without intervention by Judge Young. Eggett's counsel never objected that Question No.
5 was ambiguous; therefore, any such objection is waived. Moreover, the question is
clear on its face, plainly asking for the book value of Wasatch Energy, following the
formula used by both parties at trial in calculating the book value of Eggett's stock.
11

Judge Young had no authority to question the jury's answer or to offer his own opinion
that the question was "confusing/' or that the answer was a "mistake" or not supported by
the evidence. If the amount awarded Eggett was considered inadequate or unsupported
by the evidence, the proper remedy was by motion for new trial, not by sua sponte
intervention of Judge Young. The judge plainly erred by altering the verdict question and
coercing the jury to accept the judge's own view of the evidence.
Finally, the trial court erred by awarding Eggett attorney fees without
apportionment for nonrecoverable fees and without adequate findings of fact. Attorney
fees are authorized only by the Shareholders' Agreement for the limited purpose of
enforcing that Agreement as to book value of Eggett's stock. Accordingly, Eggett is not
entitled to fees incurred in enforcing the separate Employment Agreement relating to his
compensation. The separate compensation and stock issues were treated separately
during discovery and trial, and case law requires that fees be apportioned between the two
claims. In the absence of apportionment and adequate supporting findings, the fee award
must be vacated. In addition, if Wasatch prevails on either of its arguments on appeal
relating to book value of Eggett's stock, Wasatch is entitled to fees and costs on appeal,
as well as to reduction of Eggett's fees and costs at trial.

12

ARGUMENT
POINT 1:

A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING EGGETT'S
ADJUSTMENTS TO COMPANY BOOK VALUE CONTRARY TO
THE PARTIES' CLEAR AGREEMENT THAT THE AUDITED
FINANCIAL STATEMENT CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED
BOOK VALUE.

Governing Legal Principles.
"In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are controlling." Winegar

v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). Accordingly, courts are required to
enforce contracts according to the intent of the parties as manifested by the clear language
of the contract itself. E.g., Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 294
(Utah App. 1994) ("trial court must give effect to the intentions of the parties"); Verhoef
v. Aston, 740 P.2d 1342, 1344 (Utah App. 1987) ("[contracts should be construed so as
to give effect to the parties' intentions"). A court is not free to disregard or rewrite a
contract simply because it may produce a result that appears unfair to one of the parties.
E.g., Dalton v. Jerico Constr. Co., 642 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 1982) ("it is not for a court to
rewrite a contract improvidently entered into at arm's length or to change the bargain
indirectly on the basis of supposed equitable principles"); Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd.,
618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980) ("A court will n o t . . . make a better contract for the
parties than they have made for themselves.").
Moreover, in construing a contract, a court is bound by the plain language of the
contract. Extrinsic evidence is not admissible to alter, augment, or circumvent the terms
of an unambiguous contract. E.g., Winegar, supra, at 108 (court may consider extrinsic
13

evidence only if the contract language is "ambiguous or uncertain"); Ron Case Roofing
and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989) ("use of
extrinsic evidence is permitted only if the document appears to incompletely express the
parties' agreement or if it is ambiguous in expressing that agreement"). For example, in
Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992), the defendant agreed to purchase
stock in the plaintiffs business for $900,000, with an option to purchase another building.
After the defendant stopped making payments, the plaintiff sued for the purchase price,
plus an additional $500,000 he claimed defendant promised if he failed to exercise the
option on the other building.
In a special verdict, the Brown jury found that the defendant had agreed to the
$500,000 increase, and the court entered judgment for that amount. However, the court
of appeals reversed, holding that the parties' written agreement set the purchase price at
$900,000, without mention of any additional amount for non-exercise of the option.
Evidence intended to vary the written terms of the agreement on the stock price was not
admissible. Accordingly, the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict on that issue,
and the question should not have been submitted to the jury. This Court vacated the trial
court's award for the purported increase in the stock price. Id. at 148.
The same rule applies in the context of employment and stock buyout agreements.
In Webb v. R.O.A. General Inc., 804 P.2d 547 (Utah App. 1991), the plaintiff entered
into a written employment contract by which he would serve as vice president and board
chairman and be paid $100,000 per year, plus one percent of annual net sales. In the
14

subsequent lawsuit over compensation, the company argued that the intent of the parties
was to pay only $85,000 in cash, with $15,000 in stock trades, and to pay the percentage
of sales only if funds were available. Id. at 551. The company's audited financial
statements showed accrued amounts for unpaid compensation. Id. at 550.
This Court held that evidence of the company's intent was inadmissible: "Courts
are not obligated to rewrite contracts entered into by parties dealing at arms' length, to
relieve one party from a bargain later regretted, simply on supposed equitable principles."
Id. at 551. Because the company's claim was "contrary not only to the terms of the
integrated employment contract, but also to its own business records . . . the trial court
correctly held that extrinsic evidence was inadmissible to vary the terms of the contract."
Id. at 552. See also Hall v. Process Instruments and Control Inc., 866 P.2d 604 (Utah
App. 1993), aff'd, 890 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1995) (trial court properly applied parol evidence
rule to exclude evidence outside the written employment agreement).
Similarly, in Swecker v. Rau, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3301 (D. Pa. 1990), the
parties organized a small business and entered into a stock purchase agreement by which
the company could purchase the stock of a departing shareholder at book value. When
the plaintiff, who had departed, learned the book value of his stock, he sued to have his
stock valued by another method and sought to introduce other evidence of value on the
grounds that the term "book value" was ambiguous. Id. at *7. The court granted
summary judgment to defendants, holding that the plaintiff was bound by the agreed book
value of his stock:
15

[T]he agreement adopts the book value contained in the corporation's
financial statement, as prepared by an independent certified public
accountant in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
Thus, the clear intent of the parties is ascertainable from the unambiguous
language of the document itself, and parol evidence is inadmissible. [Id. at
•7-8.]
Finally, other courts have specifically held that a stock buyout agreement setting
the stock price at the book value established by the company's audited financial statement
is binding on the parties, without adjustments. For example, in Crowder Constr. Co. v.
Riser, 517 S.E.2d 178 (N.C. App. 1999), the defendant employee signed a shareholder
agreement providing that, upon termination of employment, stock would be sold to the
company at the adjusted book value established by the audited year-end financial
statement. The employee rejected the payment offered, contending that book value of his
shares was not properly calculated because company auditors had made adjustments for
tax liability, uncompleted contracts, and other timing adjustments. The company sued to
enforce the agreement, and the court granted summary judgment to the company.
The court held that the accountants were authorized to "adjust the book value per
share to account for several possible contingencies related to the Company's bookkeeping
practices." Id. at 185. The plaintiff argued that the accounting adjustments made
stockholder equity artificially low, and that the total should be increased for additional
inventories and over-depreciation of equipment. Id. at 186-87. However, the court
rejected those arguments as mere differences in accounting judgment. "There is no
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contention that [the independent auditors] failed to follow generally accepted auditing
standards in reviewing the Company's financial statement." The court concluded:
Where the value of a closely held corporation is determined by the
use of its balance sheet as directed by a "buy-out" agreement, and is
calculated by the accounting firm normally servicing that corporation in
accordance with the terms of the "buy-out" agreement, we hold that the
value determined by that accounting firm is presumptively correct, in the
absence of mathematical error, evidence of fraud (such as willful
concealment of assets), or evidence of a failure to follow generally accepted
accounting practices. [Id. at 189, emp. added.]
Similarly, in Area, Inc. v. Stentenfeld, 541 P.2d 755 (Alas. 1975), the corporation
entered into an agreement with a departing shareholder to purchase the shareholder's
stock at the book value established by the most recent financial statement, which
contained adjustments for deferred compensation. The corporation later audited the
books and concluded that the stock had been overvalued because the deferred
compensation had not been adjusted for tax liability. Id. at 757, 761.
The court held that the corporation was bound by the book value of stock as
adopted in the agreement. The court reasoned that "book value" has nofixedlegal
meaning, and that different results can be obtained by different methods of calculation.
The method used in valuing the stock had been approved and consistently used by the
corporation, was consistent with accepted accounting principles, and was contemplated
by the parties to the agreement; therefore, the corporation was bound by the agreement
and could not alter the book value retroactively. Id. at 763-64. See also Jones v. Harris,
388 P.2d 539, 542 (Wash. 1964) (parties to stock buyout agreement are bound by "book
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value" established by financial statements and courts should accept valuations reached
through accepted accounting practices); Sperco v. M&SD Corp., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
973, *8 (D. 111. 1989) (parties agreed to book value of stock established in accordance
with accounting principles and court cannot "renegotiate a contract... to ensure a more
favorable result").
B.

Application to Present Case.
The foregoing authorities compel the conclusion that Eggett is bound by the book

value established in the audited financial statement for June 30, 1997, without the
retroactive adjustments presented at trial. The Shareholders' Agreement signed by Eggett
is clear and comprehensive. Paragraph 3 states that the "purchase price" for stock of a
terminating employee "shall be the 'Book Value5 (as defined in Paragraph 18) of such
stock." Paragraph 18(d) defines "Book Value" as follows:
"Book Value" shall mean the consolidated net shareholders5 equity of the
Corporation determined as of the end of each [fiscal year] as certified to by
the firm of independent public accountants then regularly employed by the
Corporation . . . . Such determination shall be made on an accrual basis in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and shall be
binding and conclusive upon the parties to this Agreement. . . . The "Book
Value" . . . shall be based on audited financial statements. [Add. 28, emp.
added.]
The obvious purpose of relying on the valuation of independent auditors is to avoid
potential conflict and litigation over the parties5 differing views and calculations of book
value.
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Trial Exhibit 42 is the Company's audited financial statement for June 30,1997,
prepared by the independent accounting firm of Ernst & Young. (Add. 59.) Eggett
initially retained these accountants, who had been regularly employed by the Company
for several years. The independent audit includes careful review of the company's
financial statements and source documents to verify that the statements accurately
represent the Company's operations and financial condition. (Tr. 572, 653-55.) Under
accepted accounting principles, the audited statement is prepared on an accrual basis,
meaning that income and expenses are counted as incurred, not when actually received or
paid. Based on the judgment of the auditors, contingent liabilities or losses may be
attributed to the Company before they are actually incurred. (Tr. 656-59.)
The audited statement includes an adjustment of $618,000 for anticipated liability
in the United Utilities lawsuit (Tr. 660-64); $283,000 for anticipated loss on a "swap
contract" that had fallen through (Tr. 664-65); $296,252 for "suspense items," uncertain
earnings withheld from income for a prescribed period of time (Tr. 665-67); and $45,553
for the Gryndberg contract, which presented a potential loss (Tr. 667-69). The
independent auditor testified that the June 30, 1997 financial statement, including these
adjustments, was prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles,
that the statement accurately presented the Company's stockholder equity at $75,452, and
that Eggett's adding these adjustments back into retained earnings based on actual future
outcomes was contrary to accounting principles. (Tr. 659, 669-70.) Accordingly, the
book value of Eggett's stock, as defined by the Shareholders' Agreement, was $27,540.
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Eggett has asserted no valid basis to disregard or revise the book value of stock
contained in the audited financial statement. In his resignation letter, Eggett conceded, In
accordance with the Shareholders' Agreement, "I am required to sell my shares in the
corporation . . . for the audited Book Value as of June 30, 1997." (Add. 31, emp. added.)
Eggett's Complaint also cited and sought to enforce the Shareholders' Agreement,
alleging that the book value of his shares in December 1996 was $80,000, multiples less
than the $255,000 sought at trial. (R. 4.)
The Complaint contained no allegation of error or fraud in the audited financial
statement of June 30, 1997. Moreover, under questioning by his own counsel, Eggett
testified at trial:
Q . . . You're not claiming that the audit is not prepared in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles?
A I'm not. [Tr. 890.]
Rather, Eggett claimed only that accounting principles allow for "a range of reasonable
answers." (Tr. 891.) However, having agreed by contract to the "answer" provided by
the Company's independent accountants, Eggett was precluded from substituting a book
value of his own. See Crowder Constr. Co. v. Kiser, supra, 517 S.E.2d at 189.
In summary, based on the parties' agreement that book value of Eggett's stock
would be "conclusively" established by the audited financial statement, Eggett is bound
by that value, and extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to alter that agreed value. See Brown
v. Richards, supra, 840 P.2d at 148; Swecker v. Rau, supra. By admitting such evidence
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to contradict the agreed book value, the trial court relieved Eggett from the terms of his
bargain, rewriting the contract on supposed equitable principles, contrary to governing
case law. See Webb v. R.O.A. General Inc., supra, 804 P.2d at 551; Dalton v. Jerico
Constr. Co., supra, 642 P.2d at 750. In the absence of any allegation of mathematical
error, fraud, or departure from generally accepted accounting principles, the value
determined by the independent accountants "is presumptively correct" and binding on the
parties. See Crowder Constr. Co. v. Riser, supra\ Area, Inc. v. Stentenfeld, supra, 541
P.2d at 763-64. Therefore, the trial court erred by admitting extrinsic evidence to
contradict the agreed book value of Eggett's stock at $27,540.
POINT II:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALTERING THE SPECIAL
VERDICT QUESTION TO INTERPOSE ITS OWN VIEW OF THE
EVIDENCE AFTER THE JURY HAD RENDERED ITS VERDICT.

If this Court does not limit Eggett's stock payment to the agreed amount of
$27,540, as set forth above, it should nonetheless limit the payment to 36.5 percent of the
jury's verdict of $135,672, for a total stock payment of $49,520.
A.

Inviolability of Jury Verdict.
Defendant, Wasatch Energy, is legally entitled to have the factual issues in this

case decided by the jury. Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 10; U.C.A. § 78-21-1. "All questions
of fact, where the trial is by j u r y , . . . are to be decided by the jury, and all evidence
thereon is to be addressed to them

" U.C.A. § 78-21-2. "The right of trial by jury as

declared by the constitution or as given by statute shall be preserved to the parties." Rule
38(a), Utah R. Civ. P. Wasatch properly demanded a jury trial of the factual issues. (R.
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26.) Accordingly, the jury in this case bears the exclusive duty to determine the
credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make findings of fact, while the role of
the judge is limited to deciding questions of law and instructing the jury on the law. See
Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah 1983); U.C.A. § 78-21-3; Model Utah Jury
Instructions 2.2, 2.6, 2.27 (1993 ed.).
Rule 49(a), Utah R. Civ. P., authorizes the trial court to submit factual issues to the
jury by way of a special verdict form containing written interrogatories. Special verdict
forms may be proposed by the parties, as was done in this case. (R. 184, 270.) If either
party claims that a special verdict interrogatory is confusing or ambiguous, that party is
required to object to the form of the question before submission to the jury, otherwise, the
objection is waived. See Baker v. Cook, 308 P.2d 264, 266-67 (Utah 1957) ("If the
defendant felt that the questions were so drawn as to confuse the jury, request should have
been made to clarify the questions . . . . " ) ; Goggins v. Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282, 1289
(Wyo. 1985) (party waived alleged error in special verdict form by failing to object prior
to submission to jury); State ex rel Sam's Texaco & Towing, Inc. v. Gallagher, 842 P.2d
383, 389 (Or. 1992) (party must object to special verdict form before jury retires or
objection is waived). In the present case, neither party nor the court raised any objection
or question regarding the meaning or clarity of Special Verdict Question 5, which asked
the jury to determine the book value of Wasatch stock.
Once the jury renders its special verdict, the trial judge has no authority to alter or
reject that determination simply because the judge disagrees with it or considers it
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unsupported by the disputed evidence that the judge personally finds most persuasive.
For example, in EFCO Distributing, Inc. v. Perr in, All PJZd 615 (Utah 1966), a contract
dispute, the jury found for the plaintiff but awarded no damages. The plaintiff moved for
judgment NOV and new trial, arguing that the evidence justified some damages for the
breach of contract. However, the Supreme Court upheld denial of the motions, enforcing
the verdict as rendered. The Court acknowledged that a trial court has "supervisory
authority to rectify mistakes" by a jury, such as when the jury "has refused to accept
credible, uncontradicted evidence where there is no rational basis for rejecting it, or it is
plain to be seen that the jury has acted under a misconception of proven facts, or has
misapplied or disregarded the law, or where it appears that the verdict was the result of
passion and prejudice." Id. at 617 (emp. added). In such a case, the court may properly
grant judgment NOV or a new trial. Id. However, "unless some such error or
impropriety as just stated is clearly shown, the verdict of the jury should stand." Id. (emp.
added).
Because of the vital importance of trial by jury, a trial court must not interfere
unnecessarily with the jury's verdict:
[W]hen the parties have had the opportunity of presenting their evidence
and arguments concerning their dispute to the jury, the judgment of the jury
should be allowed to swing through a wide arc within the limits of how
reasonable minds might see the situation; and the court should not upset a
verdict merely because it may disagree. If it did so, the right of trial by jury
would be effectively abrogated and the trial may as well be to the court in
the first place. [Id. at 618, emp. added.]
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Given the "exclusive prerogative of the jury to judge the credibility of witnesses," and the
right of the jury to discount or even disregard the plaintiffs self-interested testimony, the
trial court must not be "arbitrary by nullifying the jury's judgment merely because it is
not in accord with his own." Id.
Similarly, in First Security Bank v. Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc., 454 P.2d 886 (Utah
1969), an action to collect on a dishonored check, the jury found, by special verdict, that
the bank was negligent, but that the parties had previously settled all accounts, thus
precluding recovery by the plaintiff. However, the trial judge made an "additional
finding" that the disputed check was excluded from the settlement and awarded the
plaintiff recovery. Id. at 889.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "[t]he effect of this 'further finding9 was
actually to contravene the finding made by the jury." Id. While the trial court may
correct "obvious errors or defects" in a special verdict, "it is not the trial court's
prerogative to make findings inconsistent therewith and thereby defeat the effect of the
jury's findings." Id. See also Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Ass'n, 470 P.2d 393, 39798 (Utah 1970) (absent a motion for new trial, the trial judge cannot review the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict); State ex rel Sam Js Texaco &
Towing, Inc. v. Gallagher, 842 P.2d 383, 389 (Or. 1992) (trial judge erred in refusing to
accept the jury's plain verdict).
As further demonstrated below, Judge Young in the present case had no right or
justification to question the jury verdict. By so doing, he substituted his judgment for that
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of the jur>, invaded the exclusive province of the jury, and effectively abrojeated the right
of Wasatch to a jury determination of the key fact issue in the case,
B.

Correction of Obvious Error Under Rule 47(r) Does Not Apply.
A trial court's correction of a special verdict is authorized by Rule 47(r), Utah R.

Civ. P., which states: "If the verdict rendered is informal or insufficient, it may be
corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out again."
However, as applied by the courts, such correction is limited to errors that are obvious on
the face of the verdict.
For example, in Jorgensen v. Gonzales. 383 P.2d 934 (Utah 1963), a personal
injury action, the jury returned a special verdict that included general damages down to
the penny, indicating the possibility of a quotient verdict. The court questioned the jury
and determined that the jury had improperly considered the plaintiffs personal expenses
as an element of general damage. The court directed the jury to retire and reconsider its
verdict, and the jury returned with a corrected verdict showing a round figure for general
damages.
The Supreme Court upheld this procedure under Rule 47(r), defining the term
"insufficient" in the rule to mean "inadequate or lacking in some requirement, purpose or
use." Id. at 935. The Court explained that "where it is apparent that there is some patent
error in connection with the verdict, the court may of course call the matter to [the jury's]
attention and direct them to redeliberate." Id. (emp. added). However, absent some
patent error in the verdict, the court must not interfere with a damage award: "[T]here is
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no set formula as to the amount of damages that mayl)e awarded. This is properly left to
the sound judgment of a jury

" Id. at 936.

Other cases illustrate the proper application and limits of Rule 47(r). In Brown v.
Johnson, All P.2d 942 (Utah 1970), the judge instructed the jury that special damages
could not exceed $377.50. The jury returned a verdict of $10,000 in special damages and
$1700 in general damages. The court advised the jury that there was "an obvious error"
on the face of the verdict and instructed them to retire and redeliberate. The jury returned
with a corrected verdict of $377.50 in special damages and the balance in general
damages. This corrected verdict was upheld on appeal because "[t]he error was
undoubtedly induced by failure on the part of the jury to understand the difference
between the terms 'general damage' and 'special damage.'" Id. at 945.
Similarly, in Ute-Cal Land Development Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240 (Utah
1980), the jury found that the plaintiff was injured by delivery of a warranty deed but
awarded no damages for the injury. The court held that this "patent insufficiency" was
within the scope of Rule 47(r), but that the plaintiff had waived any entitlement to relief
by failing to object when the verdict was rendered. Id. at 1248. See also Langton v.
International Transport, Inc., 491 P.2d 1211, 1214-15 (Utah 1971) (special verdict was
"insufficient" and "defective in form in that it did not comprehend all the items of
damage contained in the instructions"; however, relief was denied for failure to object);
State ex rel Sam's Texaco & Towing, Inc. v. Gallagher, supra, 842 P.2d at 387

26

(construing same language as Rule 47(r); special verdict is "sufficient^ if it "finds on an
issue which ultimately determines and necessarily supports the judgment rendered").
Based on the foregoing case law, the jury's response to Special Verdict Question
5, providing the book value of Wasatch stock, contained no obvious or patent error to
justify application of Rule 47(r). Neither the judge nor Eggett's counsel identified any
facial error in the verdict similar to those presented in the governing case law, above.
C

Rule 47(r) Does Not Apply to Challenges Based on Sufficiency of Evidence.
A challenge to a jury verdict based, not on obvious error, but on sufficiency of

evidence to support the verdict must be maintained under Rule 59(a) rather than Rule
47(r). The court in Langton v. International Transport, Inc., supra, discussed the two
types of challenges:
There is a basic distinction between an insufficient or informal verdict and a
verdict regular on its face, which awards inadequate damages . . . . In the
latter case, a new trial must be granted to correct the error. In the former
case, counsel has an opportunity to assert an objection, and the court, under
Rule 47(r), U.R.C.P., may return the jury for further deliberation and with
further instruction to correct the irregularity. [491 P.2d at 1215.]
For example, in Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999 UT App 80, 977 P.2d 508, the
trial court granted the defendant's post-trial motion to reduce past special damages from
$93,000 to $84,184.51. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that such relief was based on Rule
47(r) and was, therefore, inappropriate as untimely. However, the Court of Appeals held
that relief was properly, and necessarily, based on Rule 59(a):
While Rule 47 speaks of a court's authority to correct an informal or
insufficient verdict (also known as an irregular verdict'), Stevenett's
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reliance on this rule is misplaced In this case, the court authorized the
remittitur under Rule 59(a)(6), for insufficient evidence to support the
verdict, not Rule 47(r). An informal or insufficient verdict under Rule 47(r)
relates to the form of the verdict, not the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting it, and the issue here is insufficiency in that there was no
evidence . . , to support the award greater than $85,184.51, not that the
verdict was irregular in form. [Id. at 517, emp. added.]
Likewise, in the present case, the trial court's concern with the jury's response to
Special Verdict Question 5 was not the form of the verdict, but the insufficiency of the
evidence to support it. The verdict was "regular on its face"; the court simply regarded
the amount of damages inadequate under his view of the evidence. Therefore, Rule 47(r)
has no application to the present case. Rather, the proper procedure for Eggett to
challenge the jury's finding in Question 5 was by motion for new trial under Rule 59(a).
Langton and Stevenett, supra. Absent such a motion, the trial judge had no authority to
assess the sufficiency of evidence to support the verdict. Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric
Ass 'n, supra, 470 P.2d at 397 ("trial court has had no opportunity to pass upon the legal
sufficiency of the evidence during the trial, and cannot do so unless a motion for a new
trial upon the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence is presented to it"). See also
Goddardv. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1984) (a trial judge's "mere disagreement
[with a verdict] is not sufficient reason to order a new trial").
D.

Error in the Trial Court's Intervention and Procedure.
After reading the jury's response to Special Verdict Question 5, finding "the book

value of Wasatch Energy" to be $135,671.61, Judge Young embarked, sua sponte, on a
course to revise the question to suit his own view of the evidence. The judge first asked
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the jury foreman, "[I]s this the value that the jury believes should be paid for the shares?"
(Tr. 989, L. 23.) That initial question was unjustified, as there is no ambiguity in the
verdict form or the jury's answer that required clarification. Moreover, the judge's
question deviated from the question asked in the verdict form, thus tending to mislead,
confuse, and coerce the jury toward the judge's point of view. If the judge believed the
jury's verdict contained "obvious error," thus within the scope of Rule 47(r), "[t]he
proper procedure [was] for the trial court to require the jury to return for further
deliberation." Ute-Cal Land Development Corp. v. Sather, supra, 605 P.2d at 1247
(citation omitted). See also Jorgensen v. Gonzales, supra, 383 P.2d at 935 ("the court
directed the jury to go out and reconsider its verdict"); Brown v. Johnson, supra, All P.2d
at 945 (u[t]he trial judge elected to send the jury out to correct the verdict").
To the judge's question, the jury foreman responded, "We believe that to be the
book value." (Tr. 990, L. 1.) Thus, the foreman's answer is consistent with the verdict
answer; the $135,672 is the Wasatch "book value," not the amount to be paid to Eggett.
Based on the foreman's answer, Judge Young should have dropped the inquiry,
but he pressed on, offering his own opinion: "I think the question was confusing and
that's why I wanted to ask that question." (Id., L. 5-6.) Defense counsel then objected:
"It seems rather inappropriate to be coming up with questions for the jury at this time.
The question is as it's stated and it's answered as it's answered." (Id., L. 9-12.) The
judge overruled the objection, explaining, "Well, I'm not going to allow that to stand if it
is a mistake." (Id., L. 13.)
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Having suggested to the jury that the question was "confusing" and that their
verdict was a "mistake," the judge again asked the foreman: "Is this the value that you
think the corporation owes to Mr. Eggett to purchase his shares?" Following the judge's
leading question, this time the foreman answered, "Yes." (Id.,L. 17-20.) The judge then
proposed to poll the jury. (Id., L. 24.)
Wasatch counsel again objected, explaining that the form of the verdict question
tracked the way both parties presented the evidence at trial, and that it was the intent of
both parties to multiply that Company book value by Eggett's ownership percentage to
derive the amount owed to him. (Tr. 991, L. 5-10.) Eggett himself testified at trial that
the amount owed to him is derived by first determining the book value of the Company,
and then multiplying that figure by his ownership interest of 36.5 percent. (Tr. 256.)
Eggett's own exhibit followed the same formula. (Add. 51.) Nonetheless, the judge
again overruled the objection, stating his belief that the jury did not intend that result.
(Id., LAI.)
Judge Young then proceeded to poll the jury with the following question:
We know from the facts of this case that Mr. Eggett owns 36.5
percent. If I interpret your answer to this question to be $135,000.00 for
book value. That would mean that he would be entitled to 36.5 percent of
$135,000.00. If I understand it the way I have now asked you the question,
he is entitled to $135,671.96 which is a number that you have come to by
some calculation method for the purchase of his shares of stock. So, in
other words, this figure, 135,000, is a representative smaller figure due to
him which represents 36 percent of X which is a larger number. All right?
Now, I want to be sure that I understand that correctly and if any of
you disagree with that, I want to know that.
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,... [I]s that your verdict as I've just explained it. [Tr. 991-92, Add. 15-16.]
Each juror answered "yes." (Tr. 992-93.)
Notwithstanding these affirmative answers, the question as posed by Judge Young
was clearly compound, leading, thoroughly confusing, and misrepresented the actual
verdict question. The jurors' answer "yes" was only as good as the question posed. Were
they assenting to an award of "36.5 percent of $135,000," as stated in the first part of the
question, or to an award of the entire $135,671.96, as stated in the second part of the
question? Moreover, the $135,671.96 is not a number that the jury came to "by some
calculation method for the purchase of his shares ofstocl? (emp. added), as misstated by
the judge. That figure, as requested by the clear verdict question, is "the 'book value' of
Wasatch Energy." (R. 267.)
This procedure was not a "polling" of the jury, in the accepted sense of asking the
jurors if the written verdict is their verdict, see Rule 47(q); rather, this was a blatant
attempt by the trial court to control the verdict by altering the clear verdict question.
Through his misleading compound question, Judge Young coerced the jury to accept and
follow his view of the evidence, or at least created enough uncertainty to allow his own
inference of jury intent to supplant the true verdict. Thus, the judge plainly failed to act
"properly and discreetly in handling the situation." See Jorgensen v. Gonzales, supra,
383 P.2d at 936. See also 9 Moore's Federal Practice § 49.1 l[3][b] (3d ed. 2000)
(acknowledging the preeminent position of the trial judge and how easily the judge's
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comments and demeanor can improperly influence or coerce the jury to reconsider its
verdict).
The judge then attempted to justify the result he had coerced from the jury by
explaining his own "understanding" of the question: "This question, I find, is ambiguous
in its right [sic] and the way it was written

" (Tr. 993, L. 6.) However, as

demonstrated above, any claim of ambiguity in the form of the Special Verdict question
was waived by Eggett's failure to object prior to its submission to the jury. See, e.g.,
Baker v. Cook, supra, 308 P.2d at 266-67. Eggett's counsel never did object to the
verdict question. The judge thanked the jury for its service, concluding, "I accept our
verdict" acknowledging his own, albeit improper, role in the process. (Id., L. 19, emp.
added.)
After dismissal of the jury, Wasatch counsel again objected that "it was
inappropriate . . . for a new question to be posed to the jury without any review by either
side or attorneys and created . . . an error." (Tr. 994, L. 23.) The judge responded that, in
his view, the evidence was insufficient to support the Company book value of $135,672:
It seems to me that the number in and of itself causes me to conclude that it
would be irrationally selected if it were other than that number. For
instance, we could go through and, I don't know how they would have
come up with the book value of that company at 1 3 5 , . . . it's entirely
inconsistent with the June 30th, 1997 date. [Tr. 995, L. 2-9.]
Counsel responded that the same uncertainty exists with respect to the
compensation awarded Eggett in Question 2, and the judge agreed: "I agree with [sic] in
that respect and I don't know how they came up with number two either." (Tr. 995, L.
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10-15.) Accordingl}. the judge's action was based on his own assessment of the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, contrary to the case law discussed
above. See, e.g., EFCO Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin, supra, All P.2d at 618 ("the court
should not upset a verdict merely because it may disagree"); First Security Bank v. Ezra
C Lundahl, Inc., supra, 454 P.2d at 889 (the court may not make findings inconsistent
with the jury's findings); Langton v. International Transport, Inc., supra, 491 P.2d at
1215 (verdict awarding inadequate damages can be challenged only by motion for new
trial); Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Ass 'n, supra, 470 P.2d at 397 (court has no right to
assess sufficiency of evidence in the absence of a motion raising the issue).
Even if the sufficiency of evidence to support the verdict had been properly raised,
the trial court would have had no basis to set aside the jury verdict on the book value of
Wasatch stock. Utah law accords broad latitude to a jury in the calculation and
assessment of damages. A jury's damage verdict will not be set aside unless it finds no
support in the evidence and clearly resulted from passion or prejudice. See, e.g., Bennion
v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083-84 (Utah 1985); Fillmore
Products, Inc. v. Western States Paving, Inc., 592 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1979) (court will
not substitute its judgment for that of the jury "unless there is no competent evidence to
support the verdict"); Jorgensen v. Gonzales, supra, 383 P.2d at 936 ("there is no set
formula as to the amount of damages that may be awarded"); EFCO Distributing, Inc. v.
Perrin, supra, All P.2d at 618 ("the judgment of the jury should be allowed to swing
through a wide arc within the limits of how reasonable minds might see the situation").
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In this case, the record contains an abundance of evidence supporting the jury^s
verdict placing the book value of Company stock at $135,672 or lower. As demonstrated
in Point I, above, the undisputed shareholders' equity of the Company, based on the
audited statement of June 30, 1997, is $75,452. (Add. 63.) At trial, Eggett attempted to
"adjust" that audited figure up to nearly $700,000 (Add. 53), but the jury was obviously
entitled to disregard any portion or combination of those adjustments. See, e.g., EFCO
Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin, supra, All P.2d at 618. Accordingly, the jury's figure of
$135,000 is well within the range of $75,000 and $700,000, offered by Wasatch and
Eggett respectively. Moreover, the ratio of the amount awarded to the amount demanded
($135,000/$700,000), equal to 19 percent, is comparable to the ratio of the verdict to
amount demanded for compensation ($11,888/$66,688), equal to 18 percent. In addition,
the undisputed book value of the Company for the previous year was only $18,172. (Tr.
344-45.) Accordingly, the jury's verdict on Question 5 is consistent with the evidence
and in line with the compensation verdict, which the court did not question. Plainly, the
book value verdict is not "irrational," as the trial judge erroneously postulated.
In summary, the jury's verdict on Question 5 is not confusing or erroneous, and
the trial judge had no authority or justification to revise the question to suit his own faulty
view of the evidence. Accordingly, if the agreed book value of Eggett's stock is not
enforced, at least the jury verdict should be enforced as rendered.
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POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING EGGETT
ATTORNEY FEES WITHOUT APPORTIONMENT BETWEEN
RECOVERABLE AND NONRECOVERABLE FEES.
A.

Fees At Trial.
Attorney fees may be awarded only if authorized by contract or statute. If based

on contract, fees can be awarded only in accordance with the terms of the contract. Dixie
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). A party requesting attorney fees
must "distinguish between work done that was subject to a fee award and work that was
not." Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah 1992). Accordingly, the
claimant's supporting affidavit must apportion fees between successful claims for which
fees may be recovered and claims for which fees cannot be recovered. Id. at 269-70. See
also Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998). Moreover, the trial court must
document its award of fees with sufficiently detailed findings to support the allocation
and award. Id.; see also Miller v. Martineau & Co., 1999 UT App 216, ^145-48, 983
P.2d 1107; Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1393-94 (Utah App. 1994) (denying fees
because most related to claims for which fees were not recoverable).
In this case, Eggett claims entitlement to attorney fees pursuant to paragraph 19(c)
of the Shareholders' Agreement: "In the event any legal action is required by a party to
this Agreement to enforce the provisions of same, the prevailing party shall be entitled to
recover its costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees." (Add. 29.) However,
Eggett's Complaint contains two major, separable claims: one for breach of the
Employment Agreement by failing to pay due compensation, and one for breach of the
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Shareholders Agreement by failing to pay book value for Eggett's stock. (R. 1-5.)
Accordingly, only the fees pertaining to the stock claim are recoverable by contract; fees
related to the compensation claim are not recoverable.
The plaintiffs supporting affidavit makes no attempt to apportion fees between the
stock claim and the compensation claim. (R. 287, Add. 80.) The affidavit merely makes
the conclusory assertion that the stock and compensation claims are "inextricably
intertwined" and that Eggett should be awarded fees for both claims. (Para. 10.)
However, that assertion is unsupported by the record. The stock claim is based on the
Shareholders' Agreement and turns on whether Eggett was terminated for cause and, if
not, the proper determination of book value. (Tr. 152-69, 255-89.) The compensation
claim turns on the existence and terms of a separate, written compensation agreement.
(Tr. 170-255.) Accordingly, the claims are easily separable and were handled separately
throughout discovery and trial, with clear demarcation in the questioning of witnesses on
the two subjects at trial. (Eggett, Tr. 255; Keith Painter, Tr. 435; Curtis Chisholm, Tr.
542; Brian Watts, Tr. 607-08.) The two claims involved separate evidence and separate
calculations of damages. (Tr. 254-55, 281-82, 893-94.) Because Eggett failed to
apportion the fees for these separable claims, the attorney fee award must be set aside.
See, e.g., Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah 1998) ("trial court... may not
award wholesale all attorney fees requested if they have not been allocated as to separate
claims").
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The Supplemental Judgment, awarding Eggett over $60,000 in attorney fees,
contains entirely inadequate, and even misleading, findings to support the award. For
example, the Supplemental Judgment recites that Eggett "has made a proper and
reasonable segregation between those claims to which he is entitled to an award of costs,
expenses, and fees, and those claims to which he is not entitled to such an award." (Page
2.) However, as noted above, the supporting affidavit makes no apportionment at all for
recoverable and nonrecoverable fees. After stating that a proper segregation has been
made, the judgment recites that all claims asserted are "so intertwined . . . that it is not
possible to segregate or to distinguish them." {Id., emp. added.) Because the fee
judgment is purely conclusory, without adequate findings, it must be set aside. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Martineau, supra, at 1116-17.
B.

Fees On Appeal.
To the extent Wasatch prevails on this appeal, it is entitled to recovery of its

attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal, as well as to reduction of fees and costs
awarded Eggett at trial. See, e.g., Brown v. DavidK. Richards & Co., 1999 UT App 109,
978 P.2d 470, 479.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should vacate the judgment pertaining to the
book value of Eggett's stock and enter judgment for the agreed value of $27,540.
Alternatively, the Court should enter judgment based on the actual jury verdict, reducing
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Eggett's share to $49,520. In addition, the Court should vacate the award of attorney fees
and costs at trial and award Wasatch attorney fees and costs on appeal.
Respectfully submitted this ^ ^

day of June, 2000.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

#?~?^m£<U*^n
Eric C. Olson
Merrill F. Nelson
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH

ROGER K.EGGETT, JR.,
an individual,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.

Civil No. 97-0906444
WASATCH ENERGY CORPORATION,
a Utah Corporation,

Judge David S. Young

Defendants.

This action came on for trial beginning November 3, 1999, before the Court and jury, the
Honorable Judge David S. Young, District Court Judge, presiding. Plaintiff was represented by
Perrin R. Love of Clyde, Snow, Sessions & Swenson. Defendant was represented by Robert L.
Stevens of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson.
The parties concluded the presentation of evidence and rested their cases on November 10,
1999. Following instruction as to the law to be applied and closing arguments by counsel, the jury
Judgment @

JD

-^Wl

retired to deliberate, make findings of fact, and answer special interrogatories in a Special Verdict
Form, which is incorporated herein by reference.
On November 10,1999, after due deliberation, the jury returned in open court the following
verdict:
The total amount of additional compensation to be
awarded to Roger Eggett for the period from
January 1, 1997, through May 1,1997:

S 11,888.35

The total amount to be awarded to Roger Eggett
as book value for his shares of stock in
Wasatch Energy Co.:

S 135,671.61

Total amount to be awarded to Roger Eggett:

$ 147,559.96

As the Court read the Special Verdict Foim, the Court polled the jury to determine whether
thefigureof $135,671.61 represented the book value of Roger Eggett's shares of stock (which the
evidence showed was 36.5 per cent of the total number of outstanding shares), or the book value of
Wasatch Energy in total Each of the eight jurors stated affirmatively that $ 135,671.61 was the book
value of Roger Eggett's shares, and was the amount to be awarded to Roger Eggett.
Based upon the jury verdict, the Court found Roger Eggett to be the prevailing party in this
action.
NOW THEREFORE, based upon the verdict of the jury and good cause otherwise appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment is hereby entered in
favor of plaintiff Roger Eggett and against defendant Wasatch Energy Co., in the amount of
$ 147,559.96, together with prejudgment interest accruing at a rate provided by lawfromNovember

11, 1999, the date following the jury award, until the date this Judgment is entered, and postjudgment interest from the date that this Judgment is entered until paid.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that plaintiff Roger Eggett
may submit to this Court a Memorandum of Costs pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d), and an affidavit
of attorneys' fees and expenses. After defendant has an opportunity to respond, the Court will
consider any submissions by plaintiff, and enter a supplemental judgment, if appropriate.

IMAGED
Perrm R Love (5505)
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)322-2516
(801)521-6280 (telecopy)
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH

ROGER K EGGETT, JR ,
an individual,
Plaintiff,

SUPPLEMENTAL
JUDGiMENT

vs.

WASATCH ENERGY CORPORATION,
a Utah Corporation,

CiwlNo 97-0906444
Judge David S Young

Defendants

Judgment \\ as entered in this matter on January 11,2000, and is incorporated by reference Plaintiff
Roger Eggett moves for entry of a Supplemental Judgment against defendant Wasatch Energy Corp In
consideration of the motion, the Court has reviewed the following
a

Affidavit of Pernn R Love in Support of Award of Costs, Expenses and Attorney's Fees,

dated December 6, 1999,
b

Wasatch Energy Corp 's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Award of

Attorneys Fees, dated December 16,1999,

I III
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c.

Reply Affidavit of Perrin R. Love in Support of Award of costs and Attorney's Fees, dated

December 23, 1999;
d.

Supplemental Affidavit of Perrin R. Love in Support of Award of Costs, Expenses and

Attorney's Fees, dated January 13, 2000;
e.

Plaintiffs Verified Memorandum of Taxable Costs dated December 23, 1999; and

f.

Defendant's Motion to Tax Costs, dated January 3, 2000.

g.

Second Supplemental Affidavit of Perrin R. Love in Support of Award of Costs,

Expenses and Attorney's Fees, dated March 24, 2000.
The Court heard argument on the matters raised by these pleadings on March 24, 2000. Plaintiff
Roger Eggett was represented by Perrin R. Love of Clyde, Snow, Sessions & S wenson. Defendant Wasatch
Energy Corp. was represented by Robert L. Stevens of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson.
Based upon the submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing, the
Court finds that plaintiff Roger Eggett is entitled to an award of costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees in the
amount of 560,374.43. The Court finds that these costs, expenses, and fees are reasonable. The Court also
finds that plaintiff Roger Eggett has made a proper and reasonable segregation between those claims to
which he is entitled to an award of costs, expenses, and fees, and those claims to which he is not entitled to
such an award. Specifically, the Court finds that (1) the claims brought by Mr. Eggett to recover book value
for his shares pursuant to his Shareholder Agreement were the predominant claims at trial; (2) the facts to
be discovered and tried on Mr. Eggett's claims pursuant to the Shareholder Agreement are so intertwined
with the facts to be discovered and tried on the other claims and counterclaims that it is not possible to
segregate or to distinguish them. Accordingly, the Court finds that it is proper and reasonable to segregate
those costs, expenses, and fees incurred by Mr. Eggett before May 16, 1997, from those costs, expenses,

and fees incurred by Mr. Eggett after May 16, 1997, when Mr. Eggett's claims under the Shareholder
Agreement arose.
NOW THEREFORE, based upon the submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel, and good
cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Supplemental Judgment
is entered in favor of plaintiff Roger Eggett and against defendant Wasatch Energy Corp., as follows:
Costs, Expenses, and Attorney's Fees

S60,374.43

Prejudgment interest from November 11,
1999 through January 10, 2000, on the
Judgment amount of 5147,559.96

S 2,466.07

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that plaintiff Roger Eggett is awarded
postjudgment interest at an annual rate of 7.67 per cent on the Judgment amount of 5147,559.96 from
January 11, 2000, until paid. Plaintiff Roger Eggett is awarded postjudgment interest at an annual rate of
7.67 percent on the Supplemental Judgment amount of 560,374.43 jfrom the date that this Supplemental
Judgment is entered until paid.
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P.54(d), the Court taxes costs in the amount of S 2,157.08. These costs are
included in the award of 560,374.43, and are not a separate award.
DATED this 7 ^£Tof April, 2000.

A'
BY THE COURT: AV

David S. Young
Third District CoVrt
Approval as to form:

Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
Counsel for defendant Wasatch Energy Corp.

NOV 10 1999
SALT U K E COUNTY
deputy c i e r i r

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH

ROGER K. EGGETT, JR.,
an individual,
Plaintiff,

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

vs.

Civil No. 97-0906444

WASATCH ENERGY CORPORATION,
a Utah Corporation,

Judge David S. Young

Defendants.

WE THE JURORS empaneled in the above-captioned case find the issues of fact and answer
the special Interrogatories to us as follows:
I.

EGGETT'S CLAIMS
1.

Do you find that Wasatch Energy breached its agreements or obligations to Roger

Eggett by not paying Mr. Eggett the full amount of compensation to which he was entitled for all
or any part of the period from January 1, 1997 through May 1, 1997.
ANSWER:

2.

Yes

V

No

If the answer to Question No. 1 is "yes"> w hat is the total amount of additional

compensation that Wasatch Energy owes to Roger Eggett for all or part of the period from January
1,1997 through J u ^ i 4 f t ^ 7 ?

^ ^
d<3.

3.

Do you find that Wasatch Energy breached its agreements or obligations to Roger

Eggett, by terminating Roger Eggett for cause and not paying him book value for his shares of stock?
ANSWER:

Yes X

No

If you answered question no. I "yes," answer question no.s 4 and 5. If you answered
question no. 3 "no," skip to question no. 6.

4.

Under the SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENT between the parties, on what date was

the book value of Eggett's shares to be determined after he resigned? (Check one).
June 30, 1996
December 31, 1996
X

5.

June 30, 1997

On the date for evaluation of the shares that you selected above, what was the "book

value" of Wasatch Energy as defined by the Shareholders Agreement?

s

/35.C7/.1C

I Answer this question only if you answered either question no. 1 as "YES" or question no.
3asJ>0^

6.

^ ^

Do youfindby clear and convincing evidence that the acts o^omissions of Wasatch

Energy, as alleged by Eggett, were the result of willful and malicious or intentional fraudulent
conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward and disregard of the
rights of others?

~&r\

ANSWER:

Yes

No

II.

WASATCH ENERGY CLAIMS

7.

Do you find that Roger Eggett breached his fiduciary duties and/or breached his

compensation and reimbursement agreements with Wasatch by receiving unauthorized compensation
or abusing his expense account?
ANSWER:

8.

Yes

No

Y

If your answer to question no. 7 is "YES," what is the amount of excessive

compensation or expense account reimbursement that was received by Roger Eggett in the following
years:
1995

S

1996

S

1997

S

TOTAL

S

If you answered question no. 7 as "YES" answer the following question.

9.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of Roger

Eggett as claimed by Wasatch Energy were willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent or
manifested a knowing and reckless indifference toward and disregard the rights of others such that
punitive damages should be awarded?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

3

"2*,?

DATED this (6

day oinav&ry^-

19 f?.

Foreperson of the Jury
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1

resignation-

2

they have the burden to prove the validity of.

3

And I believe that that is something that

Okay.

The discussions were all held timely, the

4

reservation in relation to that jury instruction was timely

5

and considered before it was given during the course of the

6

trial.

7
8

We'll be in recess awaiting the deliberation of
the Jury.

9

(Whereupon a recess was taken.)

10
11
12
13
14
15

THE BAILIFF:
session.

Third District Court will resume

Please be seated.
THE COURT: All right, the record may show we

convened in the presence of the Jury.
Mr. Robertson/ were you selected as the
foreperson of the jury?

16

MR. ROBERTSON:

Yes, Your Honor.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. ROBERTSON:

19

THE COURT: Would you give it to the bailiff for

Have you reached a verdict?
Yes, we have, Your Honor.

20

delivery to the Court, please.

21

Thank you.

22

Do you find that Wasatch Energy breached its

I will read the verdict.

23

agreement or obligations to Roger Eggett by not paying Mr.

24

Eggett the full amount of compensation to which he was

25

entitled for all or part of January 1, 1997 through May 1,
988

1
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2

The answer is yes*.
Two, if the answer to question number one is yes,

3

what is the total amount of additional compensation which

4

Wasatch Energy owes to Roger Eggett for all or part of the

5

period of January 1 through May 1. $11,888.00.

6

Number 3.

Do you find that Wasatch Energy

7

breached its agreement or obligations to Roger Eggett by

8

terminating Roger Eggett for cause and nor paying him book

9

value for his shares of stock. Answer: Yes.

10

Then, skipping to question four.

The

11

shareholders agreement between the parties, on what date

12

was the book value of Eggett's share to be determined after

13

he resigned?

14

June 30, 1997.

Question 5.

On the date for evaluation of the

15

shares you selected above, what was the book value of

16

Wasatch Energy as defined by the shareholders agreement?

17

That, the answer is $135,671.61.

18

And then on to the second series of questions in

19

part 2, Wasatch Energy's claims as question number seven.

20

The answer to that is no, thus prohibiting any further

21

responses from the jury.

22

Do I understand, Mr. Robertson, that the jury's

23

decision, as I've read this question number five, is this

24

the value that the jury believes should be paid for the

25

shares?
989

1
2

MR. ROBERTSON;

We believe that to be the book

value.

3

THE COURT: And s o —

4

MR. ROBERTSON:

5

THE COURT:

Paid for the shares.

So from the, I think the question was

6

confusing and that's why I wanted to ask that question.

7

The book value would be the value from which —

8

you have a question?

9

MR. STEVENS:

yes, did

It seems rather inappropriate to be

10

coming up with questions for the jury at this time.

11

question is as it's stated and it's answered as it's

12

answered.

13

THE COURT:

Well, I'm not going to allow that to

14

stand if it is a mistake.

15

I will find that out now.

16

The

So, if I can find that out now,

What you're saying by that, let me just be sure

17

that I understand what we're talking about.

Is this the

18

value that you think the corporation owes to Mr. Eggett to

19

purchase his shares?

20

MR. ROBERTSON: Yes.

21

THE COURT: All right. Now I'm going to ask that

22

question of all of you as jurors if you concur in that

23

determination.

24
25

Let me go through.

Do either of you desire that I poll the jury on
any other questions?
990

1
2

MR. STEVENS: Your Honor, may we approach the
bench?

3

THE COURT; You may„

4

(Whereupon the following sidebar was held:

5

MR. STEVENS: Your Honor, the way this question is

6

worded and the way this has been argued has been entirely

7

talked about, at least from our point of view, (inaudible)

8

book value of the company is. We know that Mr. Eggett has

9

36.5%.

10

That's the number that should be applied here.

To

have them now—

11

THE COURT: Okay, I'm not going to allow that and

12

you can make a record of it but I'm not going to allow it.

13

I don't believe it's consistent with their desire.

14
15
16
17

MR. STEVENS: And it's certainly not consistent
with what they've just said.
THE COURT: That's exactly right and s o — we'll
make a record of it and that's just fine.)

18
19

THE COURT:

20

particularly question number 5.

21

problem and I want to just explain it to the jury so that I

22

get a clear understanding of what your decision is.

23

Okay.

I'm going to poll the jury on
The question, here's the

We know from the facts of this case that Mr.

24

Eggett owns 36.5 percent.

If I interpret your answer to

25

this question to be $135,000.00 for book value.

That would
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1

mean that he would be entitled to 36.5 percent of

2

$135,000.00.

3

you the question, he is entitled to $135,671.96 which is a

4

number that you have come to by some calculation method for

5

the purchase of his shares of stock.

6

this figure, 135,000, is a representative smaller figure

7

due to him which represents 36 percent of X which is a

8

larger number. All right?

9

If I understand it the way I have now asked

So, in other words,

Now, I want to be sure that I understand that

10

correctly and if any of you disagree with that, I want to

11

know that.

12
13

First, Mrs. Hamilton, is that your verdict as
I've just explained it.

14

MRS. HAMILTON: Yes.

15

THE COURT: Ms. Olson?

16

MRS. OLSON:

17

THE COURT: Ms. Bennion?

18

MISS BENNION: Yes.

19

THE COURT: Mr. Hank?

20

MR. HANK: Yes.

21

THE COURT: Mr. Robertson?

22

MR. ROBERTSON: Yes.

23

THE COURT: Mrs. Smith?

24

MRS. SMITH: Yes.

25

THE COURT: Mr. Corpron?

Yes, your Honor.
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1

MR. CDRPRON: Yes.

2

THE COURT: Mr. Sindt?

3

MR. SINDT:

4

THE COURT: All right.

Yes, Your Honor.
Okay, I'm going to enter,

5

well, we have the record and we have indicated on the

6

record what my understanding is. This question, I find, is

7

ambiguous in its right and the way it was written and that

8

the jury was spoken that the value is due to Mr. Eggett is

9

for the lost compensation, $11,888.00 and for his shares of

10

stock, $135,671.96.

11

the jury that those two numbers combined would equal 11, I

12

messed up, excuse me. All right, those numbers combined

13

would be $147,559.96. M l right.

14

That means that from this decision of

I want to thank you for your service.

You can

15

see the decisions to be made at the court and challenges of

16

cases like this are difficult and I hope that you've

17

learned some lessons also from the combined wisdom of

18

sharing your views among each other and deliberating.

19

of that may have been frustrating at times, but I accept

20

our verdict.

21

and an appropriate service. Unfortunately I have to tell

22

you that the legislature in its wisdom has asked you to do

23

one other thing and that is to briefly respond to some

24

questionnaires.

25

This should take just a few moments.

Some

I think you've rendered a faithful service

I will now excuse you into the jury room.
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1

Since you're excused from your service*

2

will be no further prohibition to your discussing this case

3

and if you wish to discuss the matter with the attorneys or

4

anyone else, you are free to do so.

5

that also will be respected.

6

you.

7

There

If you wish not to,

You're now excused.

Thank

All right, do either of you have any questions or

8

matters that you want to deal on the record before we

9

conclude.

10

MR. STEVENS:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. STEVENS:

13
14

I dof your Honor.

Yes, Mr. Stevens.
Your Honor, this would simply

(inaudible) took care but the sidebar —
THE COURT:

Yes, indeed.

I will indicate to you

15

that with this system the sidebar will have been picked up

16

on part of the record.

17

that don't remember sidebar conferences being recorded.

18

But, this has been.

19

MR. STEVENS:

I know we're all old practioners

Okay.

I just want to make clear

20

our objection to the questions from the bench with regard

21

to question number five.

22

I think, was agreed to by both parties.

23

it was answered and it was inappropriate, I believe, for a

24

new question to be posed to the jury without any review by

25

either side or attorneys and created, I think, an error.

Question number five as written,
It was answered as
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1

THE COURT:

Okay-

Well, you're entitled to have

2

that preserved for the record and I've told you that-

3

seems to me that the number in and of itself causes me to

4

conclude that it would be irrationally selected if it were

5

other than that number.

6

and, I don't know how they would have come up with the book

7

value of that company at 135, if you could help me to

8

figure that out, that would be fine, but it's entirely

9

inconsistent with the June 30th, 1997 date.

10

MR. STEVENS:

It

For instance, we could go through

Well, it's also, their number on

11

number two, was also, I don't know how they came up with

12

that one either.

13

numbers.

14

I don't know they ever come up with

THE COURT:

I agree with in that respect and I

15

don't know how they came up with number two either. But,

16

it struck me that number five could be a mathematical error

17

by the way it was written and indeed that's what the jury

18

confirmed it was.

19

So, any other questions?

20

Do you have any questions, Mr. Love?

21

MR. LOVE: No,

I think, obviously, I think what

22

you did was entirely appropriate because the jury did

23

express some confusion and clarified its intention.

24

We will make a claim for attorney's fees.

25

I just

want to know how you would like us to proceed on that.
995

SHAREHOLDERS' AGREEMENT

This Agreement (the "Agreement") is made and entered as of the 13th day of April,
1995, by and among (a) WASATCH OIL & GAS CORPORATION, a Utah corporabon (the
"Corporabon"), and (b) Roger K. Eggett, Jr., Todd D. Cusick, Curbs R. Chisholm (collecbvely, the
"Shareholders," and individually, a "Shareholder").
RECITALS
WHEREAS, the Shareholders own all of the Corporabon's issued and outstanding
common stock (the "Shares");
WHEREAS, the Corporabon and the Shareholders realize that, m the event of the death
or disability of one of the Shareholders or the sale of a Shareholder's Shares during his lifetime, the
Corporabon's Shares might pass into the ownership or control of persons other than the remaining
Shareholders, which could disrupt the harmonious and successful management and operabon of the
Corporabon;
WHEREAS, the Corporabon and the Shareholders further realize that, in the event one
of the Shareholders should terminate employment with the Corporabon by retirement or otherwise,
such tenrunabon could disrupt the harmonious and successful management and operabon of the
Corporabon;
WHEREAS, the Shareholders feel that their mutual interests and the interests of the
Corporabon mandate the imposibon of certain restrictions on themselves and on the Corporabon with
respect to the transfer of the Shares; and
WHEREAS, the Corporabon and the Shareholders have independently concluded that
the method of valuing the Shares provided in this Agreement is fair and equitable
NOW, THEREFORE, in considerabon of the foregoing, and the mutual promises,
obligabons, covenants, and agreements contained herein, as well as the mutual benefits to be denved
from this Agreement, the undersigned agTee as follows:

i

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT
•IIBI

°- EXH#

TERMS
1.
Shareholders' Ownership in Corporation. The Corporation has FORTY THREE
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED A N D THIRTY FOUR (43,334) shares of common stock issued and
outstanding. The Shares are owned as follows:
Name of Shareholder

Number of Shares

Roger K.Eggett, Jr.
Todd D. Cusick
Curtis R. Chisholm

24,335
10,833
8,166

2.
Purchase of Shares on Death, Disability, Retirement or Withdrawal of an
Employee. Upon the death, "disability" (as defined in Paragraph 18) or "withdrawal" (as defined in
Paragraph 18) (collectively, an "Event of Termination"), of an employee/shareholder of the Corporation
(an "Employee") (a) the remaining Shareholders shall have the right and option, but not the obligation,
exercisable at any time within ninety (90) days of any Event of Termination, to purchase, and the
employee/shareholder or, in the event of such employee/shareholder's death or disability, the personal
representative, executor, or legal administrator of the deceased or disabled employee/shareholder's
estate (a "Legal Representative") shall, upon the exercise of such right and option by the remaining
Shareholders, sell to the remaining Shareholder all or part of the stock owned by the terminated,
deceased or disabled employee/shareholder (including any stock owned by such
emplovee/shareholder's spouse, children, issue, or a trust for the exclusive benefit of such
employee/shareholder, such employee/shareholder's spouse, children, or issue) at the time of any such
Event of Termination, for the price and upon the terms and conditions hereinafter stipulated; provided
that if any remaining Shareholder does not purchase his full proportionate allotment of the Shares, the
unaccepted Shares may be purchased, proportionately, by the other remaining Shareholders within
thirty (30) days thereafter.
In the event that all or part of the stock owned by an Employee (including any stock
owned by the Employee's spouse, children, issue, or a trust for the exclusive benefit of the Employee,
the Employee's spouse, children, or issue) is not purchased in accordance with the preceding paragraphs
(a) the Corporation shall have the right and option, but not the obligation, exercisable at any time within
120 days of any Event of Termination, to purchase and redeem, and (b) the Employee (in the event of
withdrawal) or the Legal Representative, as the case may be, shall, upon the exercise of such right and
opbon by the Corporation, sell to the Corporation, all or a part of the stock owned by the Employee
(including any stock owned by the Employee's spouse, children, issue or a trust for the exclusive benefit
of the Employee, the Employee's spouse, children, or issue) at the time of any such Event of
Termination, for the price and upon the terms and conditions hereinafter stipulated.
3.
Purchase Price. If the Corporation chooses to exercise the right and option to
purchase Shares following an Event of Termination, or in the event of a purchase of Shares as otherwise
specified in this Agreement, the purchase price to be paid for a Shareholder's Shares shall be the value of
the Shares at the time of the Event of Termination or other purchase, determined as set forth in this
Paragraph. Except in the case of an Employee's "termination for cause" (as defined in Paragraph 18), the
purchase price shall be the "Book Value" (as defined in Paragraph 18) of such stock In the case of an
Employee's "termination for cause" (as defined in Paragraph 18), the purchase price shall be the lesser of
the price paid by any such Employee for such Employee's stock or the "Book Value" (as defined in
Paragraph 18) of such stock Notwithstanding the preceding two sentences, a lesser or greater purchase
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price for the common stock of the Corporation may be agreed to and specified in writing, so long as the
Corporation and each of the Shareholders consents thereto in writing.
4.
Method of Payment The purchase price to be paid for any Shares purchased in
accordance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement shall be paid as follows:
(a)
Upon the exercise of the right to purchase Shares in accordance with
this Agreement by the Corporation, then, within 180 days following the Event of Termination, and upon
the qualification of a Legal Representative of the deceased or disabled Employee's estate, the Employee
or the Legal Representative, as the case may be, shall be paid the greater of (i) the proceeds of any
insurance policy owned by the Corporation covering the deceased Employee's life, as provided in
Paragraph 11, below (limited, however, to the amount of the purchase price determined under the
provisions of subparagraph 3(a), above), or (ii) twenty percent (20%), or more, of the purchase price of
the Shares at the price determined as provided in Paragraph 3, above.
(b)
Should the amount paid under the provisions of paragraph 4(a), above,
be less than the full purchase price to be paid for the Shares, then concurrently with the payment of such
amount, the Corporation or Shareholder(s), as the case may be, shall execute and deliver to the
Shareholder or the Legal Representative, as the case may be, a Promissory Note which shall aggregate
the total unpaid balance of the purchase price owing for the Shares, which Promissory Note shall be
payable over three (3) years in equal monthly installments commencing immediately following the
execution of the Promissory Note. The Promissory Note shall bear interest at the rate equal to the prime
rate of interest charged by ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, Salt Lake City, Utah, to its most creditworthy customer, as of the date of the Event of Termination, and each payment made shall be applied
first to the payment of interest and then to the reduction of principal of the Promissory Note. The
Promissory Note shall provide that in the event of default in payment of interest or of principal all
future installments shall become due and payable immediately. Further, in the event of default under
the Promissory Note, interest shall be assessed at a default rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum
and, if collection is necessary, the costs of collection, including reasonable attorneys' fees, shall be
assessable. The Promissory Note shall be subject to prepayment, in whole or in part, at any time, and
shall be assignable by the holder thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in no event shall the aggregate
amount of the semi-annual payments on the Promissory Note during any fiscal year of the Corporation,
including principal and interest, exceed twenty percent (20%) of the Corporation's net pre-tax profits for
the preceding fiscal year. If payments must be reduced as a result of the preceding sentence, then the
amounts that are not paid when originally due shall be paid in the next succeeding fiscal year in equal
monthly installments, again subject to the twenty percent (20%) of net profits limitation.
(c)
Upon receipt of the purchase price to be paid pursuant to
subparagraphs 4(a) and 4(b), above, in cash, or in cash and by the Promissory Note, as provided above,
in payment of the Shares, the Employee or the Legal Representative, as the case may be, shall execute
and deliver to the Corporation such instruments as are necessary7 and proper to transfer full and
complete title to the Shares to the Corporation; provided that the Corporation shall irnmediately assign
to the Employee or the Legal Representative, as the case may be, as collateral security for the payment of
the unpaid balance of any Promissory Note so issued, such number of Shares as shall equal in value, as
determined by this Agreement, the amount of the unpaid Promissory Note. The Share security shall
then be released proportionately as the Promissory Note is paid.
(d)
Upon the exercise of the right to purchase Shares in accordance with
this Agreement by a Shareholder, then, within 180 days following an Event of Termination, the purchase
price shall be determined under Paragraph 3, above, and the Shareholder(s) in their discretion, shall pay
the entire purchase price of the Shares in full or pay ten percent (10%), or more, of the purchase price of
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the Shares and, concurrently therewith, execute and deliver to the Shareholder or the Legal
Representabve, as the case may be, a Promissory Note, which shall aggregate the total unpaid balance of
the purchase price owing for the Shares, on substantially the terms and condibons set forth in
subparagraph 4(b), above and subject to the terms and condibons set forth in subparagraph 4(c), above,
as revised and interpreted to benefit the purchasing Shareholder(s).
5.
Sales of Shares During Lifetime; Right of Co-Sale Each of the Shareholders
agrees that, during his lifetime, he will not transfer, encumber or dispose of any porbon or all of his
Shares, except in accordance with and strictly condiboned upon fulfillment of the terms and condibons
of this Agreement In the event a Shareholder receives a bona fide offer for the sale of his Shares, and
desires to sell the same, he shall first give nobce in writing to the other Shareholders and the
Corporabon setting forth the price offered and the terms and condibons of payment The other
Shareholders shall then have a period of thirty (30) days within which to purchase all or part of said
Shares at the same price and on the same terms and condibons. Any Shares not purchased within the
above period by the other Shareholders shall be offered to the Corporabon, at the same price and terms,
and the Corporabon shall have the right within thirty (30) days thereafter to purchase and redeem all or
part of the Shares Any Shares not purchased within the above period by the Corporabon shall be
offered to the other Shareholders, at the same price and terms, and the other Shareholders shall have the
right within thirty (30) days thereafter to purchase all or part of the Shares. If there is more than one
other Shareholder, then each Shareholder shall have the right to purchase such porbon of the Shares
offered for sale as the number of Shares owned by him at such time shall bear to the total number of
Shares owned by all other Shareholders; provided that if any Shareholder does not purchase his full
proportionate allotment of the Shares, the unpurchased Shares may be purchased by, if there is more
than one other Shareholder, the other Shareholders proportionately.
If all of the offered Shares are not purchased before the expirabon of the periods
specified in the preceding Paragraph, the offering Shareholder may dispose of any remaining offered
Shares in any lawful manner, except that he shall not sell any such Shares to any other person for any
price or upon any terms other than previously offered without first giving die Corporabon and the other
Shareholders the right to purchase the Shares at the price and on the terms offered by such other person,
and an\ person acquiring such Shares must agree to enter into a Stock Redempbon/Buy-Sell Agreement
containing provisions similar to those set forth herein with the Corporabon and the persons who then
own the remainder of the Corporabon's outstanding Shares
A sale by a Shareholder under this Paragraph shall not prejudice his right to continue to
participate in the operabons of the Corporabon Further, a Shareholder shall not have any vested right
to continue to participate in the operabons of the Corporabon, such matter being exclusively within ihe
control of the Board of Directors of the Corporabon.
Notwithstanding any term or condibon of this Paragraph 5, whenever any Shareholder
proposes to sell any shares of stock of the Corporabon, such Shareholder (the "Proposed Transferor'')
shall provide written nobce specifying the terms and condibons of the proposed sale to the other
Shareholders in the manner specified in this Paragraph 5. If the Corporabon or the other Shareholders,
as the case may be, decline to purchase the Shares from the Proposed Transferor pursuant to this
Paragraph 5, then, in lieu of such right and opbon, any or all of the Shareholders shall have the opbon to
participate in such sale with the Proposed Transferor in the manner hereinafter set forth. To exercise the
opbon, the Shareholders shall give written nobce of elecbon to the Proposed Transferor within twenty
(20) days after the expirabon of the thirty (30) day nobce period provided Thereupon, each of the
Shareholders shall have the right, but not the obligabon, to sell his Shares in the Corporabon to the
proposed purchaser upon the same terms and condibons specified in the Proposed Transferor's nobce,
pro rata with the Proposed Transferor, on the basis of their respecbve holdings of stock of the
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Corporation. The n u m b e r of Shares to be sold by the Proposed Transferor shall b e reduced b y the
number of Shares the Shareholders elect to so sell calculated in accordance with tine formula set forth in
the preceding sentence unless the proposed purchaser is willing to purchase all of the Shares proposed
to be sold by the Shareholders. If the Shareholders exercise such option, the Shareholders shall bear a
pro rata portion of the expenses incident to such sale. Failure by a Shareholder to exercise the option
within the twenty (20) day period shall be deemed a declination of any right to participate in such sale
provided that such sale is completed within ninety (90) days of the expiration of such twenty (20) day
period at a price and on terms and conditions set forth in the Proposed Transferor's notice. Failure to
meet the foregoing conditions shall require a new notice and right of co-sale with respect to such sale.
6.
Shareholder Bankruptcy, etc. If (a) any Shareholder shall make an assignment
for the benefit of creditors, (b) a trustee or receiver shall be appointed for any of the assets or properties
of any Shareholder, (c) any Shareholder shall file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy or shall consent to
the filing of an involuntary petition in bankruptcy against him, or shall fail to obtain dismissal of
bankruptcy proceedings against him within sixty (60) days following the commencement thereof, or
shall be the subject of an order for relief, or (d) an attachment or execution shall be levied upon, or a tax
or other statutory or judicial Hen shall be placed upon, any of the Shares now or at any time hereafter
held by any Shareholder and shall not be released within ten (10) days thereafter, (collectively, an "Event
of Bankruptcy"), then such Shareholder (the "Bankrupt Shareholder") shall give written notice to the
Corporation and all other Shareholders on or within three (3) days of the day of the happening of the
Event of Bankruptcy, which notice shall describe the Event of Bankruptcy.
U p o n receipt of the notice referred to in the preceding Paragraph, the Corporation shall
have the option for a period of thirty (30) days to purchase any or all of the Shares owned by the
Bankrupt Shareholder; provided that, if the other Shareholders do n o t purchase all of the Bankrupt
Shareholder's Shares, the Corporation shall have the right, within an additional ten (10) day period, to
purchase any part or all of the Bankrupt Shareholder's Shares u n p u r c h a s e d ; provided further that, if the
Corporation does not purchase any part or all of the Bankrupt Shareholder's Shares, the non-bankrupt
Shareholder shall have the right, within an additional ten (10) day period, to purchase the unpurchased
Shares; and provided further that, if there is more than one other Shareholder, each Shareholder shall
have the right to purchase that portion of the unpurchased Shares as the n u m b e r of Shares owned by
him at the date of the Event of Bankruptcy shall bear to the total n u m b e r of Shares owned by all nonbankrupt Shareholders at that date. If any non-bankrupt Shareholder does not purchase his full
proportionate share of the Shares, such unpurchased Shares m a y be purchased by the non-bankrupt
Shareholders proportionately within an additional ten (10) day period. If any of the unpurchased Shares
remain unpurchased by the non-bankrupt Shareholders, any non-bankrupt Shareholder shall have an
additional ten (10) day period within which to purchase such Shares. The price and terms of the
purchase and sale shall be as set forth in Paragraph 3, above.
Any Shares, which become subject to the provisions of this Paragraph and as to which a
purchase option is not exercised, may be transferred p u r s u a n t to such assignment for the benefit of
creditors or such trusteeship, receivership, or bankruptcy 7 proceedings, or upon sale or foreclosure
under such attachment or levy of execution or hen, upon the expiration of the purchase option; provided
that the transferee and such transferee's spouse, if applicable, execute and become parties to this
Agreement, and thereby agree to receive and hold said Shares subject to all of the terms and conditions
of this Agreement
7.
Transfers Between Shareholder and Permitted Transferee. Notwithstanding any
of the terms or conditions of this Agreement, each Shareholder shall have the right during his or her
lifetime to transfer all or any part of the Shareholder's Shares, with or w i t h o u t consideration, to a
"Permitted Transferee" (as defined in Paragraph 18, below), and the shares may be transferred from any
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sudiPermittBdTTansferee bade to the Shareholder, provided mat any Shares transferred to the
Shareholder's Permitted Transferee shall remain subject to all of the terms and conditions of this
Agreement, just as though said transfer had not taken place; and provided further that, at the discretion
and direction of the Corporation, any Permitted Transferee executes a copy of this Agreement In this
connection, the Shareholder shall have his spouse, determined as of the date of this Agreement or any
subsequent date, execute the "Consent of Spouses" attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated
herein by this reference.
8.
Endorsement of Certificates. The Shareholders agree that all 5hare certificates
which they now hold or which they may acquire in the future evidencing stock of the Corporation shall
be endorsed substantially as follows:
THIS STOCK CERTIFICATE IS SUBJECT TO A
SHAREHOLDERS' AGREEMENT, DATED AS OF THE _ D A Y
OF
, _ EXECUTED BY THE CORPORATION A N D
ALL OF ITS SHAREHOLDERS A N D IS TRANSFERABLE
ONLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT
9.
Alteration or Amendments. This Agreement may be altered or amended, in
whole or in part, at any time by filing with this Agreement a written instrument setting forth such
changes, dated and signed by the Corporation and all of the Shareholders.
10.
Termination. This Agreement shall terminate upon the earliest to occur of any
one of the following events:
(a)
The written agreement of the Corporation and all of the
Shareholders to mat effect
(b)
Corporation.

The bankruptcy, receivership or dissolution of the

(c)

The cessation of business of the Corporation.

(d)

A public offering of the capital stock of the Corporation.

(e)
Whenever there is only one surviving party to this
Agreement bound by the terms of this Agreement
(f)
If not sooner terminated, four (4) years after the
execution of this Agreement
11.
Insurance Proceeds. The Corporation shall have the right, but no obligation, to
take out insurance (whole life or term or any combination thereof) on the life of any Shareholder and a
disability insurance policy covering any Shareholder. In the event the Corporation takes out any such
insurance, the Corporation shall have the right to increase, terminate, or reduce such insurance
whenever, at the sole discretion of the Corporafaon, such insurance or additional or less insurance is
required to assist the Corporation in meeting its options or obhgations under this Agreement; provided
that, before the Corporation shall surrender any insurance policy to the insurance company which
issued the same, the Corporation shall hrst offer such policy to the insured for the same a m o u n t s )
which the Corporation would be enfatled to receive from the insurance company for the surrender of the
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insurance policy. This right to purchase insurance shall lapse if not exercised within sixty (60) days
following the sale of a Shareholder's Shares during his lifetime, the receipt of a statement of Shareholder
disability, the termination of an Employee's employment by the Corporation, or the termination of this
Agreement
The Corporation shall be the beneficiary of the policies issued to the Corporation and
may apply to the payment of premiums any dividends declared and paid on the policies. If the
Corporation shall receive proceeds from any insurance policy covering the life of a deceased
Shareholder or a disabled Shareholder, such proceeds shall be paid by the Corporation to the Legal
Representative of the decedent's estate to the extent of the purchase price of the decedent's or disabled
Shareholder's Shares. Such payment shall be deemed to have been made as payment or partial payment
of the purchase price as provided hereinabove. Any amount in excess of said purchase price shall be
retained by the CorporatiorL Payment of the insurance proceeds may be deferred until the expiration of
ninety (90) days following the deceased Shareholder's death or the disability of a Shareholder. In the
event the proceeds from such insurance policy or policies are insufficient to pay the purchase price for
the Shares, as set forth above, then the deficiency shall be paid in accordance with subparagraph 4(b),
above.
12.
Notices, Any and all notices, designations, offers, acceptances, or any other
communications provided for in this Agreement shall be given, in writing, by registered or certified
mail, which shall be addressed, in the case of the Corporation, to its principal office, and in the case of
the Shareholders, to their addresses appearing on the stock books of the Corporation.
13.
Invalid Provision; Severability. The invalidity or unenforceability of any
particular provision of this Agreement shall not affect the other provisions hereof and the Agreement
shall be construed in all respects as if such invalid provision were omitted.
14.
Legal Effect; Future Share Issuances. The provisions of this Agreement shall be
deemed covenants running with the ownership of the Shares of the Corporation presently owned by the
Shareholders and all future issuances of stock by the Corporation, and shall be binding upon and inure
to the benefit of the parties hereto, and also upon their heirs, executors, legal administrators, successors
or assigns; and the parties hereby agree for themselves and their heirs, executors, administrators,
successors or assigns, to execute any instruments and to perform any act which may be necessary or
proper to carry out the purposes of this Agreement
15.
Involuntary Transfers; Void Transfers. In the event that any portion of the
Shares of any Shareholder of the Corporation, or any interest therein, shall be acquired by any third
person, firm or corporation as a result of execution, attachment or judicial sale, by operation of law or in
any manner other than a voluntary transfer by said Shareholder, the Shares so acquired by said third
person, firm or corporation shall remain subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement and to
the rights of the Corporation and the other Shareholders of the Corporation hereunder, and the person,
firm or corporation so acquiring said Shares shall be required, as a condition precedent to transfer of
said Shares to enter in an Agreement containing provisions similar to those set forth herein with the
Corporation and the persons who then own the remainder of the Corporation's outstanding Shares.
Otherwise, any transfer or attempt to transfer any Shares in violation of the terms of this Agreement
shall not be valid. The transferee shall not be deemed to be the shareholder of such Shares, or entitled to
any rights thereon, and the Corporation shall refuse to transfer any Shares on its books to the alleged
transferee thereof.
16.
Injunctive Relief. The parties hereby declare that it is impossible to measure in
money the damages which will accrue to a party or person bound hereby or to the Legal Representative

-/-

of a deceased or disabled party or person by reason of a failure to perform any of the obligations under
this Agreement Therefore, if any party hereto or the Legal Representative of a deceased or disabled
Shareholder or a Permitted Transferee shall institute any action or proceeding to enforce the provisions
hereof, any person (including the party against whom such an action or proceeding is brought) hereby
agrees that the court in such an action is brought may grant injunctive relief and hereby waives the
claim or defense therein that such party, Legal Representative, or Permitted Transferee has an adequate
remedy at law, and such person shall not urge in any such action or proceeding the claim or defense that
such a remedy at law exists Any sale, transfer, or other disposition made in violation of this Agreement
shall be null and void and of no force or effect
17.
Provision in Will This Agreement shall be binding upon the parties to this
Agreement, their heirs, legatees, executors, administrators and assigns. To this end, each party to this
Agreement shall maintain in effect at all times a will directing his or her representative to carry out the
terms and conditions of this Agreement and to execute any and all documents necessary to accomplish
that result, provided that the failure to maintain in effect such a will shall not affect the rights or
obligations of the parties to this Agreement
18.
Definitions. As used in this Agreement, the following terms shall have the
meanings set forth below:
(a)
Disability. For purposes of this Agreement, if at any time in the opinion
of the Corporation a question arises as to the disability of any Shareholder, then the Corporation shall
prompt!} employ three (3) physicians who are members of the American Medical Association to
examine the Shareholder and determine if his physical and mental condition is such as to render him
incapable of participating in die operations of the Corporation. In the event the Shareholder under
consideration appears to have mental capacity to act in his own behalf, then one (1) of the three (3)
physicians employed by the Corporation for this purpose shall be a physician selected by the
Shareholder The decision of said group of three (3) physicians shall be certified in writing to the Board
of Directors of the Corporation and the Board of Directors may make such certification available to the
Shareholder or his Legal Representative The Board of Directors of the Corporation, m its sole
discretion, shall make any final determination of permanent disability and said determination of
permanent disability shall be binding and conclusive upon the Corporation and the involved
Shareholder and shall have the effect of terminating the participation of the Shareholder in the
operations of the Corporation for purposes of this Agreement
(b)
Permitted Transferee. For purposes of this Agreement, (l) a transfer by
a Shareholder of any of his Shares in the Corporation (A) to his spouse or issue of either of them or his
parents, or (B) in trust for the benefit of himself, his spouse, or issue of either spouse; provided that the
Shareholder has and at all times maintains legal and practical control of any such trust, (C) to a family
partnership in which the Shareholder has and at all times maintains legal and practical control of die
affairs of the family partnership and in which the only partners are the Shareholder, his spouse, or the
issue of either of them or (D) to Shareholders other shall be deemed a transfer of Shares to a "Permitted
Transferee", and such spouse, or the issue of either spouse, shall be deemed to be a Permitted Transferee
with respect to such Shares, (u) a person shall be deemed a Permitted Transferee of a Shareholder only
with respect to the Shares received from such Shareholder or from other Permitted Transferees of such
Shareholder, and (in) a Permitted Transferee shall be deemed a Permitted Transferee of the Shareholder
from whom he received such Shares, or if the Shares were received from another Permitted Transferee,
the Shareholder from whom such Permitted Transferee received the Shares.
(c)
Withdrawal, Termination for Cause. Any withdrawal by an Employee
from participation in the operabons of the Corporation as a result of the mutual or unilateral decision of
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the Employee and Hie Corporation or the Employee, respectively, other than by reason of disability or
"termination for cause" (as defined below). For purposes of this Agreement, "termination for cause"
shall mean termination of an Employee's employment by and with the Corporation, upon fifteen (15)
days written notice from the Corporation, for "cause" as follows:
(i)
if the Employee has been convicted of, or pleads guilt}' or nolo
contendere to, a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude, in which case the
Corporation may terminate such Employee's employment immediately upon the
occurrence of such conviction or plea; or
(ii)
if the Employee has (A) engaged in fraudulent misconduct with
respect to the Corporation, or (B) engaged in theft of Corporation assets; or
(iii)
if the Employee has committed any material breach of his
obligations, covenants, agreements, or warranties to the Corporation; or
(iv)
in the event of the repeated neglect, malfeasance, nonfeasance,
or other conduct of the Employee in the performance of the services of the
Employee to the Corporation, any of which (in the reasonable judgment of the
Board of Directors of the Corporation) is detrimental to the best interests of the
Corporation; or
(v)

if the Employee has a substance abuse problem.

(d)
Book Value. For purposes of this Agreement, "Book Value" shall mean
the consolidated net shareholders' equity of the Corporation determined as of the end of each of the
Corporation's calendar years (commencing December 31,1994) as certified to by the firm of independent
public accountants then regularly employed by the Corporation, divided by the n u m b e r of the Shares
issued and outstanding. Such determination shall be m a d e on an accrual basis in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles and shall be binding and conclusive u p o n the parties to this
Agreement and their Permitted Transferees. Proceeds of any insurance owned by the Corporation on
the life of a deceased Shareholder shall not be included in any calculation of "Book Value" (as defined
below) for purposes of arriving at the value of the Shares o w n e d by the deceased Shareholder, his estate,
heirs, or Permitted Transferee(s). The "Book Value" (as defined below r ) as of December 31 of each year
(commencing December 31, 1993) shall be based on audited financial statements. However, because of
the fame required to prepare audited financial statements as of December 31 of each year, any valuation
of Shares that is to be m a d e after December 31 of a year b u t before completion of audited financial
statements (and the price to be paid) shall be based u p o n an estimate of "Book Value" (as defined below)
as of the appropriate December 31. Such estimate of "Book Value" (as defined below) and purchase
price shall be adjusted following receipt of the audited financial statements so as to conform wTith the
audited financial statements.
(e)
Shareholders' Equity7. For p u r p o s e s of this Agreement, "Shareholders'
Equity" shall mean the shareholders' equity of ihe Corporation as certified to by the firm of certified
public accountants then regularly employed by the Corporation in the Corporation's most recent
consolidated financial statements. Such determination shall be binding and conclusive upon the parties
to the Agreement and their Permitted Transferees.
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General Provisions. The parties hereto hereby agree to the following general

provisions:
(a)
The administrator, personal representative or Legal Representative of a
deceased 01 disabled Shareholder shall execute and deliver any and all documents or legal instruments
necessarv or desirable to carry out the provisions of this A g r e e m e n t
(b)
This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah,
notwithstanding the fact that one of the parries to this Agreement may hereafter become a resident of a
different State.
' '
enforce the provisions ^i >*.
reasonable attorneys' fees.

In the event any legal, action is required by a party to this Agreement to
the prevailing part)' shall be entitled to recover its costs of suit, including

(d)
The rights and obligations of any Shareholder 1 , Permitted ' I i ansferee, or
the heirs or estate of either of them under this Agreement may not be assigned without the prior written
consent of the CorporationFuture Shareholders of the Corporation may become parties to this
Agreement b) exec utuig a counterpart hereof and, if and w h e n applicable, by having their spouse
execute a counterpart of the Consent of Spouses attached hereto, whereupon each such signing person
shall be bound by the terms and conditions of this Agreement and shall be entitled to the rights under
this Agreement the re a fter as though such person had originally executed this Agreement
(£)
It is e
. understood that this Agreement constitutes the entire
agreement between the parties hereto ana tnat mere are no representations, warranties, or agreements,
whether express or implied or oral or written, except as set forth herein. The terms and conditions of
thus Agreement may be modified only by a written agreement signed by all the parties hereto.
(g)
No waiver of any of the provisions of this Agreement shall be deemed,
or shall constitute, a waiver of any other provision, whether or not similar, nor shall any waiver
constitute a continuing waiver. No waiver shall be binding unless executed in writing by the party
malang the waiver.
fill
Unless 'the context otherwise requires, the singular includes the plural,
flic pluml iih lutit'i I he siTiguli", and any 'masculine or feminine references include the other.
20.
Termination by Establishment of Public Market for Shares; Termination by
Shareholder Agreement This Agreement shall automatically terminate and all restrictions upon the
sale, disposition or transfer of the Shares established b y this Agreement shall be removed at such time as
the Corporation shall, with approval of the Shareholders w h o own or whose Permitted Transferees o w n
two-thirds (2/3) of all of the Shares, through voluntary registration or other voluntary action establish a
public market for the Shares, This Agreement may be teirninated by the affirmative vote of
Shareholders who own or whose Permitted Transferees own two-thirds (2/3) of all of the Shares.
(a)
In the event that this Agreement is so terminated, any Shareholder w h o
voted against termination and his Permitted Transferee(s), may, within ninety (90) days from such
termination, offer all, b u t not some, of their aggregate Shares to the Corporation for purchase upon the
terms and conditions set forth in Paragraphs 3 and 4, above, and the Corporation shall purchase such.
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Shares as therein provided. If the Corporation has insufficient "Shareholders' Equity" (as defined below)
to purchase all of the Shares which are offered to the Corporation by such Shareholders and Permitted
Transferees, then the Corporation shall purchase such Shares to the extent that it shall have qualified
"Shareholders' Equity" (as defined below), such "Shareholders' Equity" (as defined below) to be used
(proportionately, if inadequate to purchase all such Shares) among all of such Shareholders and
Permitted Transferees who offer Shares pursuant to this subparagraph
(b)
Should the Corporation fail to purchase the Shares of any such
Shareholder or Permitted Transferee or any part thereof, as in Paragraph 20(a), above, then such
Shareholder or Permitted Transferee may sell those Shares not purchased by the Corporation in
accordance with the procedure contained in Paragraph 5, above except that no offer need be made to the
Corporation as called for in subparagraph 20(a), above, and the only parties having a right to purchase
such Shares shall be the other eligible Shareholders.
(c)
A sale by a Shareholder under this Paragraph shall not prejudice his
right to continue to be an employee of the Corporation. Neither shall such a Shareholder have any
vested right to continue to be an employee of the Corporation, such matter being exclusively the
responsibility of management of the Corporation.
(d)
It is understood that the rights conferred by this Paragraph are optional
to said Shareholders and Permitted Transferees and that they may retain their Shares in die Corporation
following termination of this Agreement by agreement of the Shareholders.
21.
Previous Shareholders' and Shareholder's Agreements. This Agreement
supersedes, amends and replaces all previous Shareholders' and Shareholder's Agreements.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Corporation has caused this Agreement to be executed by
its dulv authorized officers and the Shareholders have executed this Agreement, all as of the poky of _
SHAREHOLDERS:

<&{2,M2WASATCH OIL & GAS CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation

By.
Its;
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April 15, 1997

Boai d ol Directors
Wasatch Energy Corporation
240 South 200 West
P.O. Box 699
Farmington, " 1 R ' 1 , T , f

Please accept this notice of my resig ,J, ~\ ai* n t
< uuai.r.ion.:
Board of Directors of Wasatch Energ> Corporation emu wasatch Oil & Gao
Corporation (collectively, the "Company").
In accordance with the Employment Agreement (the "Agreement") entered into
between the Company and myself dated March 31, 1995, I make the following
assertions:
1. My employment terminates 90 days after the dcVi nil HIM, iiesignafi 'i
July 14, 1997. July 14, 1997 will be my date ot .-.
iation.

'I i I ••

2. I am under no obligation to continue to guarantee the line of credit and will
immediately notify Barnes Banking Co,,, of my resignation and of my
withdrawal of the personal guarantee.
.:. i am under no obligation to continue as a Directoi or as Chairman of the
Board of Directors and therefore immediately resign from these positions
; estricted from performing certain activities as outlined in paragraph 6 of
the Agreement for a period of 1,2 months following the termination of rr my
employment.
In accordance with the Shareholders' Agreement entered into between myself
and Todd D. Cusick and Curtis R. Chisholm on or about the first week of April
iOGC;
, I am required to sell my shares in the corporation on a pro rata basis to
; D Cusick and Curtis R. Chisholm for the audited Book Value as of June
• , ?v " i i the event these two individuals do not purchase the stock the «
Corporation has the right to purchase any remaining shares for the same price,
Please inform me of the activities 1 should perform prior to July 14, 1997

Sincerp,w

•• „ £ " K Eggetf Jr.

S
|
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Friday, April 25, 1997
Roger Eggett
1026 South Mary Circle
Bountiful, UT 84010
Dear Roger:
The purpose of this letter is to inform you that on April 16,1997, the Board of
Directors for Wasatch Energy Corporation accepted your resignation as
President and Chairman of tne Board of Directors. Information regarding your
status of employment with Wasatch will be forthcoming.
Yesterday you asked me to confirm in writing my request that you do not come
to the Wasatch offices. This letter confirms that request. Please direct all
inquiries of Wasatch in writing to either Brian Watts or myself.
Sincerely,
WASATCH ENERGY CORPORATION
/y^

Todd Cusick
President

S
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IOHNL.YOUNTCBRETT F. PAULSEN'"
LYNNS.DAVIES
ROBERT G. GILCHRIST
RUSSELL C.FERICKS
MICHAEL R MOHRMAN

MICHAEL N. EMERY
MICHAEL n ZACCHEO
CARYL. JOHNSON
CURTIS J. DRAKE
GEORGE TNAEGLE
CRAIG CCOBURN
BRAD C BETEBENNER
ROBERT G. WRIGHT"
CHRISTIAN W. NELSON t t

ELIZABETH A HRUBYMILLS
BRETM HANNAMcKAY M.PEARSON
MATTHEW C.BARNECKKENT W HANSEN
MARK L. MCCARTY
CARRIE T TAYLOR
S. BROOK MILLARD
JAMES L. BARNETT

Of COUNSEL
ROBERT W BRANDT
WILLIAM S RICHARDS
WALLACE R LAUCHNOR
ROBERT W MILLER (1<*4(W1Q83)
ALSO ADMITTED IN
— ARIZONA
- MICHIGAN
t CALIFORNIA
TE>.AS
- COLORADO • WYOMING
t t IDAHO

KEY BANK JQWER
5U SOUTH MAIN ?th FLOOR
POST OFFICE BOX 2465
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84110-2465

n

(801)531-2000 FAX (801)532-5506
INTERNET ADDRESS

rbmn.cum

Via Facsimile No. 801-537-5199

CAMP!
>,\\: K& SESSIONS
201 South Main, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Re:

Termination of Roger Eggett *s Employment with Wasatch Energy Corp.
Ot JX File No. 13771 001

Deai 1 'en: in:
I h is letter is to advise Mr. Eggett that the Board of Directors of Wasatch Energy Corp. met
May 16, 1997, to review Mr. Eggett's continued employment status with the company At that meeting it
was the determination of the Board of Directors that Mr. Eggett has violated his Employment Agreement in
the following:
-- .
Jtors is acxisec tna: M:
•:•;)., . . ... ~ . ..Jywhite to lesvMht* £ ^r
L'L-etf s emplovnenl contract
i the Corporation and the Chairman of the
*v. . LA. ;...
. . . ^ . ; i took excessive sums and compensation
'h. at the approval of the Board of Directors nor the company's
Compensation Committee. Mr. Eggett repeatedly refused to disclose to
the Board or Compensation Committee the amounts he was taking in
compensation as well as misrepresented to Board members the amoiint. he
was taking.
Mr. Eggett abused his expense account. For examr
reimbursement such personal expenses as a person^ .
to the Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation. Further, Mr Eggett,
Brian. Watts, the Secretary of the company; to make the payments for
Mi Eggett's personal vehicle. Mr. Eggett misrepresented that *•expense was part of his compensation package anr*"^ . : u* *Uf
,-.

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

i

PerrinR Love
May 16, 1997
Page 2

However, this expense was not even requested by Mr. Eggett from
K. Painter (1 member of the Compensation Committee) until
approximately three months after the company began making these
payments, and has never been approved.
• At a company meeting held on April 15, 1997, while Mr. Eggett was still
the President of the company, Mr. Eggett stated to the employees of the
company that the company was a sinking ship and recommended that all
employees leave the company as soon as possible because, in Mr. Eggett's
absence, there was no capable management within the company. These
statements were clearly disruptive and detrimental to the company's
interests.
• After Mr. Eggett resigned and was removed as the President of the
corporation he made repeated calls and visits to company employees
during normal business hours, disrupting the company's business. Todd
Cusick, the President of the company as of that time, requested that
Mr. Eggett not enter the premises and that future communications from
Mr. Eggett be made in writing. However, Mr. Eggett disregarded this
request and continued to disrupt the company's business by entering the
premises and making repeated calls to company employees during business
hours.
All but the last of the foregoing acts were taken at a time when Mr. Eggett was acting as the
President of the company as well as the Chairman of the Board of Directors, and owed the company a duty
of fidelity and loyalty commensurate with that position. In the judgment of the Board of Directors, these
acts constitute grounds for termination for cause under paragraphs 2(e)(ii), 2(e)(iii) and 2(e)(iv) of
Mr. Eggett's Employment Agreement.
Each of these acts, in the determination of the Board of Directors, constitute independent grounds
for termination for cause under Mr. Eggett's Agreement. Accordingly, we hereby notify you that inasmuch
as Mr. Eggett has been paid in advance through May 31, 1997, his employment with the company is
terminated for cause effective that date. If Mr. Eggett believes the Board is mistaken in its determination
with regard to any of the foregoing acts, the Board of Directors is willing to consider any explanation or
appeal which Mr. Eggett submits in writing.

Perrin R. Love
May 16, 1997
Page 3

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Wasatch will horioi Mr. Eggett's request for a shareholder meeting,,,
In light of Wasatch's termination of Mr. Eggett for cause, the shareholder meeting will be held on. May 30,
1997 at 10:00 p.m at our offices,,, Appropriate notices will be sent to all shareholders.
As we have previously advised you, the company reserves all rights to seek reimbursement .and
damages from. Mi „,. Eggett for any excess compensation oi distribution taken, by Mr. Eggett.
I received a copy of youi lettei dated May 14, 1997 this i i IOI ning and ha\ e forwarded it to Wasatch
for its consideration. We will respond to this once Wasatch has an, opportunity to consider your proposal.
However, it appears that Mr. Eggett's offer demands a greater amount than his previous offer1",,
Finally, I am advised that 'Mr. Eggett has demanded access to "W asatch records, ; writing the records to which Mr. Eggett seeks access together with the purpose for acces„ ~.
which V Eggett claims he is enisled thereto ird Wasatch w?'s considei h\<* ?eoues:
<

. . . . . .

Sincerely,

K W H / p m 152547

cc:

n
^ w.i

. PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION
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INELfCROBERT L. STEVEN"DAVID L. BARCLAY BRETT F. PAULSFV
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ROBERT G. GILCHRIS:
RUSSELL C.FERICK'
MICHAEL K. MOHRMA?

M1CHAE; N. EMEF'
MICHAELF ZACCHtC
GARY L. IOHNSON
CURTIS i.DRAKl
GEORGE T. NAEGLi
CRAiGC.COBURN
ERADC.BETEBENNER
ROBERT G.WRIGHT •
CHRISTIAN; W. NELSON t?

KEY BANK TOWER
50 SOUTH MAIN 7th FLOOK

ELIZAEETH. ....JEVM1
EKETM.HAMN^MckAYM. PEARSONMATTHEW C. BARNECK
KENT W: HANSEN
MARK L. McCART;
CARRIE T. TAYLOF
S.EROOKMILLARU
IAMESL.BARNET:

OFCOUN'SE.
ROBERT W BRAND:
WILLIAM S. RICHARDS
WALLACE R. LAL'CHNOFROBERT W. MILLER (1^0-19?.'
ALSO ADMITTED IN
"AR1ZON-.
~ MICHIGAN
+ CALIFORNIA • TEXAS
- COLORADO ' WYOMING
ft IDAHO

August28? 1997

POST OFFICE BOX 24fcr
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8J]10-24fcr

Via Hand-delivery

(801)531-2000 FAX (S01)532-550r
INTERNET ADDRESS rbmn.coir

Perrin R. Love
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS
201 South Main, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Wasatch Energy Corp. v. Eggett
Our File No. 13771-001

Dear Perrin:
Enclosed is a check in the amount of $1,216.70 made payable to Mr. Eggett for the purchase of his
shares in Wasatch Energy Corporation. This sum represents the amount Mr. Eggett paid for his shares
(24,334 shares X .05 per share). By this letter we are notifying you of Wasatch's decision to terminate the
Standstill Agreement, and hereby demand that Mr. Eggett return his shares in Wasatch no later than close of
business Friday, August 29, 1997. The shares may be returned by deliver)' to me. In the event Mr. Eggett
refuses to return his shares as provided herein, the shares will be canceled on Wasatch's books.
Should you wish to discuss the matter or have questions please call.
Very trulv vours.
RICHA

KWH/pm: mn:

T, MILLER & NELSON
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Arthur-J3L GccafeUcH:
i 11 -' uid sgazf

T7Jt juiiw Street
Sancry. t/r S4C93

May 9, 1997
Magna Energy
International
620 So Main Street
Bountiful
[77 84 010
Gentlemen:
i ou instructed
me to perform
± limited
examinatic:
: c: : the
books
and records
and corporate
minutes
of Wasatch
Energy
Corporation
= i ) ::i" to pay particular
attention
to salary
payments
to principa
2
officers;
bonus and or profit
sharing
payments
to all employees
travel
expense
reimbursements'
of principal
officers,
corporate
c on t ri b u t i on s a n d a ny othe r paym ents
ma de o n o r b e h a 1 f o f a n}
corporate
employee*
To accomplish
this,
I reviewed
all
corporate
minutes
(from
the
date
of incorporation
(7/8/93)
to and including
4/30/9"* r )
Z
reviewed
all
corporate
bank statements
for 1994, 1995,
1996 a nd
1997,
The corporation,
at various
times,
had checking
accounts
with First
Security
Bank of Utah, Zions
First
National
Bank and
Ba rnes Banking
Co.
I reviewed
all available
payroll
records
and
data pertaining
to bonus and profit
sharing
payments.
I rev iewed
all available
vouchers
submitted
for travel
reimbursements.
1'i.lfrecJ

UpCI'il

! I|

e - ' X d / l i J H a l , ,1 ! 11

|
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I
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FACTS
COMPENSATION;
1,
The corporation
had employment
contracts
with its
three
principal
officer/employees.
However,
these
contracts
were
silent
as to the amount of compensation
or method
of
computing
such compensation.
The contracts
were entered
into
on March 31 ,
1995,
the term of the contract
was from April
17, 1995
through
Apri Z 16,
2 9 9 9 fo r Roger
Eggett
Tr a nd £ ro m Sp r i 1 2 7
1995
P DEFENDANT'S
••
EXHIBIT
11 A^\ a- &</i/L <
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through April
16, 1996 for Todd Cusick
Section
3 of the employment
contracts
compensation.
It states
as
follows:

and Curtis
sets
the

JUB

Chisholm.
terms
for

Compensation.
The Employee
shall
be
entitled
compensation
for any and all
services
performed
under
Agreement as may be agreed tof in writing^ by the parties
to
Agreement.

to
this
this

The Salary,, in the event that this Agreement shall not be
terminated/
shall
be reviewed
at least
annually
and may be
increased
or decreased,
consistent
with general salary
increases
or decreases/
as the case my bef for the Corporation's
executive
employees or as appropriate
in light
of the performance
of the
Corporation and the Employee.
I could not find
and the employee
payments.

any written
agreements between the
Corporation
as to compensation,
bonus or profit
sharing

Absent any additional
information,
I have concluded
that
officer
salaries,
bonus and or profit
sharing payments would
to be determined and approved by the Board of
Directors.

all
have

The minutes of the Board of Directors
meetings
did not
address
the problem.
That is, the Board did not set salary or any other
compensation package for the officer/employees.
However, in the
directors
meeting of May 31, 1995 the issue of company
payroll
was discussed.
Roger stated
that the following
minimum payroll
had been agreed to:
(There was no board action on
this.)
Roger
Todd
Curtis
Roger, also
be increased

indicated
that circumstances,
to the following
levels:
Roger
Todd
Curtis

$ 4 000 per mo
1 500 per mo
1 500 per mo
allowing,

payroll

would

$ 7 000 per mo
4 583 per mo
3 150 per mo

Roger
Eggett
Jr.,
assumed
the
sole
responsibility,
for
determining
the pay, bonus and profit
sharing for all
employees.
The amount of compensation
was never
openly
discussed
in
director's
meetings,
staff meetings
or committee meetings.
The
director
of Finance had no idea as to the salary of any employee

HAY-12-B7 HON 16:37

until
1997.

he

WASfiT" ENERGY

recovered

the

payroll

I "AX 1 10 801 & 1 92:04

records

from

Paychex

in

April

During
the year
1995,
the exact
date
is unknown,
Roger
Eggett
decided
that
all
employees
should
receive
their
salaries
in
advance.
At that
time he had the finance
officer
issue
each
employee
an additional
paycheck,
making' 13 pay periods
in
1995
and placing
all current and future
employee's
on the program
~f

receiving j a}r r <::> 2 1 fo r pe c iods of time not yet
The total
employees
year)

worked.

payment of wages, bonus and profit
sharing paid. t< 2 1
of the company for the period ended I7/~- /$6 (ca 1 • M i :: i1" = : r

and 3/31/97

l f. i rst

qua. rter)

are

3 1 96 (12 employees)
: " I S >7 (13 employees)

as

follows~

$55o jr 240 196

CONTRIBUTIONS :
The corporationf
at the request
of its
employees,
initiated
a
program
in mid 1936 whereby
any employee
could ' designate
a
portion
of his salary
to be paid
directly
to the Bishop
of
his
IDS Ward.
The amounts
so designated
would not be
considered
wages to the employee,
but, would be considered
as a
contribution
from Wasatch to the LDS Wa rd.
Only two employee9sf
Roger K. Eggett
Jr and Todd Cusick,
took
-advantage
of this
program
foi
the fiscal
year
ended
6/30/96*
However,
for
the calendar
year
ended. 12/31/96,
two
additional
employees,
Curtis
R
Chisholm
and
Richard
K
Eggett
a 2 so
participated
in the
program.
Th e idea
was appa ren lly
concei ved a t: 3 1 unch
mee ti ng <::: f th e
empl oyees
i n Dec emh er 1995,
Th e c omp a ny h ad. onl y fo 1 11: ( 4 I
employees
at the time and they all
agi eed to di.scuss
the
idea
with their
bishop
to see if it had merit*
Roger stated
he would
1 un it by his attorney
to determine
if it was
legal.
2 'he principa
1 benefit
his tithing
paid, by
W-2 and to avoid
the
so a
llocated.

to be derived
by the employee
was
the company,
not include
the income
payment
of FICA AND MC taxes
on the

to
have
0.2 1 his
amounts

MAY-12-37 HON 16:37
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The principal
benefits
to be derived
by the company were to
a contribution
deduction
in lieu
of wages paid
and to avoid
payment of the employers
share of the FICA AND MC taxes.

?.lfi

have
the

It appears
that the employees
attempted
to create
a plan
similar
to a "Cafeteria
Plan"
whereby
they
could
allocate
wages
as
contributions
and not have to include
them in taxable
income.
However,
in a cafeteria
plan,
even though
the amounts are
not
subject
to income tax they are subject
to FICA AND MC tax.
In reality
the checks
employee
and were then
his
bishop.

were
given

made payable
to the Ward of
to the employee
to hand deliver

the
to

I would assume the person
who delivered
the donation
was
given
credit
in his
tithing
record
and there
would be nothing
to
prevent
that person
from claiming
the contribution
when
preparing
his federal
income tax
return.
Possible
tax consequence:
In the event of an IRS audit
the
contributions
would probably
be disallowed
to the company
with
the amounts being
allocated
to the employee
as additional
wages
or as consent
dividends.
If the amounts were determined
to be
additional
wages to the employee
the tax impact
to the
company
would be additional
FICA AND MC (both employee
and employer)
and
possibly
federal
withholding
taxes
on the amounts so
allocated.
However,
if determined
to be consent
dividends
the company
would
lose the deduction
for the amounts so paid and would be
required
to pay the additional
federal
taxes and interest.
The impact
to
the employee
would be minor.
They would probably
have to
include
in income the amounts so allocated,
but,
the offset
would be a
contribution
deduction
for the amounts so included
in
income.

TRAVEL REIMBURSEMENT:
Apparently
it
is
the policy
of the company
to reimburse
all
authorized
travel.
Receipt
documentation
is
required.
All
company travel
was either
by the company president,
Roger
K.
Eggett
Jr.,
or was authorized
by him.
On most occasions
Roger
Eggett
was accompanied
by another
employee.
All
travel
costs
would be charged to the credit
card of Mr. Eggett.
At the end of
the month he would submit
a voucher
requesting
reimbursement
of
all funds
spent.

HAY-1.2-97 HON 13=38
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Mr. Eggett
would, prepare
his own. travel
i ' ouchers
and submit
them
along
with the documents
for payment.
In most instances
there
wa s not an appi oving signature
on the travel
voucher.
The travel

voucher

was used

for

reimbursement

of items

other

than

company trave I
Mr.

Eg g • • ' t: t:

Ir took

flyi ng

lessons

and

submi tted

them

for

reimbursement.
Mr. Eggett
would also purchase,
for t he
office,
i terns
of
office
furni ture,
cell
phones,
offi ce
e< 3 uipment ,
computers,
office
supplies,
etc* and charge
them to his
American
Exp re ss
ca rd. a n d t h em s 1 i bin:! 1:11 n g do cumenta 11 © n a s ki n g fo r

reimburse-

**

1 reviewed
all travel
vouchers
submitted
time period
1/1/96
through
4/1/07,
with
submitted
1/5/97
and 4/2/97.
The latter
be
located.

by Mr. Eggett
for
the exception
of
two vouchers
could

the
those
not

1 discussed
the travel
reimbursement
policy
with Mr. Brian Watts,
he indicated
that Mr, Eggett
controlled
all travel
1
eimbvrsement
authority.
That any travel
by person
other
than Mr. Eggett
would
be approved
by Mr. Eggett.
Since/
Mr. Eggett,
was the
President
of the Company and controlled
all
travel
author!ty
21 1 ra » 1 :i ot
necessary
for anyone
to approve
his travel
reimbursement.
Hi
Watts
further
stated
that his function
was to verify
that
all
submitted
vouchers
had adequate
documentation
of all
claimed
charges.
He

did

stater

however,

that

the

reason

all

of

the

travel

was

charged, to Mi
would get credit

Eg g e11 '* s American Ca.rd was so tha t Mx , Egge11
for SKY MILES
? ,3 » benefits
from the SKY MILES

were

to

keep.

state

that

Mr.

Mr. Eggetts
Watts

enough

did

SKY MILES

Mr,

Eggett.

had

told,

him

that

he

had

I• ::> t a ke he and hIs fami Iy on a n exten,ded

trip

to Europe
When questioned
about
the flying
lessons
Mr. Watts
stated
that
Mr. Eggett
stated
in a staff
meeting
that he was going
to
take
flying
lessons
in o rdei to save the company money.
That is,
2f
h e had a private
license
he would
be able
to rent
small
airplanes,
when necessaryf
in order
to save time in
performing
company business.
( V. i s i t i n g remote locations,
e t :: )

The total

cost

of pi ivate

lessons reimbursed

was $ ; 069.50
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Mr. Eggett's
"Pilots
log" would reveal
any and all
trips
made on
behalf
of Wasatch Energy,
including
any and all passengers
who
accompanied
him, place
of origin,
- destination,
date of
departure
and date of
return.
The available
records
revealed
that Roger Eggett
Jr only rented
a
private
plane once and that was to fly
to Vail,
Colorado.
Many
commercial
flights
fly into and out of Vail each day.
Indeed,
I
heard that the whether was so bad that the plane
was abandoned
in
Vail
and a commercial
flight
was used to return
to Salt
Lake
City.
Automobile

Payment:

Roger Eggett
Jr.
approved
the lease
payment
for
an
automobile
operated
by Todd Cusick.
The automobile
is a 1997 Toyota.
Lease
payment is $477.56 per month starting
May 1, 1997.
This
payment
along with all
operating
cost
of the vehicle
were approved
for
corporate
expenditures
because
the vehicle
is u s e d in excess
of
90% on company
business.
Roger Eggett
Jr. also approved
the corporation
making
automobile
payments
for his
own personal
automobile
starting
November
1,
1996.
The payments
are made to Utah First
Cr Un in the amount of
$653.16
per month.
The company was also
to pay all
operating
expenses
of this
automobile.
It appears
that Rogers automobile
was driven
for personal
use and therefore
the payments
additional
compensation.

mostly
should

(85% or more)
be
considered

CONCLUSION
Based upon the records
and documents
examined and the
interviews
conducted
I have concluded
that Roger K. Eggett,
Jr.
withdrew
funds from the corporation
in excess
of the amounts authorized
by
e i t h e r t h e Board of Directors
or his employment contract
as
follows:
Compensation
- bonus
v&thout
authorization:
1996
1997

and profit

sharing

$ 88
63

payments

754
250

taken

WftSftl'11 W l : i M
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Travel
IK

Reimbursement

-

cos

\ne f f t :
2596

•'

Contributions
behalf
of Roger K,
1996
1997

- contrijbutiorjs
Egguit

to

the LDS Church

for

and

on

$ 19 400
4 600
contributions

to

Ouelessebougou

contributions

to Rock/

1997

1996

Foundation

> i .J
- Automobile

' he y e a r s

Flk

;» I 11

19 97

4+11 ±uch

Mt,

amounts

should

i1 Q96 and

N

payments

ai1&\1

h

to

hi*

Utah First

(<•/.»!

Cr Un

zompensation

for

1 99 '

2 'h 1 5 wo ul d i e s u 21 i ,.n h x s t o t a 1 c oizip en s a i i o n a s fo 2 1 «o t r s :
2 (I TAL COMPENSATION

Roger

K, Eggett

PAID

Jr.,

R DGER R, EGGETT JR. ;
4/1/97

$ 84 000
88 754
172 754

$ 28 000
62 350
90 250

President

Base Salary
(Board
Meeting
5/31/95)
$7 000 p/m
'
Bonus N
- -mfif
Sharing
Balance
I JLUicoL Paymen l ' I"
Hill
LDS Ward
Designated

12 i f 31/36

amount

. _„

12

500

not

yet pa id to Moss Mil I I D 5

4 600
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Contribution

B X NO. BD:l *51 B2D4

to Ouelessebougou

P.

1 250

Contribution
to Rocky Mt
Elk Foundation
1 000
Automobile
Utah First
Reimbursed
Lessons
Total
Less:
Excess

Payments made
Cr Union
Flying

1 306

2 613

7 060

Compensation
Base Salary (above)
Compensation Paid

|

189 020

111 313

84 000
105 020

28 000
83 313

It appears that Wasatch would have a very strong case to demand
repayment of all excess bonus and profit
sharing,
contributions
and reimbursements
for personal
expenses taken by Roger and for
that matter any and all employees who received
such
payments.
Again, it must be noted that there was never any authority
for
the corporation
to pay any employee or officer
a bonus or
profit
sharing distribution,
reimbursement
for personal
expenses.
Any
such payments would, at best be an illegal
distribution,
subject
to recapture,
or at worst, a theft of corporate
funds.
It should be noted at this time that no employee or officer
of
the corporation,
other
than Roger K. Eggett,
Jr.,
had any
knowledge
of how the bonus or profit
sharing
payments
were
computed or paid.
They, therefore,
would be only
innocent
participants
of the payment plans.
No recommendation is made in
reference
to these
amounts.
RECCMMENLATIONS
Recommended that the company abandon it policy
of paying
salary
in advance and return to the old conventional
method of work now
receive pay
later.
Recommended that the company immediately
review
all
wage and
salary
payments and adjust
them in accordance
with
ordinary,
necessary
and reasonable
amounts.
Further,
if a bonus or
profit
sharing plan is to be put in place,
it be done by legal
document
and approved by the Board of Directors.
That any and all bonus
or profit
sharing payments be made once each year not later
than
60 days following
the close of the taxable
year.
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•it"

KQCprnmended "that the company discontinue
einpLoyees ±© earmaxic part
of their
salary
to have
the
company
withhold
and pay
corporate
contx
ibution,

"1!" iiui

M

MU\

the policy
of alJourijng
as a contribution
and
e
the
contribute
on f\
n

zrsr.enc
z cr-r the
company
reference
tc travel
an
. c-- . c-- ,.ub;. rsement.
That
travel
be
authorized
Jb> a designated
perse:
.reimbursements
he approved
>*• <* different
person,
^egOJrgnejia-ecj
^
^
„w:.^
employee t h a t .
secure
hearing'
note,
' . ** such
appropri a t e c c 2 j- 5 /"».

miHlJJR V

,,,"i;^DFi;JiiT.OF

;p

in
company
•.'-.•*
4)1

P-.^JL-^

all

__ 4^<3t/ii> w-u a d v a n c e s r.oney
such
advance
with
signed
r
advance
or loan
*
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:
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-^
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1

1

-^^^rA2©«53BWfl»IMB»
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1

1

Jf? . .
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1994
HI
:

L H I I I ^ M B

1995

1996

1997

Sales (millions)

'"

'J ^

1996 Actual Payroll
Payroll Prior to Joining Wasatch
1996
;gett
Cusick
Chisholm

Prior

$195,704 $180,000
$80,776

$54,000

$83,355

$45,000

$67,100

$42,000

109%
142%
185%

Mr. Eggett's
1997 Compensation Agreement

$7,000 Per Month
10% of Net Income
Before Taxes

Compensation Paid to Roger Eggett
Between January and May 1997
Month

Base Pay

• January '97
• February '97
•March ''97
•" April ;.97
• May "97

$7,000
$7,000
$7,000
$7,000
$0

Other
$15,300
$7,650
$20,400
$19,000
$2,500

Description
Nov. *96 profit sharing
Dec. *96 profit sharing
Jan. 497. profit sharing
Feb. *97 profit sharing
Consulting Fee

1997 Profit Sharing Remaining
to be Paid
1

;v-r-.-.?- •••*• *-rtt'.<&***&stsc3Kiuk mm*

-i..:i.*,3T73»!,:>: ~.• .;£..-;•«: - \\- = • . . . ' . • , • ' .

Net Income Plus 10%

1 • January
•February
1 • March
1 "April
• Total

|

Paid

Remaining

1

1

$550,000 $55,000 $20,400 $34,600
$392,000 $39,200 $19,000 $20,200 J
$0 $9,634 1
$96,340 $9,634
$22,540 $2,254
$0 $2,254 >1
$66,688 I
••'-*-'-iJ

BOOK VALUE
Book Value is determined by multiplying
Stockholders* Equity by Ownership interest.
Stockholders* Equity * Ownership Interest

REVISED
RETAINED EARNINGS
AS OF JUNE 30, 1997
• Per Audit Report
• Add Swap Contract Adj.
J ..-• Add Suspense Items
1 V AddGrynberg Adj.
• Adjusted Retained Earnings

$57,224
$283,000
$296,252

|

1
J
1

$45,553 ^ J
$682,029

Jj

CALCULATED BOOK VALUE
at JUNE 30, 1997

|

?.x~~^f.^{^TSi-y'^vi^' <»;•< *_

• Adjusted Retained Earnings
1 • Contribued Capital
• Total Stockholders'Equity
• Ownership Interest
1 "Book Value

1 ••:--:'-:y'-':i^'r:--:-'::;-^:':''J-:-'-

'"^".'VS •;',;-'-:

" \ ' : / W ' 0 ^ - ' ' - : -v ; v : '.'

$682,029
1
$17,749
j
$699,778
j
:
36.5% :;;;1
$255,419-;r-l

"-v/-<-"-:-"V^-f'f^i

Retained Earnings as of
December '31,1996
Per Management Report
Add Suspense Items
Add Grynberg Adjustment
Retained Earnings

Calculated Book Value at
December 31,1996
Retained Earnings
Contributed Capital
Total Stockholders' Equity
Ownership Interest
Book Value

Summary with Book Value at
December 31,1996
In accordance with the Employment Agreement.
Shareholders* Agreement, and Compensation
Agreement, Mr. Esgett should receive the
following:
Book Value at December 31,1996
Profit Sharing through April 1997
Total

$ 126,429
$66,688
$193,117

Summary with Book Value at
June 30,1997
In accordance with the Employment Agreement.
Shareholders' Agreement, and Compensation
Agreement, Mr. Eggett should receive the
following:
Book Value at June 30,1997
$255,419
Profit Sharing through April 1997 $66,688
Total
$322,107

1995 Actual Payroll
Vs.
Minimum Payroll
Acutal
Eggett
$81,660
Cusick
$36,855
Chisholm $34,800

Budget
$48,000
$18,000
$18,000

Note: Cusick and Chishom each received an
additional 2,833 shafes"ofWasatch Energyas
compensation.
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Report of Independent Auditors
The Board of Directors and Stockholders
Wasatch Energy Corporation
We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets of Wasatch Energy
Corporation as of June 30, 1997 and 1996, and the related consolidated statements of
income, stockholders' equity and cash flows for the years then ended. These financial
statements are the responsibility of the Company's management. Our responsibility is to
express an opinion on these financial statements based on our audits.
We conducted our audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance
about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement. An audit
includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in
the financial statements. An audit also includes assessing the accounting principles used
and significant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the overall financial
statement presentation. WTe believe that our audits provide a reasonable basis for our
opinion.
In our opinion, the consolidated financial statements referred to above present fairly, in
all material respects, the consolidated financial position of Wasatch Energy Corporation
at June 30, 1997 and 1996, and the consolidated results of its operations and its cash
flows for the years then ended in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles.

+(fr
August 19, 1997

i
Ernst & Young LLP is a member of Ernst & Young International, Ltd.
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Wasatch Energy Corporation
Consolidated Balance Sheets

June 30
1997
Assets
Current assets:
Cash
Accounts receivable
Deferred income tax assets and prepaid expenses
Accounts receivable from related parties
Total current assets
Property, plant and equipment:
Furniture and equipment
Natural gas producing properties
Less accumulated depreciation

S2,538,576
435,579
12,000
2,986,155
269,845
50,847
(93,489)
227,203

S3,213,358

1996

$1,049,112
2,072,718
344.678
3,466,508
58,107
63.340
(27.929)
93,518

S3.560.026

->
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June 30

Liabilities and stockholders' equity
Current liabilities:
Outstanding checks in excess of bank balance
Accounts payable
Accrued liabilities
Accrued income taxes
Accrued taxes, other
Total current liabilities

1997

1996

S 98,008
1,746,995
957,447
304,299
31,157
3,137,906

$2,899,284
397,987
65.489
73.152
3,435,912
105.942

Note payable to stockholder

105.942
Stockholders* equity:
Common stock, par value S.05 per share: authorized
100.000 shares. 66.667 shares in 1997 and 1996
issued and outstanding
Additional paid-in capital
Retained earnings
i

c

3,333
16,226
57,703
77,262

19.016
479
22.828

11.810)
X 75,452
/S3,213,358

(4.656)
18.172
S3.560.026

^

Treasury stock, at cost: 700 shares in 1997 and 1.800
shares in 1996
Total stockholders* equity
Total liabilities and stockholders* equity

1

. t-c* I*-.

\

See accompanying notes.
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Wasatch Energy Corporation
Consolidated Statements of Income

Year ended June 30
1997
1996

Sales
Interest income

Cost of sales
General and administrative
Income before interest expense and income taxes

$29,924,165
38,337
29,962,502

$12,016,135
11,866
12,028,001

27,437,624
2,358,032
29,795,656
166,846

11,254,817
568.469
11,823.286
204.715

80,688
86,158

16.517
188,198

Interest expense
Income before income taxes
Income taxes
Net income

S

28,934
57,224

S

68.359
119,839

See accompanying notes.
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Wasatch Energy Corporation
Consolidated Statements of Stockholders' Equity

Common
Stock
Balance at July 1. 1995
Issuance of treasury stock
Net income
Balance at June 30. 1996
Issuance of treasury stock
Net income
Balance at June 30, 1997

$3,333

Additional
Paid-in
Capital

Retained
Earnings
(Deficit)

Treasury
Stock

Total

$29,667

$(119,360)

$(15,517)

$(101,877)

10,861

210
119.839

(10,651)
119,839
3,333

19,016
(2,790)

479

(4,656)
2,846

18.172
56
57,224

S (1,810)

S 75.452

57,224
S3.333

S 16.226

S 57,703

See accompanying notes.
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"Wasatch Energy Corporation
Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows

Year ended June 30
1997
1996
Operating activities
Net income
Adjustments to reconcile net income to net cash
provided by (used in) operating activities:
Depreciation and amortization
Changes in operating assets and liabilities:
Accounts receivable
Prepaids and other assets
Accounts payable
Accrued liabilities
Accrued income and other taxes
Net cash provided b\ (used in) operating activities

$

57,224

70,218

119,839

53.164

(465,858)
(102,901)
(1,152,289)
559,460
196,815
(837,331)

(1,736,229)
(229.092)
2,482.746
284.551
135.693
1.110.672

(203,903)

(69.044)

(2,790)
(105,942)
2,846
(105,886)
(1,147,120)
1,049,112

(43.358)
210
(43.148)
998.480
50.632

(98,008)

S 1,049.112

Investing activities
Purchases of property, plant and equipment
Financing activities
Additional paid in capital
Note payable
Issuance of treasury stock
Net cash used in financing activities
Net increase (decrease) in cash
Cash at beginning of year
Cash (checks outstanding in excess of bank balance)
at end of year

$

S

See accompanying notes.
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Wasatch Energy Corporation
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements
June 30,1997

1. Significant Accounting Policies
Wasatch Energy Corporation (the Company) was incorporated July 7, 1993, under the
laws of the state of Utah as Wasatch Oil & Gas Corporation. On April 10, 1996, the
Company changed its name to W7asatch Energy Corporation and formed Wasatch Oil &
Gas Corporation as a wholly-owned subsidiary. The Company principally buys and
resells natural gas to retail markets.
Principles of Consolidation
The consolidated financial statements include the accounts of Wasatch Energy
Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary Wasatch Oil & Gas Corporation. All
significant intercompany accounts and transactions have been eliminated.
Property, Plant and Equipment
Property, plant and equipment, including natural gas producing properties, are recorded at
cost. Depreciation is computed using the straight-line method based on estimated useful
lives of 36 months.
Gas Imbalances
Quantities of gas over-delivered or under-delivered under imbalance agreements with
pipelines, are recorded monthly as prepaids or accrued liabilities using the lower of cost
or market price for prepaid balances and higher of cost or market price for accrued
liability balances. Generally, these balances are settled with deliveries of gas.
Revenue Recognition
The Company recognizes gas sales when the purchaser takes possession of gas at the
contracted point of deliver)'.

7
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Wasatch Energy Corporation
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (continued)
1. Significant Accounting Policies (continued)
Credit Risk
The Company's primary market areas are the Rocky Mountain and Pacific Northwest
regions. The Company's exposure to credit risk may be impacted by the concentration of
customers in those regions due to changing economic or other conditions. The
Company's customers include individuals and companies in numerous industries that
may be impacted differently by changing conditions. The Company believes that it does
not have significant potential for credit related losses and that the carrying amount of
receivables equals fair value. The Company generally does not require collateral from
customers.
Market Risk
The Company enters into swaps and options to secure known margins for the marketing
of natural gas. Generally, swap contracts involve exchanging a NYMEX based price or
fixed price for a local market price. There is a high degree of correlation of such
contracts with the related physical commodity. Recognized gains and losses on the
hedged transactions are recorded during the same period as the related physical
transactions. Failure by counter parties to deliver physical volumes may expose the
Company to market risk.
Use of Estimates
The preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles requires management to make estimates and assumptions that affect the
amounts of assets and liabilities or the results of operations. Actual amounts could differ
from those estimates.
Income Taxes
Temporary' differences primarily relate to unrealized losses and certain reserves not
currently deductible for tax purposes.
Reclassifications
Certain 1996 amounts have been reclassified to conform with the 1997 presentation.

8
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Wasatch Energy Corporation
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (continued)
2. Financial Instruments
At June 30, 1997 and 1996, the Company held swap contracts covering approximately
3,800.000 MMBtus and 7,000,000 MMBtus of natural gas to be delivered through
October 1998 and December 1997, respectively. The face value of the contracts was
approximately $5,500,000 and $9,800,000 at June 30, 1997 and 1996, respectively. The
market value of the contracts was approximately $627,000 less and $610,000 less than
face value at June 30, 1997 and 1996, respectively. As of August 19, 1997, the market
value was approximately $255,000 less than face value. The calculation of the market
value assumes the Company closed its position on that date and did not recognize
potential gains on the physical transaction. The fair value of these contracts was based on
market prices as listed in Inside FERC or quotations from brokers at year end. The
Company only enters into swap contracts with large credit worthy brokers specializing in
natural gas derivatives.
3. Income Taxes
Deferred income taxes reflect the net tax effects of temporary differences between the
earning amounts of assets and liabilities for financial reporting purposes and the amounts
used for income tax purposes. The Company's deferred tax assets are approximate!)
$374,000 and $0 at June 30. 1997 and 1996. respectively.
The components of deferred taxes are primarily certain reserves and unrealized losses not
currenth deductible for tax purposes.
The provision for income taxes consists of the following:
June 30
1997

Federal:
Current
Deferred
Total Federal
State:
Current
Deferred
Total State
Total

1996

S 349,000
(325,000)
24,000

$59,000

54,000
(49,000)
5,000

10,000

S

29,000

59,000

10,000
S69.000

000436

Wasatch Energy Corporation
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (continued)
3. Income Taxes (continued)
Differences between the reported amount of income tax expense attributable to
continuing operations for the year and the amount of income tax expense that would
result from applying domestic federal statutory tax rates to pretax income from
continuing operations relate primarily to permanent differences.
4. Related Party Transactions
At June 30, 1997. the Company holds a note receivable from a stockholder for SI2.000.
The Company also leased office space on a month to month basis from a stockholder
during 1997 and 1996. Total payments under the lease totaled $33,950 and $19,500 at
June 30. 1997 and 1996, respectively.
5. Lease Obligations
Rental expense for 1997 and 1996 was $63,412 and $19,500. respectively. Future rental
payments for a non-cancelable office building lease from June 30, 1997 through February
28. 2000 total $455,000. The Company also has the option to extend the lease for 2
years.
6. Contingencies and Commitments
Prepaid Gas Transaction
During August 1996. the Company, and an outside investor, entered into a prepaid
natural gas transaction with a supplier. Based on commitments to deliver gas from the
supplier, the Company entered into swap contracts with brokers to secure a margin on the
scheduled deliveries. In March 1997. the supplier ceased deliver}' of its gas to the
Company, filed suit against the Company to void the contract, and sold its gas reserves to
a third party. The Company countersued for breach of contract and foreclosure on the
supplier's properties.
At June 30, 1997, the Company had recorded as accounts receivable approximately
$490,000 for payments made to settle the related swap contracts. The Company
estimates that an additional $400,000 will be paid to settle swap positions through
December 31, 1997.

10
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Wasatch Energy Corporation
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (continued)
6. Contingencies and Commitments (continued)
Fixed Price Derivative Transactions
At June 30, 1997, the Company held a swap contract with a broker for which there was
no offsetting physical transaction. The contract settles monthly and calls for the
Company to pay a local market price for that month and in return receive $1.50 per
MMBtu. Volumes covered by the contract are 3,700 per day with the contract beginning
July 1, 1997 and ending on June 30, 1998. Face value of the contract is approximately
$2,025,750. At June 30, 1997. the Company would incur a loss of approximately
$283,000 related to this contract if it closed its position. Since inception, the maximum
potential loss of the contract has been $305,000.
Other
Estimates for payments to settle swap contracts are based on current market prices of
natural gas which can fluctuate significantly.
The Company has a $1,800,000 revolving line of credit with a bank. As of June 30.
1997, $250,000 of the $1,800,000 was reserved for an outstanding letter of credit.

11
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Wasatch Energy
June 30,1997
Audit Strategies Memorandum

Changes in Client's Business and Audit Scope
Wasatch Energy (the Company) was organized in 1993, under the name Wasatch Oil &
Gas, as a sub-chapter S corporation. It was later changed to a C corporation in April of
1995. The Company later reorganized changing its name to Wasatch Energy and forming
a subsidiary named Wasatch Oil & Gas. The subsidiary is wholly owned by Wasatch
Energy and deals with gas producers while Wasatch Energy handles the marketing
functions. The Company is engaged in the buying and reselling of natural gas. The
Company buys natural gas from other brokers or natural gas producers and resells the gas
to end users or other brokers. It may also enter the market for electricity in the future.
The majority of the Company's sales are to utilities in the Northwest. Hedges are placed
on all transactions that expose the Company to market risk in order to guarantee the
Company a targeted margin of 3 to 5 cents/MMBTU. The majority of the Company's
contracts are short-term in nature.
Through May, 1997, the Company's annualized sales were S30.8 million, a 156% increase
over 1996. Annualized net income for 1997 was $458,500, compared to 5172,758 for
1996. Income amounts may fluctuate due to imbalances which are recalculated every
month.
Accounting and Auditing Issues
Between April and June we attended several meetings with Brian Watts, controller, to
discuss the upcoming audit and learn more about the client's needs. From our planning
meeting with the client and review of the Company's financial records, we identified the
following issues.
Hedges
The Company has numerous hedges using basis swaps, swaps, and futures contracts.
Testing will be conducted to determine if there are any positions which expose the
Company to excessive risk. We will also need to disclose hedging information in
accordance with FASB standards in the financial statements.
Accounts Receivable
Approximately 60 percent of the Company's balance sheet consists of accounts receivable
and no reserve has been established for bad debts. We will confirm the receivables
EY 000757
File: Audit Strategies Memo
CONFIDENTIAL SUBJECT
TO PROTECTIVE ORDER

according to Micro-Start and ascertain the necessity of establishing a bad debt reserve
account.
PP&E
In our prior year audit, we noted the Company had capital leases that were treated as
operating leases. We will examine leases and test for proper accounting treatment of
leases.
Accounts Payable
Approximately 95 percent of the Company's current liabilities consists of accounts payable
to suppliers. We will perform a search for unrecorded liabilities in accordance with the
audit program to determine that all liabilities are properly included on the balance sheet.
Imbalance Account
The Company's balance sheet shows a significant gas imbalance that is for gas owed to
transportation providers (offiset is to income). We will test the imbalance amount to
determine that it is properly stated on the balance sheet.
Suspense Accounts
The Company's policy is to carry an accrual on the balance sheet for amounts remitted in
excess of invoices (Invoices are based on nominations) for one year before taking the
amount to income. We will examine contracts and determine the accounting treatment
and policy is in accordance with the contracts.
Shareholder Transactions
During 1997, numerous shareholder transactions occurred with several changes in the
number shareholders and stock owned by shareholders. We will determine the proper
disclosure of shareholder information in the financial statements.
Other Issues
During 1997 a supplier to the Company entered into bankruptcy, causing the Company to
incur losses as it had to provide "makeup" gas to customers and fulfill swap commitments
to brokers. Although the Company had filed lien^n properties held by the supplier, the
supplier sold the property to a third party. The Company has filed suit against the supplier
and is seeking the revenues from the property sale. The case is currently in court.
During 1997 the Company entered into a swap position intending to offset the position
with another broker. The offsetting position could not be completed, leaving the
Company exposed to market fluctuations. The swap is currently in a loss position of
approximately $200,000.
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The Company is currently in mediation to resolve a dispute with a shareholder who is also
the past president. There is a possibility that mediation will be unsuccessful. If the
mediation is unsuccessful, the shareholder may pursue legal action against the Company.

Overall Analytical Review
See the enclosed financial statements.
Changes in Audit Strategies and Risk Assessments
We concluded that it would be more efficient to not test controls as this is a small client
with some segregation of duties issues. We will use the small business approach for this
client. For our Micro-Starts, we will assess the controls as ineffective and risk as high.

Planning Materiality
We have based our planning materiality on net operating income before taxes. Annualized
pre-tax operating income at 5/31/97 was $746,283 X 7.5% equals $55,971, rounded to
$55,000. We will use this PM for the June 30 1997 audit and set TE at 75% or $41,000.
We will post all items greater than 10% of TE ($4,100) to the summary of audit
differences.
Client Expectations and Needs
Timely delivery of financial statements.
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SUMMARY REVIEW MEMORANDUM
WASATCH ENERGY CORPORATION
June 30, 1997

BACKGROUND
Wasatch Energy Corporation (the Company) was originally incorporated in July 1993 as a
"Subchapter S Corporation" under the laws of the state of Utah with the name Wasatch Oil &
Gas Corporation. In April 1995, the Company changed its structure to a C Corp and its name to
Wasatch Energy Corporation. It also formed a subsidiary (100% owned by Wasatch Energy)
named Wasatch Oil & Gas Corporation to operate oil and gas producing properties. The
Company's main focus is buying natural gas from small producers and reselling it to utilities and
industrial users. It has also started to acquire some smaller oil and gas producing properties.
SCOPE OF EXAMINATION
We were engaged to perform an audit of the financial statements of Wasatch Energy Corporation
as of and for the year ending June 30, 1997, and to express an opinion thereon. We previously
audited the Company for June 30 1994, 1995 and 1996.
IMPORTANT ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING MATTERS
Allowance for Doubtful Accounts
The Company's purchasers are primarily larger industrial or utility customers. Amounts are
generally paid within 30 days. The Company recorded an allowance for doubtful accounts of
$619,000 related to litigation with a supplier (United Utilities). No other amounts are currently
outstanding that appear uncollectible nor has the Company experienced significant write-offs.
Income Taxes
The Company has a deferred tax asset of approximately $373,000 related timing differences for
amortization of furniture and fixtures, unrealized losses, and certain loss reserves. The tax status
was reviewed by the tax department.
Commitments and Contingencies
In 1994, Wasatch established a relationship with a producer, United Utilities. In early 1996,
United developed several gas wells and became a significant supplier for Wasatch. However,
United was experiencing cash flow difficulties and needed operating capital. Wasatch structured
several transactions where an outside investor would provide loans (setup as a prepaid gas
transaction) to United, which would be paid back to the investor in gas. The investor would sell
the gas to Wasatch, and Wasatch would sell the gas to customers. The initial arrangement was
successful as United received operating capital and a fair price for its gas, Wasatch obtained a
significant supply of gas, and the outside investor received a good return on his investment.
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In August 1996 another transaction was arranged so that the outside investor would loan
$1,100,000 and Wasatch would loan $400,000 (total $1.5 million) to United in exchange for gas
to be returned in the future. Based on United's previous production, it appeared that United
would be able to supply the gas. As security, Wasatch obtained a Deed of Trust on United's gas
properties, which covered "any and all" obligations. United also committed to deliver additional
volumes above what was to be delivered in the prepaid arrangement. Based on the prepaid
PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT
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transaction and additional volumes committed by United, Wasatch hedged contracted volumes to
secure a margin on the gas being sold.
By January 1997, United's production volumes had decreased below the volumes it had
committed to fulfill and United did not satisfy its gas delivery obligations to Wasatch. Some gas
was received in January and February with no gas being received after February. About the same
time, United sold its properties to a company named Rosewood (despite the Trust deed to
Wasatch) and filed a lawsuit against Wasatch to void the contract. Wasatch counter sued to
foreclose on United's property and for breach of contract.
With no offsetting physical volumes, Wasatch was exposed to market risk for the hedges placed
on United's gas. Wasatch continued to fulfill its hedging obligations with brokers (by settling in
cash) and booked amounts paid to brokers as receivables from United. Total receivables
recorded related to United at June 30, 1997 amounted to $1,040,000. Based on current market
prices, the Company projects to pay an additional $465,000 to brokers through December (when
the hedges expire). Amounts paid are being booked as receivables based on the Trust deed. The
Company recorded an allowance of $619,000 related to the receivable currently in litigation.
In its lawsuit, Wasatch has submitted a settlement claim for $3,800,000. This amount includes
penalties stipulated by the contract and an amount for profit Wasatch would have received on the
receipt and sale of gas. Wasatch believes it likely that a settlement is going to be reached with no
negative financial impact in view of its secured position.
United claims that only amounts relating to the prepaid transaction are secured by the Trust deed.
Losses on any hedge positions are essentially unsecured. Based on prices "triggered" by United,
the value of gas related to the prepaid transaction would be $1,975,000. Rosewood (the new
owner) has offered to settle out-of-court for $1,500,000. For any settlement received, Wasatch
would need to first repay the outside investor upto $1,100,000 (should no settlement be received,
Wasatch is not obligated to repay the investor).
The outside investor has been assigned the Trust deed and is essentially in 1st position. However,
Wasatch's contract with the investor indicates that the investor must first allow Wasatch to
attempt to recover the gas or settlement as long as it is exerting their best efforts. This stipulation,
prevents the outside investor from circumventing Wasatch's position and negotiating directly •'
with United or Rosewood. As the lawsuit is still in the early stages, we have not proposed a,
writeoff of the receivable balance related to United or accrual of additional reserves.
/
Wasatch has also filed another lawsuit against a smaller producer, MM & O. During May 1997,
NM & O defaulted on supplying its gas to Wasatch. Based on volumes committed by NM & O,
Wasatch had entered into hedges to secure a margin for the gas delivered from NM & O. Based
on actual and projected swap payments less payables to NM & O, Wasatch will incur losses of
approximately $55,000 by the time the hedges expire in October (based on current market
values). To recover the amount, Wasatch filed a lawsuit claiming NM & O breached its contract
with Wasatch. Wasatch did not obtain a security interest in NM & O's property and has
pY
LT
established a reserve for $55,000.
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The company had a $1,800,000 line of credit at the end of 1997. No balance was outstanding on
the line at June 30, 1997.
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Hedging
The Company enters into hedging arrangements with natural gas brokers to limit its exposure to
price risk on purchases of natural gas. We noted one hedge arrangement at June 30, 1997 which
was not properly tied to physical volumes and has an unrecognized loss of $283,000. All other
hedging arrangements (with exception of United and NM & O discussed above) appeared to be
properly matched to physical transactions and as such qualify for deferred treatment of gains and
losses. The Company has recorded the unrealized loss of $283,000.
Related Party Transactions
Our testing revealed the following related party transaction:
1) The Company loaned $12,000 to Todd Cusick, a shareholder.
Going Concern
We discussed the following observations regarding the Company's ability to continue as a going
concern:
1. The Company generated pre-tax income of approximately $86,000 in 1997 and has positive
equity.
2. The Company has no long-term debt.
3. The Company has access to a $1,800,000 line of credit. There are currently no amounts
outstanding.
Based on the above considerations, we do not believe that the Company's ability to continue as a
going concern is in question.
SUMMARY ANALYTICAL REVIEW
See attached copies of financial statements.
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SUMMARY OF AUDIT DIFFERENCES
There were no audit differences.
The following factors were considered in evaluating whether or not the financial statements are
materially misstated:
There were no audit differences in the current or prior year.
The possible effect of undetected errors has been considered.
OPINION
It is our opinion that the scope of our audit was adequate and that the financial statements of
Wasatch Energy Corporation as of June 30, 1997 are presented fairly in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles applied on a consistent basis.

"/*/&
Date

^M<n
Date
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Wasatch Energy
United Receivable
6/30/97
In assessing the receivable duefromUnited Utilities, we considered the accounting
treatment required by FAS 5 and the circumstances surrounding the receivable from
United.
The natural gas purchase agreements with United included a default provision that
specified a payment to Wasatch equal to the difference between the NYMEX based price
and the related Inside FERC price in the event that United did not produce the gas under
contract. This difference is substantially equal to the amount that Wasatch is obligated to
pay and has paid on its hedges of the purchase volumes.
As the underlying transaction and contract provisions essentially created an obligation
from United at the point of default, we believe that accounting rules for loss
contingencies as opposed to gain contingencies should apply to the recorded receivable.
The underlying premise is that an obligation by United is created at the time of default
and the receivable was recorded based orHhc gas purchase agreement.
The receivable balance was approximately $1.1 million at June 30, 1997 but is likely to
increase to approximately $1.4 million at December 31, 1997 when the hedge agreements
expire depending on the price of gas.
Although Wasatch has a deed of trust on the gas and is actively pursuing the receivable
through litigation, there is a question regarding collectibility. Because of the uncertainty
regarding the outcome of the litigation, Wasatch has recorded a specific reserve of
\ $600,000 for this receivable. Wasatch continues to beftei^that it has a valid receivable
that will be fully collected. It has received an offer onl.5/nillion from the purchaser of
the United properties to settle the matter but has chosenTo pursue litigation.
This receivable has been prominently discussed in the notes to the financial statements
with adequate uncertainty discussion.
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Perrin R. Love (5505)
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)322-2516
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH
ROGER K. EGGETT, JR.,
an individual,
AFFIDAVIT OF PERRIN R. LOVE

Plaintiff,

IN SUPPORT OF AWARD
vs.

WASATCH ENERGY CORPORATION,
a Utah Corporation,

OF COSTS, EXPENSES, AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES

Defendants.
Civil No. 97-0906444CV
Judge David S. Young

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

: ss.

Perrin R. Love, being first duly sworn, on his oath deposes and verily states:
a.

I have been a shareholder of Clyde, Snow, Sessions & Swenson since September

1998 ("'Clyde, Snow"). Before that, I was a shareholder at Campbell. Maack & Sessions ("CMS").
I have served as counsel for Roger Eggett ("Mr. Eggett") in the above-captioned litigation.
b.

I submit this Affidavit in Support of Award of Costs, Expenses, and Attorney's Fees

of Reasonable Attorney Fees pursuant to the finding of the Court that Mr. Eggett is the prevailing

party. All statements are based upon my personal knowledge and my review of the billing records
of Clyde, Snow and CMS.
3.

At trial, the jury awarded to Mr. Eggett SI 1,888.35 in additional compensation due

Mr. Eggett as damages for breach of his Employment Agreement ("Employment Agreement") dated
April 21, 1995, and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The jury awarded to Mr. Eggett
S135,671.60, the book value of Mr. Eggett's shares in defendant Wasatch Energy Corp. ("Wasatch"),
as damages for breach of the Shareholder's Agreement ("Shareholder's Agreement") dated April 13,
1995 and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In so awarding, the jury rejected Wasatch's
defenses and counterclaims that Mr. Eggett was properly terminated for cause or that Eggett had
taken excessive compensation and abused his expense account.
4.

Mr. Eggett's claim for costs, expenses, and attorney's fees is based upon paragraph

19(c) of the Shareholder's Agreement, which states in full:
In the event any legal action is required by a party to this
Agreement to enforce the provisions of same, the prevailing party
shall be entitled to recover its costs of suit, including reasonable
attorneys' fees.
The Employment Agreement has no comparable provision, and does not authorize either prevailing
party to recover expenses or attorney's fees.
5.

In making this Affidavit, I follow the four factors identified in Dixie State Bank v.

Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), to determine the reasonableness of attorney's fees: (1) what
legal work actually was performed; (2) was the legal work reasonably necessary to adequately
prosecute or defend the matter; (3) were the hourly rates reasonable compared to others in the
locality; and (4) what additional circumstances, including the circumstances listed in Rule 1.5 of the
Rules of Professional Conduct, affect the reasonableness of the fees. Accord, Cabrera v. Cottrell
694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1992).

w
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For the reasons explained below, Eggett is entitled to an award of cost, expenses, and

attorney's fees m the amount of $56,900 27 In calculating this amount, I have excluded costs,
expenses, and attorney's fees incurred before May 16, 1997, because those fees relate solely to Mr
Eggett's claims for additional compensation pursuant to the Employment Agreement, which does
not authorize an award of costs, expenses, or attorney's fees
7

I was retained by Mr Eggett on or about April 25, 1997, about 10 days after he

submitted his letter of resignation to Wasatch (to be effective July 14, 1997) Mr Eggett agreed to
pay for my representation at an hourly rate of SI 50 00 per hour.
8

Initially, I was retained to assist Mr Eggett m obtaining compensation to which he

was entitled pursuant to his Employment Agreement for the period January 1,1997 through July 14,
1997 The scope of my representation changed when I received notice on May 16, 1997, that
Wasatch had terminated Eggett for cause pursuant to paragraph 2(e) of the Employment Agreement
Shortly thereafter, Wasatch informed me that, because Eggett had been terminated for cause,
Wasatch was entitled to redeem Eggett's shares for par value rather than book value, pursuant to
paragraphs 3 and 18(e) of Shareholder Agreement
9

Accordingly, the scope of my representation expanded on or about May 16,1997, to

include claims for breach of the Shareholder Agreement, and to obtain for Mr Eggett book value
for his shares

These claims required Mr Eggett to prove that his termination for cause was

wrongful, that he had not taken excessive compensation or abused his expense account, and that his
termination was a pretext to deny him book value for his shares
10

Because Mr Eggett's claims under the Shareholder Agreement are inextricably

mtertw med with his claims under the Employment Agreement, and with Wasatch's counterclaims,
Mr Eggett is entitled to recover all of his costs, expenses, and fees incurred from the time that Mr
Eggett w as terminated for cause, and that Wasatch asserted that it was entitled to pay Mr Eggett par

value rather than book value. This Court has discretion to award all fees where a prevailing party
is entitled to an award of attorney's fees on some, but not all, claims.
11.

In Henslev v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), the Supreme Court held that a

prevailing party may recover fees only on the claims on which it prevailed or is otherwise entitled
to an award, unless all claims involve a common core of fact or legal theory. Where the parties'
claims involve a common core of facts or related legal theories, much
of counsel's time will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it
difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis. Such a lawsuit
cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims.
461 U.S. at 435. In those situations, where
a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully
compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably expended on
the litigation, and indeed in some cases of exceptional success an enhanced award
may be justified. In these circumstances the fee should not be reduced simply
because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit.
Litigants in good faith may raise alternative legal grounds for a desired outcome, and
the court's rejection of or failure to reach certain grounds in not a sufficient reason
for reducing a fee. The result is what matters.

12.

The Utah Court of Appeals adopted the same approach in Sprouse v. Jager, 806 P.2d

219 (Utah App. 1991). In Sprouse, the attorney for the prevailing party apportioned one-third of his
time in litigation to a contract claim, and two-thirds of his time to other claims (the contract had an
attorney's fee provision). The trial court awarded the prevailing party all of its fees, and the Court
of Appeals upheld the award because all claims and issues were so intertwined:
The trial court has discretion in determining reasonable attorney fees, and, absent an
abuse of discretion, we will not overturn such an award. Although the minute entry
is somewhat sketchy, it appears that Sprouse's objection is not to the number of hours
or to the hourly rate, but rather it is to the fact that the court failed to separate out
two-thirds of the attorney time that Sprouse considered to be irrelevant because it did
not pertain to the [contract claim]. However, the court was satisfied that, because
appellees prevailed on the counterclaim, the foreclosure, and the collection, they
were entitled to the full amount. Because these complex issues were so intertwined,
we find the court acted within its discretion in its award of attorney fees.
S06 P.2d at 226 (emphasis added).
4
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After May 16, 1997, my time was devoted to the litigation as a whole, and not to

discreet claims under either the Shareholder Agreement or the Employment Agreement The parties
prepared for and participated in a mediation in August 1997 that addressed all of the parties' claims
and counterclaims Preparation of Mr Eggett's pleadings obviously related to all claims, as did
document discovery from Wasatch, Magna Energy International, and Ernst & Young

The

depositions of Roger Eggett, Keith Painter, David Lillywhite, Curtis Chisholm, and Tod Cusick
related to all claims, as did trial preparation and tnal
14

Appended to this Affidavit are the billing statements provided to Mr Eggett from

April 25, 1997, through the date of this Affidavit, by Clyde, Snow and CMS The time entnes
reflected on the billing statements were recorded on a regular if not daily basis throughout this
litigation, and were maintained on the CMS and Clyde, Snow computenzed billing systems
15

From Apnl 25,1997, through December 31,1997, Mr Eggett was billed at a rate of

SI 50 00 per hour Mr Eggett, however, could not afford to pay this hourly rate As of October 31,
1997,1 agreed with Mr Eggett to defer half of the hourly fee until Mr Eggett obtained a favorable
settlement or judgment, and agreed to be paid from the proceeds of that settlement or judgment
This was not a modification of the retainer agreement from an hourly to a contingency fee, Mr
Eggett agreed that if he did not obtain a favorable settlement or judgment, he would pay the deferred
fee from other sources Accordingly, the billing statements from November 1,1997 forward reflect
an hourly rate of $75 00 per hour In making this Affidavit, I adjust those billing statements to
reflect the fees to be awarded at a rate of S150 00 per hour I believe that a rate of $150 00 is
reasonable, because my hourly rate since January 1, 1998, has been SI75 00
16

To summarize the fees and expenses in the billing statements
a

Exhibit A is a Statement of Services Rendered from Apnl 25, 1997 through

May 31, 1997 Again, Mr Eggett seeks an award of fees and costs from May 16, 1997 forward

5

Those fees total $1,320.00 (8.8 hours); the costs total SI68.30 (including SI50.00 for the Mediation
filing fee required by the American Arbitration Association).
b.

Exhibit B is a Statement of Services Rendered for June 1997. The total fees

are S255.00. The total costs are SI.00.
c.

Exhibit C is a Statement of Services Rendered for July 1997. The total fees

are $2,250. Total costs are S.60.
d.

Exhibit D is a Statement of Services Rendered from August 1,1997 through

October 31, 1997. The total fees incurred are $2,407.50, which relate to the mediation conducted
pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association, and the preparation of the initial
pleadings. Total costs are $372.10, which relate primarily to the mediator's fee. This amount
excludes $ 175.00 in costs reflected on the billing statement for filing the initial Complaint in Second
District Court. After filing in Second District Court, I refiled the Complaint in Third District Court.
Wasatch should not have to pay both filing fees.
e.

Exhibit E is a Statement of Services Rendered from November 1, 1997

through December 31, 1997. The total fees are $795.00 (at $150.00 per hour), and relate to
answering Wasatch's counterclaim, settlement negotiations, and preparing discovery requests. Total
costs are S324.27, which include the Third District Court filing fee.
f.

Exhibit F is a Statement of Sendees Rendered from January 1,1998 through

February 28, 1998. The total fees are S375.00 (at $150.00 per hour). Total costs are S2.83.
g.

Exhibit G is a Statement of Sendees Rendered for April, 1998. Total costs

h.

Exhibit H is a Statement of Sendees Rendered for May 1998. The total fees

areSlO.01.

are S3,060 (at SI 50.00 per hour). These fees relate principally to the depositions of Mr. Eggett and
Keith Painter, and the document production from Ernst & Young. Total costs are $46.57.

6

i.

Exhibit I is a Statement of Services Rendered for June 1998. The total fees

are S270 (at $150.00 per hour). Total costs are S5.20.
j.

Exhibit J is a Statement of Services Rendered for August 1998. The total fees

are 51,200.00 (at $150 per hour), and relate primarily to the depositions of Curtis Chisholm and
David Lillywhite.
k

Exhibit K is a Statement of Services Rendered from October 1998 through

March 1999. The total fees are S360.00 (at SI50.00 per hour). Total costs are S397.66.
1.

Exhibit L is a Statement of Services Rendered from April 1999 through

September 1999. The total fees are S2,925.00 (at $150.00 per hour). These fees relate primarily to
the deposition of Tod Cusick, to preparing responses to discovery, and to preparing a motion to
compel responses to discovery. Total costs are $522.60, which include the court reporter fees for
the Cusick deposition.
m.

Exhibit M is a Statement of Services Rendered for October 1999. The total

fees are S16,513.00. These fees include my fees of S13,275.00 (at S150.00 per hour), T. Mickell
Jimenez's fees of $2,622.00 (at SI 15.00 per hour), and Amy Pelton's fees of S616.00 (at $70.00 per
hour). Ms. Jimenez is an associate who performed legal research relating to jury instructions and
other issues, including the definition of "good cause" and "bad faith" in wrongful termination cases,
liability of a board of directors for wrongful termination, and admissibility of after-acquired evidence
as a basis for wrongful termination. Amy Pelton is a paralegal who prepared trial exhibits, and
operated the projector at trial. Total costs are S590.80, which include copying costs for all copies
of the trial exhibits.
n.

Exhibit N is a Statement of Services Rendered for November 1999 and

December 1-3. The total fees are $19,762.00. These fees include my fees of $14,175.00 (at S150.00
per hour), T Mickell Jimenez's fees of S828.00 (at SI 15.00 per hour), Amy Pelton's fees of
S-U56.00 (at $70.00 per hour), and Susan Bailey and Donald Maughan's fees of S203.00 (at $70
7
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per hour). My fees relate to trial preparation (including preparation of the jury verdict form, jury
instructions, and voir dire questions, as well as preparations of witness exams and opening
argument), attendance at trial, and post-trial matters (including preparation of this Affidavit). Ms.
Jimenez continued to perform legal research, primarily for jury instructions, Ms. Pelton attended trial
as a paralegal to operate the projector and coordinate exhibits, and Mr. Maughan and Ms. Bailey
performed services as paralegals during trial. Total costs are S812.31, including a charge for on-line
Lexis research in the amount of $588.13. A detailed accounting of the Lexis research performed is
provided.
o.

Exhibit 0 is an invoice from Litigation Technology, Inc., for rental of the

projector and computer at trial, in the amount of 51,435.73. I believe that use of the projector was
essential to enable the jury to follow and understand the documents establishing that Mr. Eggett's
termination was wrongful, that Mr. Eggett was entitled to book value for his shares, and to
establishing book value itself.
p.

Exhibit Pare invoices for court reporter fees paid directly by Mr. Eggett. One

invoice is for 5498.80. The other is for $229.00.
17.

I believe these fees were reasonably incurred. On behalf of Mr. Eggett, I took only

two depositions-Keith Painter and Tod Cusick. Wasatch took all other depositions. To save
expense, I did not depose Dennis Fox, Brian Watts, Greg Probst, or Ward Coombs, all of whom were
identified as trial witnesses, and all of whom testified at trial. I also delayed performing any legal
research until it was absolutely clear that the matter would go to trial. I also was required to file two
motions to compel because Wasatch initially refused to produce documents that I considered
relevant, which increased the fees incurred.
18.

Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(4) and Henslev hold that the trial court should

consider the result obtained in determining the reasonableness of the fee, and that an enhanced fee
may be appropriate. Given the jury verdict for Eggett and against Wasatch on all claims, I believe
8

that an enhanced fee would be appropriate. Mr. Eggett does not seek an enhancement of fees.
Instead, I cite this factor simply to underscore the reasonableness of the fees that Mr. Eggett has
incurred and is entitled to recover.
19.

Some of the costs identified in the Affidavit are taxable costs that may be awarded

pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d). Mr. Eggett does not seek a double recovery of these costs; if the
Court awards to Mr. Eggett all of his costs, Mr. Eggett will file a Memorandum of Costs pursuant
to Rule 54(d) to preserve an independent basis for the award of these costs in the event there is an
appeal.
Dated this

^

of December, 1999.

On the c^: day of December, 1999, Perrin R. Love, being first duly sworn under oath, stated
that he has read the foregoing Affidavit and knows the contents thereof and the same are true to the
best of his knowledge, except as to those matters stated to be alleged on information and belief, and
to those matters he believes them to be true.
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PUBLIC

K. NICOLE HOLT
201 South Main #1300
Sart Lak° City, UT 84111
My Co^Tvssion Expires
June 2 1 , 2003
STATE OF UTAH

Notary Public
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH
ROGER K. EGGETT, JR.,
an individual,
REPLY AFFIDAVIT
Plaintiff,
OF PERRIN R. LOVE
vs.

IN SUPPORT OF AWARD

WASATCH ENERGY CORPORATION,
a Utah Corporation,

OF COSTS AND

Defendants.

ATTORNEY'S FEES

Civil No. 97-0906444CV
Judge David S. Young

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ss.

Perrin R. Love, being first duly sworn, on his oath deposes and verily states:
1.

I have been a shareholder of Clyde, Snow, Sessions & Swenson since September

1998 ("Clyde, Snow"). Before that, I was a shareholder at Campbell, Maack & Sessions ("CMS").
I ha\ e served as counsel for Roger Eggett ("Mr. Eggett") in the above-captioned litigation.

2.

I submit this Reply Affidavit in Support of Award of Costs and Attorney's Fees to

respond to the Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Attorneys Fees
("Mem. Opp.") submitted by defendant Wasatch Energy Corp. ("Wasatch"). All statements are based
upon my personal knowledge and my review of the billing records of Clyde, Snow and CMS.
ATTORNEY'S FEES
3.

Contrary to Wasatch's assertion, Mem. Opp. at 2-3, my initial Affidavit properly

segregates fees incurred on Eggett's claims brought pursuant to the Shareholder Agreement (which
has an attorney's fee provision) from his claims brought pursuant to the Employment Agreement
(which has no attorney's fees provision). Eggett seeks no fees or costs incurred before May 16,
1997, when Wasatch purported to terminate him for cause and to deny him book value for his shares.
4.

From that point forward, there is no principled way to distinguish time or expenses

incurred on Eggett's claims under the Shareholder Agreement from his claims under the
Employment Agreement, or from Wasatch's counterclaims. Every fact relating to Wasatch's
counterclaims for excessive compensation and abuse of Eggett's expense account would have been
litigated whether or not Wasatch filed a counterclaim, because Wasatch asserted those facts as a
defense to Eggett's claims for book value for his shares. (Wasatch asserted that Eggett was not
entitled to book value because he took excessive compensation and abused his expense account,
justifying his termination for cause.) All of the fees and costs were "necessarily incurred" to
prosecute Eggett's claims under the Shareholder Agreement, and Eggett is entitled to recover them.
5.

The same is true of Eggett's claim under the Employment Agreement for additional

compensation between January and May 1997. Because Wasatch claimed that Eggett took excessive
compensation during this period (and purported to terminate him for it), all of the facts surrounding
Eggett's 1997 compensation would have been litigated whether or not Eggett pursued a claim under
the Employment Agreement for additional compensation.

2

6. My initial Affidavit complies with the requirements of Foote v. Clark, 962 F.2d 52 (Utah
1998), and Valcarce v. Fitzeerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998), relied upon by Wasatch, because the
Affidavit segregates those fees and expenses incurred in pursuing claims under the Employment
Agreement. Neither Foote nor Valcarce stand for the proposition that a prevailing party cannot
recover fees and expenses necessarily incurred on claims that entitle the party to fees and costs,
simply because those fees and costs also relate to other claims.
7. Neither Foote nor Valcarce is factually similar to the situation here. In Valcarce, the
litigation involved several phases and several parties. The defendant claimed that the prevailing
party failed to allocate those fees that were incurred against other parties, or to distinguish those fees
that were incurred before the defendant was joined in the lawsuit. See 961 P.2d at 317. In Foote v.
Clark, 962 F.2d 52 (Utah 1998), a disappointed home buyer sued the seller for breach of the real
estate purchase contract (which had an attorney's fee provision), and sued the seller's broker for
tortuous interference of contract. In requesting attorney's fees, the buyer did not distinguish time
and expense pursing the breach of contract claims against the seller, and time and expense pursing
tort claims against the broker. See 962 P.2d at 56-7.
COSTS
8.

Wasatch objects to many of the costs incurred by Eggett, because they are not taxable

costs within the scope of Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d). See Mem. Opp. at 6-7. The objection is unfounded,
because Eggett's right to recover these costs is contractual, not statutory. Paragraph 19(c) of the
Shareholder Agreement states that "the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its costs of suit,
including reasonable attorneys' fees." By its plain language, paragraph 19(c) defines costs to include
all costs, not just taxable costs, because it defines costs to include attorneys' fees. Those costs that
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are not properly recoverable as taxable costs pursuant to Rule 54(d) are recoverable pursuant to the
Shareholder Agreement.l
9.

To respond to Wasatch's objections to specific costs:
a.

Runner Fees. Runner fees were incurred in the ordinary course of business,

as appropriate, generally to provide hand delivery of pleadings, important documents, or sizable
documents to court and to opposing counsel. When mailing or faxing was appropriate, those
methods were preferred, particularly of correspondence between counsel.
b.

Photocopies. Photocopies were made, in the ordinary course of business, of

correspondence, pleadings, documents, and exhibits, to provide to the client or opposing counsel,
to maintain records for our files, and for use in discovery and at trial. The vast majority of
photocopies are for trial exhibits in October and November 1999. The price is S.18 per page, and
is recorded and allocated to Roger Eggett at the time the copy is made.
c.

Mediation Expenses. Although the Mediation was required by paragraph 9(i)

of the Employment Agreement, the parties agreed to mediate all claims and to attempt to resolve all
claims, including Eggett's claims pursuant to the Shareholder Agreement. Indeed, I prepared and
submitted to the mediator a Statement of Position that primarily addressed Eggett's right to book
value for his shares, and the facts and circumstances establishing that Wasatch terminated Eggett in
bad faith to deny him book value for his shares. The mediation primarily focused on these issues,
as well as Wasatch's defense that Eggett was properly terminated for cause because Eggett took
excessive compensation and abused his expense account. Again, these issues are inextricably
intertwined because one is a defense to the other.

^ n d e r Rule 54(d), costs are recoverable "only in the amounts and in the manner provided
by statute, and generally is restricted to those costs which are "required to be paid to the court and
to witnesses
" Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773-74 (Utah 1980). No such restriction
applies to a contractual provision. Pursuant to Rule 54(d), Eggett is submitting a separate Verified
Memorandum of Costs to establish an independent basis for an award of those costs.
4

d.

Long distance telephone calls. All long distance telephone calls were to

Roger Eggett at the Bear River Lodge, where he was employed, or to his home in Evanston,
Wyoming, where he moved to run the Bear River Lodge. They were necessary to prosecute Mr.
Eggett's claims.
e.

Deposition Costs. Wasatch complains that my Affidavit fails to specify

deposition costs, other than the costs associated with the Keith Painter, Curtis Chisholm, and David
Lillywhite depositions. To the contrary, paragraph 16.1. of the Affidavit and Exhibit L each specify
S438 as the court reporter fees for the Tod Cusick deposition. Wasatch cannot deny that the Cusick
deposition was used at trial. Wasatch argues that Eggett is not entitled to reimbursement for
transcripts of the Chisholm and Lillywhite depositions, because Wasatch took those depositions.
Wasatch cites no authority for the assertion and it makes no sense. No Utah authority excludes
deposition transcripts as a taxable cost, and Form 23 to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifially
includes as a taxable cost "deposition transcript." Regardless whether a deposition transcript is a
taxable cost, it is a recoverable costs pursuant to paragraph 19(c) of the Shareholder Agreement.
Chisholm and Lillywhite were non-party witnesses; their testimony was necessary to develop Eggett's
case. Eggett would have deposed them if Wasatch had not; and I questioned each witness on behalf
of Eggett.
f.

Witness Fees. The witness fees are as follows:

May 29, 1998

Service of Subpoena Duces Tecum
To Ernst & Young

$ 5.00

October 14, 1998

Service of Subpoena Duces Tecum
on Magna Energy

$ 38.00

October 28, 1999

Trial subpoenas for Keith Painter
and Curtis Chisholm

S 37.00

November 5, 1999

Service of Trial Subpoenas on Keith
Painter and Curtis Chisholm

S 85.00

5
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g.

Lexis Legal Research. This research was conducted by Mickell Jiminez, and

is identified in the billing statements for October and November 1999, Exhibits M and N to my initial
Affidavit. All of this research related to Eggett's claims under the Shareholder Agreement. To
summarize those entries, Ms. Jiminez researched wrongful termination issues, both to prepare jury
instructions and to anticipate issues and evidence that might be raised at trial. These included the
admissibility of after-acquired evidence as a justification for termination for cause; the right of an
employer to terminate an employee for cause after the employee has resigned; the right of members
of a board of directors to rely on reports from employees or other board members; the elements and
requirements of "bad faith" by members of the board of directors in performing their duties, including
terminating an officer or employee for cause, and the burden of proof on these issues. Ms. Jiminez
was required to use Lexis to research case law outside the states encompassed by the Pacific Reporter.
Moreover, in my opinion, use of electronic research is more efficient and less expensive than
requiring a lawyer to review regional treatises and other sources of case law.
h.

Use of Projector at Trial. As explained in my initial Affidavit, the projector

was necessary to present the documentary exhibits to the jury in an efficient and comprehensible
manner
10.

To eliminate ongoing dispute about these matters, however, I have reviewed the billing

records in light of Wasatch's objections, and make the following redactions to the fees and costs
identified in the initial Affidavit:
a.

August 28, 1997, "Meet with Roger Eggett to discuss revised fee agreement;

prepare revised fee agreement," 1.5 hours, $225.00;
b.

October 28, 1997, "Draft Reply to Counterclaim," 1.0 hour, SI50.00;

c.

November 25,1997, telephone conference with Eric Olson regarding request

for cooperation in United litigation; telephone conference with Roger Eggett regarding same," 0.5
hours, S75.00;
6

d.

September 4,1997, runner services to file Complaint in Second District Court

and to serve on Wasatch, $52.00 (again, because the Complaint was later filed in Third Diistrict
Court, Wasatch should not bear this expense).
e.
11.

October 9, 1998, Magna Energy Witness Fee S 17.00, duplicate billing.

I have made no similar redaction for discussion with Mr. Eggett regarding his non-

competition agreement, see Mem. Opp. at 5, because that discussion arose in the context of
negotiations to settle all claims. I have made no redaction regarding my review of correspondence
from David Lillywhite, Mem. Opp. at 5, because I reviewed that correspondence in the course of
determining whether Wasatch's purported termination of Eggett for cause was a pretext to deny him
book value for his shares. Finally, I have made no redaction for research relating to jury instruction,
or for responding to discovery requests, Mem. Opp. at 5, because those activies squarely related to
Eggett's claims for book value for his shares.
12.

The redactions identified in paragraph 10 total S519.00. This reduces Eggett's

requested costs and fees to 556,381.27.
Dated this

.of December, 1999.

Perriii R. Live/, Esq.v
On the ^ p d a y of December, 1999, Perrin R. Love, being first duly sworn under oath, stated
that he has read the foregoing Affidavit and knows the contents thereof and the same are true to the
best of his knowledge, except as to those matters stated to be alleged on information and belief, and
to those matters he believes them to be true.
V

V PUBLIC
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oarty's attorney fees incurred in a motion to
compel discovery. Affleck v. Third Judicial Dist.
Court, 655 P.2d 665 OJtah 1982;.
Cited in Hatch v. Renzo, 21 Utah 2d 144, 442
R2d 467 (1968); Poulsen v. Poulsen, 672 P.2d 97

I'IUJCKI^:

Rule ?JH

'Lv.ah 19H:JJ/: Synergetics v*x rei. Lancer Indus.,
Inc. v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 R2d 1106
'Utah 1985;; Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
973 R2d 932 'Utah 1998;.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Attorney's Fees in
Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments — Attorney's Fees, 1989
Utah L. Rev. 342.
Brigham Young Law Review. — The Use
of a Rule 37(b)(2XA.) Sanction to Establish In
Personam Jurisdiction, 1982 B.Y.U. L. Rev.
103.
A New Antidote for an Opponent's Pretrial
Discovery Misconduct: Treating the Misconduct
at Trial as an Admission by Conduct of the
Weakness of the Opponent's Case, 1993 B.Y.U.
L. Rev. 793.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions
and Discovery §§ 361 to 372.
C.J.S. — 27 C.J.S. Discovery §§ 53, 68, 86.
A.L.R. — Failure of party or his attorney to
appear at pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Dismissal of state court action for failure or
refusal of plaintiff to answer written interrogatories, 56 A.L.R.3d 1109.
Construction and application of state statute
or rule subjecting party making untrue allegations or denials to payment of costs or attor-

neys' fees, 68 A.L.R.3d 209.
Attorney's conduct in delaying or obstructing
discovery as basis for contempt proceeding, 8
A.L.R.4th 1181.
Judgment in favor of plaintiff in state court
action for defendant's failure to obey request or
order for production of documents or other
objects, 26 A.L.R.4th 849.
Dismissal of state court action for failure or
refusal of plaintiff to obey request or order for
production of documents or other objects, 27
A.L.R.4th 61.
Judgment in favor of plaintiff in state court
action for defendant's failure to obey request or
order to answer interrogatories or other discover:/ questions, 30 A.L.R~4th 9.
Dismissal of state court action for failure or
refusal of plaintiff to appear or answer questions at deposition or oral examination, 32
A.L.R.4th 212.
Sanctions for failure to make discovery under
Federal Civil Procedure Rule 37 as affected by
defaulting party's good faith attempts to comply, 2 A.L.R. Fed. 811.

PART VI. TRIALS
Rule 38. J u r y trial of right.
(a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the constitution
or as given by statute shall be preserved to the parties.
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of
right by a jury by paying the statutory jury fee and serving upon the other
parties a demand therefor in writing at any time after the commencement of
the action and not later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading
directed to such issue. Such demand may be endorsed upon a pleading of the
party.
(c) Same: specification of issues. In his demand a party may specify the
issues which he wishes so tried; otherwise he shall be deemed to have
demanded trial by jury for all the issues so triable. If he has demanded trial by
jury for only some of the issues, any other part}*, within 10 days after service
of the demand or such lesser time as the court may order, may serve a demand
for trial by jury of any other or all of the issues of fact in the action.
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to pay the statutory fee, to serve a demand
as required by this rule and to file it as required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a
waiver by him of trial by jury. A demand for trial by jury made as herein
provided may not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 38, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Constitutional guarantee, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 10.
Discretion to order jury trial in absence oi"

demand, U.R.C.P. 39<b\
Fees of jurors, § 21-5-1 et seq.
Jury provisions generally, § 78-46-1 et seq.
Statutory risrht to jury trial, $ 7S-21-1.
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Rule 48. Exceptions unnecessary.
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is
sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or
sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to take
or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds therefor; and, if a
party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made,
the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice him.
Compiler's Notes. — This: rile is substantially similar to Rule 46, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Objections to instructions to jury, U.R.C.P. 51.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Form of verdict
—Duty to examine and object.
In general.
Instructions.
— Right to object.
Harmless error.
Cited.
Form of verdict.

Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456 (Utah Ct. App.
1989), cert, denied, SCO P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).
Instructions.

— Duty to examine and object.
Counsel has the obligation not only to object
to the form of the verdict, but to affirmatively
seek to examine it; by failing to request court
permission to examine the verdict and make
objection to it, party waived any objection to the
verdict form. Martineau v. Anderson, 636 P.2d
1039 (Utah 1981).
In general.
To preserve a question for appeal, an objection must be clear and concise and made in a
fashion calculated to obtain a ruling thereon.

—Right to object.
theThe
instructions
to preserve
to their
parties have
a right to challenges
make objections
to
accuracy; if counsel was prevented from making objections to instructions, he should, under
this rule, be deemed to have done so. Hanks v.
Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564 (1960).
Harmless error.
If the instructions are correct, any error
which prevents counsel from making objections
thereto is harmless error. Hanks v.
Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564 (1960).
Cited in Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455
'Utah 1931); 3roberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate
Review § 614.
C.J.S. — 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 202 et
seq.

A.L.R. — Sufficiency in federal court of motion in limine to preserve for appeal objection to
evidence absent contemporary objection at
trial, 76 A.L.R. Fed. 619.

Rule 47. Jurors.
(a) Examination of jurors. The court may permit the parties or their
attorneys to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself
conduct the examination. In the latter event, the court shall permit the parties
or their attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as is
material and proper cr shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such
additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as is material and proper.
(b) Alternate jurors. The court may direct that one or two jurors in addition
to the regular panel be called and impaneled to sit as alternate jurors.
Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who,
prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or
disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the
same manner, shall have the same qualifications,, shall be subject to the same
examination and challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the same
functions, powers, facilities, and privileges as the principal jurors. An alternate
juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged after the jury
retires to consider its verdict. If one or two alternate jurors are called each
party is entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to those otherwise
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allowed. The additional peremptory challenge may be used only against an
alternate juror, and the other peremptory challenges allowed by law shall not
be used against the alternates.
(c) Challenge defined; by whom made. A challenge is an objection made to
the trial jurors and may be directed (1) to the panel or (2) to an individual juror.
Either party may challenge the jurors, but where there are several parties on
either side, they must join in a challenge before it can be made.
(d) Challenge to panel; time and manner of taking; proceedings. A challenge
to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from the forms
prescribed in respect to the drawing and return of the jury, or on the
intentional omission of the proper officer to summon one or more of the jurors
drawn. It must be taken before a juror is sworn. It must be in writing or be
stated on the record, and must specifically set forth the facts constituting the
ground of challenge. If the challenge is allowed, the court must discharge the
jury so far as the trial in question is concerned.
(e) Challenges to individual jurors; number of peremptory challenges. The
challenges to individual jurors are either peremptory or for cause. Each party
shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges, except as provided under
Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule.
(f) Challenges for cause; how tried. Challenges for cause may be taken on
one or more of the following grounds:
(1) A want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law to render a person
competent as a juror.
(2) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to either party, or to
an officer of a corporation that is a party.
(3) Standing in the relation of debtor and creditor, guardian and ward,
master and servant, employer and employee or principal and agent, to either
party, or united in business with either party, or being on any bond or
obligation for either party; provided, that the relationship of debtor and
creditor shall be deemed not to exist between a municipality and a resident
thereof indebted to such municipality by reason of a tax, license fee, or service
charge for water, power, light or other services rendered to such resident.
(4) Having served as a juror, or having been a witness, on a previous trial
between the same parties for the same cause of action, or being then a witness
therein.
(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of the juror in the result of the action, or
in the main question involved in the action, except his interest as a member or
citizen of a municipal corporation.
(6) That a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to the
cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging; but no
person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or expressed
an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, founded upon
public rumor, statements in public journals or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror can and will, notwithstanding such
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him.
Any challenge for cause shall be tried by the court. The juror challenged, and
any other person, may be examined as a witness on the trial of such challenge.
(g) Selection of jury. The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number ofjurors
that are to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for all
peremptory challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause sustained,
another juror shall be called to fill the vacancy before further challenges are
made, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause. When the
challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors
remaining, in the order called, and each side, beginning with the plaintiff, shall
indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn
until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then
call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to
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constitute the jury m the order in which they appear on the list, and the
persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury.
(h) Oath of jury. As soon as the jury is completed an oath must be
administered to the jurors, in substance, that they and each of them will well
and truly try the matter in issue between the parties, and a true verdict
rendered according to the evidence and the instructions of the court.
(i) Proceedings when juror discharged. If, after the jury is impaneled and
before verdict, a juror becomes unable or disqualified to perform his duty and
there is no alternate juror, the parties may agree to proceed with the other
jurors, or to swear a new juror and commence the trial anew. If the parties do
not so agree the court shall discharge the jury and the case shall be tried with
a new jury.
(j) View by jury. When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to
have a view of the property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place in
which any material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body
under the charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by
some person appointed by the court for that purpose. While the jury are thus
absent no person other than the person so appointed shall speak to them on
any subject connected with the trial.
(k) Separation ofjury. If the jurors are permitted to separate, either during
the trial or after the case is submitted to them, they shall be admonished by the
court that it is their duty not to converse with, or suffer themselves to be
addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their
duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally
submitted to them.
(1) Deliberation ofjury. When the case is finally submitted to the jury they
may decide in court or retire for deliberation. If they retire they must be kept
together in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree
upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Unless
by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge must not suffer
any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask
them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he must not, before the
verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their deliberations
or the verdict agreed upon.
(m) Papers taken by jury. Upon retiring for deliberation the jury may take
with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits and all papers which
have been received as evidence in the cause, except depositions or copies of
such papers as ought not, in the opinion of the court, to be taken from the
person having them in possession; and they may also take with them notes of
the testimony or other proceedings on the trial taken by themselves or any of
them, but none taken by any other person.
(n) Additional instructions of jury. After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there is a disagreement among them as to any part of the testimony, or
if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they may
require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon their being brought into
court the information required must be given in the presence of, or after notice
to, the parties or counsel. Such information must be given in writing or stated
on the record.
(o) New trial when no verdict given. If a jury is discharged or prevented from
giving a verdict for any reason, the action shall be tried anew.
(p) Court deemed in session pending verdict; verdict may be sealed. While
the jury is absent the court may be adjourned from time to time in respect to
other business, but it shall be open for every purpose connected with the cause
submitted to the jury, until a verdict is rendered or the jury discharged. The
court may direct the jury to bring in a sealed verdict at the opening of the court,
in case of an agreement during a recess or adjournment for the day.
(q) Declaration of verdict. When the jury or three-fourths of them, or such
other number as may have been agreed upon by the parties pursuant to Rule
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48, have agreed upon a verdict they must be conducted into court, their names
called by the clerk, and the verdict rendered by their foreman; the verdict must
be in writing, signed by the foreman, and must be read by the clerk to the jury,
and the inquiry made whether it is their verdict. Either party mayTequire the
jury to be polled, which shall be done by the court or clerk asking each juror if
it is his verdict. If, upon such inquiry or polling there is an insufficient number
ofjurors agreeing therewith, the jury must be sent out again; otherwise the
verdict is complete and the jury shall be discharged from the cause.
(r) Correction of verdict If the verdict rendered is informal or insufficient, it
may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be
sent out again.
(Amended effective January 1, 1998.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective January 1, 1998, substituted
"stated on the record" for "noted by the reporter" in the second sentence of Subdivision (d)
and for "taken down by the reporter" at the end
of Subdivision (n) and made stylistic changes.
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivision (a) of this

rule is similar to Rule 47(a), F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Jurors generally,
§ 78-46-1 et seq.
Three-fourths of jurors may find verdict in
civil case, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 10.
Witness, juror as, § 78-24-3; U.R.E. 606.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Additional instructions.
—Absence of counsel.
Prejudice.
—Entry of judge into jury room.
—Written response to inquiry.
Challenges for cause.
—Acquaintance with party.
— Bias or prejudice.
Malpractice.
Religious affiliation.
Waiver of right to challenge.
Wrongful death.
—Failure to remove juror when cause established.
Prejudicial error.
Correction of verdict.
—Award of damages.
Excess of maximum.
Travel expenses.
—Waiver of objection.
Insufficient on face.
Declaration of verdict.
— Impeachment.
— Intent of rule.
—Three-fourths concurrence.
Dissent.
Removal of municipal officer.
Deliberations.
— Impeachment of verdict.
—Knowledge of everyday affairs.
Examination.
—Judge's discretion.
— Preliminary questions.
Juror's misconduct.
No verdict.
— Directed verdict.
Papers taken by jurors.
—Depositions.
— Pleadings.
Introduction into evidence.
—X-rays.
Peremptory challenges.
—Number allowed.
Separation.

—Outside communication.
View of property or place.
—Condition in issue.
—Eminent domain.
Cited.
Additional instructions.
—Absence of counsel.
Prejudice.
Where, upon request of the jury, the trial
court brought the jury back into the courtroom,
explained apparently conflicting instructions,
told the jury to reread all instructions, and
offered future assistance if needed, unless appellant could show substantial or prejudicial
error, it was not error to have proceeded without appellant's counsel who had left the court
building. Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438 (Utah
1979).
— Entry of judge into jury room.
Where bailiff had informed trial judge that
jurors wanted advice on a certain point, it was
improper for judge to go into jury room to
advise them in absence of and without consent
of counsel. Johnson v. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268,
342 P.2d 884 (1959).
—Written response to inquiry.
Court's written response to an inquiry of the
jury which was simply a correct statement of
the law regarding the responsibilities of a jury
was not reversible error. Board of Comm'rs of
State Bar v. Petersen, 937 P.2d 1263 (Utah
1997).
Challenges for cause.
—Acquaintance with party.
In action by truck owner whose vehicle was
damaged when it struck defendant's cow on
highway, plaintiff's challenge of jurors for cause
on grounds they were acquainted with defendant and were engaged in raising livestock did

Rule 49
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Compiler's Notes.— This rule corresponds
to Rule 48, F.K.C.P.
rivilcase,
Cross-References. — Number of jurors,
§ 78-46-5.

Three-fourths of jurors may find verdict in
Utah Const.,.Art. 1, Sec. 10.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Effect of Rule 47(q).
Removal of municipal officer.

instruction as to the number of concurring
jurors required to reach a verdict. Madsen y.
Brown, 701 R2d 1086 (Utah 1985).

Effect of Rule 47(q)
Intent of U.R.C.P. 47(q) is to allow the parties
the opportunity to ensure that the requisite
number of jurors concurred in the verdict; it is
not a vehicle to bring into issue the courts

Removal of municipal officer.
F
R e m Q v a l of m u n i c i

al o f f i c e r d o e s n o t

ire

three-fourths
m a j o r i t y i s a c c e ptable. Madsen v. Brown, 701
p 2 d IQQQ (Utah 1985).

unanimous verdict by a jury; a

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 211 et
seq.
C.J.S. — 50 C.J.S. Juries § 123; 89 C.J.S.
Trial § 494.
A.L.R. — Validity of agreement, by stipula-

tion or waiver in state civil case, to accept
verdict by number or proportion of jurors less
than that constitutionally permitted, 15
A.L.R.4th 213.

Rule 49. Special verdicts and interrogatories,
(a) Special verdicts. The court may require a jury to return only a special
verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact. In that
event the court may submit to the jury written interrogatories susceptible of
categorical or other brief answer or may submit written forms of the several
special findings which might properly be made under the pleadings and
evidence; or it may use such other method of submitting the issues and
requiring the written findings thereon as it deems most appropriate. The court
shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the matter
thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings
upon each issue. If in so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the
pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by jury of the
issue so omitted unless before the jury retires he demands its submission to the
jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand the court may make a
finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in
accord with the judgment on the special verdict.
(b) General verdict accompanied by answer to interrogatories. The court may
submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general verdict,
written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of which is
necessary to a verdict. The court shall give such explanation or instruction as
may be necessary to enable the jury both to make answers to the interrogatories and to render a general verdict, and the court shall direct the jury both to
make written answers and to render a general verdict. When the general
verdict and the answers are harmonious, the appropriate judgment upon the
verdict and answers shall be entered pursuant to Rule 5SA. When the answers
are consistent with each other but one or more is inconsistent with the general
verdict, judgment may be entered pursuant to Rule 58Ain accordance with the
answers, notwithstanding the general verdict, or the court may return the jury
for further consideration of its answers and verdict or may order a new trial.
When the answers are inconsistent with each other and one or more is likewise
inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment shall not be entered, but the
court shall return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict
or shall order a new trial.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 49, F.R.C.P.
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(d) £/fec£ o/* satisfaction,. When a judgment shall have been satisfied, in
whole or m part, or as to any judgment debtor, and such satisfaction entered
upon the docket by the clerk, such judgment shall, to the extent of such
satisfaction, be discharged and cease to be a lien. In case of partial satisfaction,
if any execution shall thereafter be issued on the judgment, such execution
shall be endorsed with a memorandum of such partial satisfaction and shall
direct the officer to collect only the residue thereof, or to collect only from the
judgment debtors remaining liable thereon.
(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other counties. When any satisfaction
0 f a judgment shall have been entered on the judgment docket of the county
where such judgment was first docketed, a certified transcript of satisfaction,
or a certificate by the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed with the
clerk of the district court in any other county, where the judgment may have
been docketed. Thereupon a similar entry in the judgment docket shall be
made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall have the same effect as
in the county where the same was originally entered.
Compiler's Notes. — There is no federal
rule covering this subject matter.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Acceptance of full payment.
—Effect.
Attachment.
Vacation of satisfaction.
....
.
Acceptance of full payment.
Effect.
When plaintiff voluntarily accepted full payment of a judgment in his favor, the satisfaction
and discharge operated to satisfy and discharge
everything merged in and adjudicated by the
judgment. Sierra Nev. Mill Co. v. Keith O'Brien
Co., 48 Utah 12, 156 P. 943 (1916).

tial satisfaction of judgment to extent of money
collected through attachment proceeding.
Blake v. Farrell, 31 Utah 110, 86 P. 805 (1906).
Vacation of satisfaction.
T h e recorded sat;3faction of j u d g m e n t signed
by judgment creditor cannot be vacated without
action and hearing in equity, and the lien of an
attorney against the proceeds of the judgment
does not include his personal right to execute
against the judgment debtor. Utah C.V. Fed.
Credit Union v. Jenkins. 528 P.2d 1187 (Utah
1974).

Attachment.
Court had duty to make order directing parCOLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§ 1004 et seq.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584.

A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of
judgment against one joint tort-feasor as release of others, 40 A.L.R.Sd 11S1.

Rule 59. New trials; a m e n d m e n t s of j u d g m e n t .
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the
following causes; provided., however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party or any
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented
from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have
been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any
question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by
chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit
of any one of the jurors.

Rule 59
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(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under
the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or
that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than
10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made
under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit.
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served
with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period
not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties
by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the
court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 59, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Harmless error not
lot
ground for new trial, Rule 61.

Juror's competency as witness as to validity
of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence,
Rule 606.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Abandonment of motion.
Accident or surprise.
Arbitration awards.
Burden of proof.
Caption on motion for new trial.
Correction of insufficient or informal verdict.
Correction of record.
Costs.
Decision against law.
Discretion of trial court.
Effect of order granting new trial.
Effect of untimely motion.
Evidence.
—Insufficiency.
—Sufficiency.
Excessive or inadequate damages.
—Punitive damages.
Failure to object to findings of fact.
Failure to order discovery.
Filing of affidavits.
Grounds for new trial.
—Particularization in motion.
Improper statement by counsel.
Incompetence or negligence of counsel.
Misconduct of jury.
Motion to alter or amend judgment.
Motion to be presented to trial court.
Newly discovered evidence.
New trial on initiative of court.
Procedure for questioning grant of new trial.

Reconsideration of motion for new trial..
Sanctions.
Settlement bars appeal.
Summary judgment.
Time for motion.
Tolling time for appeal.
Waiver.
Cited.
Abandonment of motion.
Abandonment of motion for new trial must be
intentional, and the facts must indicate this
intention. Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d
1043 (Utah 1984).
Accident or surprise.
This section requires that the moving party
show that ordinary prudence was exercised to
guard against the accident or surprise. Powers
v. Gene's Bldg. Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174
(Utah 1977).
Plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial on the
basis of surprise concerning testimony of the
defendant's expert witness where the plaintiff
failed to object to the testimony either before, or
immediately after, it was given. Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977).
A "surprise" at trial which could have been
easily guarded against by utilization of available discovery procedures may not serve as a
ground for a new trial under Subdivison (a)(3).
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(1) the acts of its volunteers are not as described in Subsection 78-192(1) unless the nonprofit organization had, or reasonably should have had,
reasonable notice of the volunteer's unfitness to provide services to the
nonprofit organization under circumstances that make the .nonprofit
organization's use of the volunteer reckless or wanton in light of that
notice; or
(2) a business employer would not be liable under the laws of this state
if the act or omission were the act or omission of one of its employees.
History: C. 1953, 78-19-3, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 4, § 3.

CHAPTER 20
RESERVED
PART III
PROCEDURE

CHAPTER 21
ISSUES AND TRIAL
Section
78-21-1.
78-21-2.
78-21-3.

Right to jury trial.
Jury- to decide questions of fact.
Court to decide questions of law.

78-21-1. Right to j u r y trial.
In actions for the recovery of specific real or personal property, with or
without damages, or for money claimed as due upon contract or as damages for
breach of contract, or for injuries, an issue of fact may be tried by a jury, unless
a jury trial is waived or a reference is ordered.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-21-1.
Cross-References. — Demand for jury trial,
Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 10; Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 38(b).

Righttojury trial, Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 10;
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 38(a).
Waiver of jury trial, Utah Const. Art. I, Sec.
10; Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 38(d).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Consolidation of causes of action.
Discretion of trial court.
Powers and functions of jury.
Quiet title actions.
Rescission of instruments.
Right to jury trial.

Specific performance action.
~
. . , ,.
.
Consolidation of causes of action.
order
r
^
f° consolidation, for trial of the
issue of liability, of eleven actions involving
nineteen plaintiffs claiming damages against
the defendants did not violate this section.
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78-21-2

78-21-2. Jury to decide questions of fact.
All questions of fact, where the trial is by jury, other than those mentioned
in Section 78-21-3, are to be decided by the jury, and all evidence thereon is to
be addressed to them, except when otherwise provided.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-21-2; L. 1995, ch. 20, § 158.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "Section 78-21-3" for "the next section."
Cross-References. — Contents of writings,
recordings and photographs, determinations
for jury, U.R.E. Rule 1008.
Court submission of special findings to jury,
U.R.C.R Rule 49(a).

Court to charge that the jury are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact, U.R.C.R
Rule 51.
Trial by jury or court, U.R.C.R Rules 39(a) to
(0.
Verdict may be general or special, U.R.C.R
Rules 49(a), (b), 58A(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
determine; but when physical conditions and
the attending circumstances are such as to
render it highly improbable that they could
make the observation, the rule is otherwise.
Seybold v. Union Pac. R.R., 121 Utah 61, 239
P.2d 174 (1951).

ANALYSIS

Consolidation of causes of action.
Drawing of inferences.
Express warranty
Negative testimony.
Negligence.
Proximate causeQuiet title,
— BoundariesRight to jury trial
Cited.
Consolidation of causes of action.
The term *the jury" does not mean that one
and the same jury must try all the issues in a
case, but means that all questions of fact are to
be decided by the jury impaneled to try such
issues. Raggenbuck v. Suhrmann, 7 Utah 2d
327, 325 P.2d 258 (1958).
Drawing of inferences.
While juries are given great latitude in deducing inferences from established facts, they,
nevertheless, are not permitted to base an
inference upon an inference, nor may they,
without reason, overturn legal presumptions or
arbitrarily disregard positive statements of
witnesses. Karren v. Bair, 63 Utah 344, 225 P.
1094 (1924).
Express warranty.
The question of express warranty is properly
submitted to the jury where the evidence is
substantial and supports the essential elements which the plaintiff is required to prove.
Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Utah 339, 241
P-2d 914, 40 A.L.R.2d 273 (1952).
Negative testimony.
The weight of negative testimony of witnesses as to the giving of warning signals by
railroad employees ordinarily is for the jury to

Negligence.
Generally the degree of care which a person
must exercise for his own safety is a matter for
the jury. Eisner v. Salt Lake City, 120 Utah 675,
238 P.2d 416 (1950).
Ordinarily, questions of negligence present
questions of fact to be determined by the jury.
Poulsen v. Manness, 121 Utah 269, 241 P.2d
152 (1952).
Matters of negligence generally are jury
questions, unless the evidentiary facts are of
such conclusive character as to require all reasonable minds to conclude that the ultimate
fact of negligence does or does not exist. Gibbs
v. Blue Cab, Inc., 122 Utah 312, 249 P.2d 213
(1952), aff'd, 123 Utah 281, 259 P.2d 294 (1953).
P r o x i m a t e cause.
The question of proximate cause is a jury
question. Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Utah
339, 241 P.2d 914, 40 A.L.R.2d 273 (1952).
Matters of proximate cause generally are
jury questions, unless the evidentiary facts are
of such conclusive character as to require all
reasonable minds to conclude that the ultimate
fact of proximate cause does or does not exist.
Gibbs v. Blue Cab, Inc., 122 Utah 312, 249 P.2d
213 (1952), aff'd, 123 Utah 281, 259 P.2d 294
(1953).
Quiet title.
— Boundaries.
Trial court, in a quiet title action, properly
submitted to the jury the question of the actual
location of a disputed boundary corner. Hansen
v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988).
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Right to jury trial.
Bight to have the jury pass upon issues of fact
does not include the right to have a cause
submitted to the jury in hope of a verdict where
the facts undisputably show that the plaintiff is
not entitled to relief. Raymond v. Union Pac.
R.R., 113 Utah 26, 191 P.2d 137 (1948).

Where there is substantial contradictory evidence on both sides, the case must be given to
the jury. Finlayson v. Brady, 121 Utah 204, 240
P.2d 491 (1952).
Cited in Home Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 817 P.2d 341 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 75AAm. Jur. 2d Trial § 719.
C.J.S. - 88 C.J.S. Trial § 203 et seq.
AX.R. — Failure to comply with statute
regulating travel by pedestrian along highway

as affecting right to recovery for injuries or
death resulting from collision with automobile,
45 A.L.R.3d 658.
Key Numbers. — Trial «=» 134 et seq.

78-21-3. Court to decide questions of law.
All questions of law, including the admissibility of evidence, the facts
preliminary to such admission, the construction of statutes and other writings,
and the application of the rules of evidence are to be decided by the court and
all discussions of law addressed to it. Whenever the knowledge of the court is
by law made evidence of a fact, the court is to declare such knowledge to the
jury, who are bound to accept it.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-21-3.
Cross-References. — Contents of writings,

recordings and photographs, determinations by
court, Rules of Evidence, Rule 1008.
Judicial notice, Rules of Evidence, Rule 201.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Interpretation of statute.
Meaning of the phrase "domestic or family
remedies" in a statute delineating acts constituting the practice of medicine was a matter for
determination by the court, not the jury. State
v. Yee Foo Lun, 45 Utah 531,147 P. 488 (1915).

ANALYSIS

Existence of agency.
Interpretation of statute.
Legal effect of written instrument.
Cited.
Existence of agency.
Where evidence in support of a particular
agency is undisputed, the question of existence
of agency is one of law for the court, but, where
such agency is disputed, the question of the
agency's existence is a mixed question of law
and fact to be determined by the jury.
McCornick v. Queen of Sheba Gold Mining &
Milling Co., 23 Utah 71, 63 P. 820 (1900).

Legal effect of written instrument.
The legal effect of a written instrument is for
the determination of the court as a matter of
law. Verdi v. Helper State Bank, 57 Utah 502,
196 P. 225, 15 A.L.R. 641 (1921).
Cited in Hansen v. Stewart, 761 R2d 14
(Utah 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
§§ 717, 718.

75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial
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C.J.S. - 88 C.J.S. Trial § 300.
Key Numbers. - Trial e=» 213.

